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ABSTRACT 
A History of Liberal Education and Liberalism: 
The Traditional Humanist in Conflict with 
the Liberal Ideologue 
(February 1986) 
Richard A. Farrell, University of Wisconsin 
M.Ed., Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor David Schuman 
In this century much has been written about the "search for a 
common learning" and whether or not the liberal tradition should be 
buried or can be revived. This dissertation shows that there are in 
fact two liberal traditions and our discussion of these issues have 
been confused by our failure to distinguish between the two. One 
liberal tradition is essentially educational in nature, inspired by 
the life of ancient Greece and formalized for centuries as the liberal 
arts. The second is essentially political in nature and stems from 
the thought of John Locke and the philosophes of the Enlightenment. 
The two traditions have been in conflict over the course of this 
country's history, the former attempting to preserve a traditional 
sense of liberal education and the latter serving to reshape the ideal 
of liberal education to fit the tenets of liberalism. 
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The dissertation shows that the two traditions have become 
confused through the rise of liberalism and its success in shaping the 
structure of higher education and educational thought through the 
university movement in the last century and the progressive education 
movement in this century. The dissertation traces the history of both 
liberal traditions and shows how the tenets of liberalism have come to 
permeate present day discussions about liberal education. The world 
views of the ancient Greeks, Renaissance humanists, American Puritans, 
and American liberals are compared and contrasted, with a particular 
emphasis on the relationship between Puritanism and liberalism. The 
Puritans initiated and maintained their version of liberal education 
for over two-hundred years and it was this curious situation that made 
liberalism seem, in comparison, to represent the "true" vision of 
liberal education. Like the Puritans, liberals have reconstructed the 
concept of liberal education to suit their own purposes, and this 
reconstruction is examined. 
The dissertation concludes with suggestions to traditional 
humanists for reviving the humanist ideal of liberal education. The 
point is made that rather than concentrating upon plans for shared 
learning humanists must first recreate a common language with which to 
discuss liberal education and, to avoid confusion this language must 
be distinguished from that of liberalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If we hope to live not just from moment to moment, 
but in true consciousness of our existence, then 
our greatest need and most difficult achievement is 
to find meaning in our lives. It is well known how 
many have lost the will to live, and have stopped 
trying, because such meaning has evaded them. An 
understanding of the meaning of one's life is not 
suddenly acquired at a particular age, not even 
when one has reached chronological maturity. On 
the contrary, gaining a secure understanding of 
what the meaning of one's life may or ought to be-- 
this constitutes having attained psychological 
maturity. 
Bruno Bettelheim 
The debate about technical training versus liberal 
arts really misses the point. We need to rethink 
the whole idea of what education adds to--or 
subtracts from—any single person. It is time that 
a college education provides a chance for a student 
to really begin and practice what the student 
thinks best. 
David Schuman 
This study is motivated by the belief that education should help 
the individual develop a meaningful perspective on his or her own 
life. We are familiar with the critiques of modern Western society, 
the emphasis on the alienation of the individual, the "future shock 
of rapidly expanding knowledge, the breakdown of traditional ties. It 
seems that individuals are more than ever in need of help in finding 
meaning in their lives and that despite all of our talk of meeting 
student needs, we concentrate least upon this one. As elusive as the 
1 
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question of meaning is, we can consider the ways in which education 
either adds to or subtracts from the individual's sense of meaning. 
When speaking of meaning in relation to education we often refer 
to "liberal education." About 150 years ago this term had a meaning 
that was generally shared by those who discussed education; however, 
this meaning has been become muddled through the numerous adaptations 
of the concept to the circumstances of twentieth century life. Even 
so, the promise of liberal education is often articulated by 
educators, a promise that one is better off developing a general 
knowledge rather than a specialized one, for gradually this general 
knowledge will become integrated into a meaningful perspective on 
life. Though this integration is the most problematic step of the 
process, educators give it little attention. We seem to assume that 
with maturity we will integrate this knowledge into a meaningful 
perspective. Bettelheim seems to suggest something different, that 
psychological maturity i_s this meaningful perspective. 
Allow me to use myself as an example. By general standards I 
had as good a liberal education as most before entering graduate 
school. A history major at the University of Wisconsin, I had a broad 
course of study and a few inspiring teachers. I proceeded to 
supplement this formal education through travel, various kinds of 
work, and sel f-expl oration through acting and therapy. Yet, I 
returned to school sensing that something was missing, not sure that 
this "something" was possible to find there, but with the hope of 
integrating knowledge and experience in a satisfying way. 
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The public explanation for my return to school was the need to 
"retool" myself to be better able to compete in the job market. Given 
the few work prospects in foundations of education departments, this 
could not have been my primary motive, but it sounded more sensible 
and mature than saying; "I am groping for meaning." In retrospect, I 
see that I was searching for my own aesthetic sense, which David 
Schuman describes as "the critical cord that ties life together." I 
had believed in the promise of a liberal education, but the promise 
had yet to be fulfilled. 
Looking back upon my own liberal education I admit that it did 
give me a broad understanding of many fields of knowledge, did compel 
me to think about things, and to realize how little I know. My 
liberal education had taught me to question, to be skeptical, to see 
other points of view, but it did not give me that aesthetic sense, 
that critical cord with which to tie things together. Instead it 
overwhelmed me with how little I knew and how much there is to know. 
Many think that this is exactly what a good education should teach, 
but such a realization does not simply teach one a proper humility; it 
also teaches despair of ever knowing enough to act. 
I am not alone in feeling that my education has failed to give 
me sufficient help in making sense of the world. A recent article in 
The Chronicle of Higher Education states that "a growing number of 
adults, many of them older people with college degrees" are returning 
to study the liberal arts. The author then speculates upon their 
moti vations-"an attractive alternative to the singles bar," or 
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"successful lawyers and other professional people want programs that 
cover what they did not get initially," or "as one gets older, one 
ponders the eternal verities more." I speculate that a number of 
these students feel a more pressing need than the author recognizes, 
that they, like myself, are looking for that critical cord, but I 
doubt that a course or two in the liberal arts will be of much help. 
The habits of mind, categories of thought, assumptions and 
values that are dominant in our society work against our developing 
our own points of view, our own aesthetic senses. We share a 
collective point of view based upon a system of biases that we hold as 
assumed truths; grouped together they have been called the liberal 
ideology. Collectively we think in terms of progress, reform, 
welcoming new knowledge and diversity. We are individualistic, 
pragmatically realistic, believing in greater opportunities for all, 
reason, compromise, diversity, toleration, and we strive to understand 
all points of view. The problem is that we seem better able to see 
the points of view of others and to compromise than we are able to 
distinguish our own point of view and advocate it--unless, of course, 
one's own point of view accords closely with liberalism. 
Liberalism provides three basic points of view, three brands of 
meaning, through our education. One is centered upon striving for 
success--!iberal individualism; a second stresses one's contribution 
to a more perfect society-liberal humanitarianism; the third and most 
recent emphasizes personal exploration, self-acceptance, and 
clarification of val ues-1 i beral psychological humanism. Having 
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explored these paths I have come to believe that none of these 
perspectives--or a combination of them--can give me the meaningful 
perspective that I have sought through my liberal education. 
By experiencing and studying the history of liberal education I 
have come to realize that the concept is incompatible with our liberal 
ideology in important ways. Understanding the nature of this 
incompatibility is difficult, for it is obscured by the rhetoric of 
freedom and possibility of liberalism and the liberals' partially 
successful transformation of liberal education to fit the liberal 
mind-set. Since one finds only occasional mention of the distinctions 
between liberalism and liberal education in the literature on the 
latter--only as asides--the significance of these differences goes 
largely unnoticed. 
Gilbert Highet provides an example of such an aside in The 
Immortal Profession. While discussing the qualities of a liberal 
teacher-- "liberal" as in liberal education--he feels obliged to 
insert: "The word 'liberal' has frequently been misused by political 
writers. It has been suggested that a liberal education ought to be 
controlled by the principles of those political parties which preempt 
the word 'liberal' in their titles or their programs. This is a 
mistake, and a dangerous mistake."^ Highet warns us but goes no 
further with the issue. 
How does one differentiate liberal education from liberalism? 
David Schuman's study on the meaning of higher education helped me to 
begin to distinguish between the two. Using interviews totaling 
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"about twenty hours apiece," Schuman concludes that, "People who do 
best in the world...are those who have a sense of what they think is 
most beautiful, what is aesthetically pleasing." And he suggests that 
college as it is now structured seems to give little help in this 
regard. Schuman attributes this to our liberal vision of the market¬ 
place of ideas, in which truth is supposed to prevail in open 
competition. He feels this view is unrealistic: "We know that in the 
academy, academics fight for power so that their ideas will win, 
instead of the other way around." Rather than working to bring 
students closer to the "truth," the marketplace of ideas produces many 
truths making "the student divide himself or herself into parts: a 
history part; a science part; a social science part. Five courses, 
five truths, and five selves." And Schuman concludes: "The structure 
of college is such that the student learns, quite naturally, many 
visions of the truth. In the end it makes it very difficult to see 
the world in any kind of unified way, or to know who you are in it."^ 
Masked by the idealization of the marketplace of ideas, the education 
that our universities actually provide runs exactly opposite to the 
"connected vision" that has been central to the concept of liberal 
education. 
Let us consider another significant difference between liberal 
education and liberalism. The key to liberal education has been the 
teacher, the educated individual directing the uneducated, not simply 
through subject matter but by example. One developed a thoughtful 
perspective by spending time with teachers who exemplified it. The 
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teacher's moral authority is central to the tradition of liberal 
education, and if the teacher abuses his or her authority or is 
unworthy of it then the teacher should be replaced, not the idea of 
authority itself. However, the liberal's mistrust of authority has 
been combined with his optimism about human nature to glorify the idea 
of self-directed learning, which has been the rationale for electives 
at the college level and progressive education at lower levels. (It 
might be that this emphasis on self-directed learning is simply our 
admission that we ourselves do not fare well at making sense of the 
world, and so have little to teach in this regard.) The glorification 
of self-directed learning only further confuses us in our attempts to 
offer or find a meaningful education. We have lost a sense of liberal 
education through the habits of mind of our liberalism; although the 
two share the word "liberal," the attitudes of mind are essentially 
different. 
In the conclusion of his study, David Schuman suggests that we 
replace the idea of the university as a marketplace of ideas with "a 
multiplicity of 'pure' institutions," in which "structure, ethics, 
ideology, and outlook should be coordinated." With serious 
playfulness he suggests the possibility of an Ultra-Conservative 
University, a Freudian University, a Capitalist University, even (a) 
Liberal University."^ Such a suggestion clarifies, perhaps by 
exaggeration, the fact that there are many other assumptions and 
values included in the liberal ideology that also contradict or 
distract from the traditional concept of liberal education. In order 
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to develop a sense of what liberal education can be in our times we 
must distinguish it from liberalism, including our own. 
In the first chapter I will describe the nature of our present 
confusion between liberalism and liberal education, and how this 
confusion prevents us from seeing the possibilities of a meaningful 
liberal education. I will begin by describing the loss of traditional 
beliefs in religion and philosophy that once gave a sense of meaning 
and purpose to life. I will then describe the insights traditional 
liberal education has to offer and how these insights are lost in our 
confusion between liberalism and liberal education. I will support 
this contention by describing the general nature of discussion 
regarding liberal education today, indicating how this discussion is 
more reflective of liberalism than traditional liberal education. I 
will conclude by describing the gap in our historical perception of 
liberal education, and suggest that we must examine the history of the 
concept to understand our present confusion. 
Having described the nature of the problem in the first chapter, 
in the second I will describe the Greek spirit which has inspired the 
admiration of the humanist over the centuries and in turn given life 
to the tradition of liberal education. In doing so, I will 
distinguish between the spirit of liberal education and its 
formalization in the liberal arts and systematic philosophy, and will 
show how the spirit was lost in the process of formalization. A sense 
of this spirit will be important in later chapters when we examine 
liberal education from the perspectives of Renaissance humanists. 
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American Puritans, and American liberals. We will compare and 
contrast their spirits with that of the Greeks, and in turn judge 
whether or not their education should be called liberal education. 
In the third chapter I will describe the humanist revival of the 
Greek spirit in the Renaissance and the Calvinism that evolved out of 
humanism. The general purpose is to explain how the humanists were 
largely in accord with the Greek spirit while the Calvinists were not. 
This is an important difference since Calvinists initiated liberal 
education in this country and controlled its practice for over 200 
years. 
In the fourth chapter I will examine the nature of this 
Calvinist, or Puritan, mind and its version of liberal education, 
since it was the curious nature of a Puritan liberal education that 
made the liberal seem to be the "true" advocate of liberal education. 
In order to understand the Puritan version of liberal education I will 
examine the founding of Harvard College, both its purposes and 
operating principles. 
In the fifth chapter I will trace the decline in Puritan 
influence on liberal education along with the rise of the liberal 
perspective. I will show how the central issues in American higher 
education have revolved around the struggle between Puritanism and 
liberalism. I will also show how in this century the advocates of a 
traditional sense of liberal education were forced to contend with a 
new version of the concept based upon 20th century liberalism, and how 
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with the ascendancy of the progressive movement in education and 
politics the old sense of the term became confused with the new. 
Having clarified our confusion between liberal education and 
liberalism education, I will conclude with a few suggestions for 




^Gilbert Highet, The Immortal Profession: The Joys of Teaching 
and Learning (New York; Weybright and Talley, 1976)," p. 46.-^ 
2 
David Schuman, Policy Analysis, Education, and Evervdav life 
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1962)', pp. 233-241.-^- 
^Ibid. 
CHAPTER I 
LIBERALISM AND THE LOST MEANING OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 
The humanist tradition of liberal education has much to offer 
those of us who believe that education should help individuals make 
more sense of their lives, but it does not fit well with our modern 
biases which since the seventeenth century have been increasingly 
based upon a scientific search for truth. From the scientific 
perspective the "eternal verities" often associated with liberal 
education are now thought of as mere personal opinions and 
consequently carry much less weight than the verifiable discoveries of 
science. And hand in hand with science, liberalism has grown, the 
primary cause of our lost sense of liberal education. With the rise 
of liberalism the concept of liberal education increasingly became 
confused with an education in liberalism. Education was increasingly 
defined and conceived of in the terms of liberalism, with its emphasis 
upon individualism, scientific knowledge, and the new over the old. 
The general purpose of this chapter is to explain why traditional 
humanism might in fact have insights to offer us regarding a 
meaningful education, and then to describe how liberalism interferes 




The Problem of Meaning in Our Time 
We live at a time when it is particularly difficult to find an 
explanation of life that we find meaningful, a sense of belonging to 
this world. A meaningful explanation of life helps make one feel at 
home in the world, while alienation is the feeling of being isolated 
from, of not being a part of this world, and in turn not feeling at 
home in it. In this section I will expand upon this point with the 
help of three humanists: Hannah Arendt, Michael Denneny, and William 
Barrett. 
My images of homelessness stem from the thought of Hannah Arendt 
as does much of the following sketch of our contemporary malaise. 
When she speaks of the "world" she is referring not merely to the 
natural world but to a world made human by speaking and thinking about 
it. Traditionally this world was interpreted through transcendent 
ideas such as God, immortality, and freedom and it is our loss of such 
interpretation which underlies our pervasive sense of meaningless¬ 
ness. As Michael Denneny adds, it was the "accepted assumption of 
Western thought that the world around us (Becoming) could be 
understood only through the illumination of a transcendent, 
intelligible world (Being)." As tenuous as this invisible "world" of 
ideas was, the belief in them provided the ground for the traditional 
authority of religion and philosophy, which maintained a meaningful 
explanation of life, via religion for the many and philosophy for the 
few. 
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Since Descartes we have developed a modern way of thinking which 
no longer tries to tie us to the natural world but instead divides us 
from it. With Descartes thinking about the world became divided into 
an objective material world and our subjective responses to it. The 
sense of human reality which had traditionally tied the natural world 
to an invisible "world" of ideas gave way to a sense of reality which 
conformed to that which could be empirically tested. The pursuit of 
knowledge, which had been directed by a sense of ideals intuited from 
the invisible realm of ideas became restricted to a knowledge of the 
material world. Transcendent ideas were reduced to a matter of 
personal subjectivity.^ Without the explanations provided by both 
religion and philosophy each of us is left with the task of making 
sense of things alone without the aid of general concepts or universal 
rules. 
Voltaire said something to the effect that if there were no God 
man would invent one. If not a God, certainly a secular faith was 
developed along with the rise of science, a faith based upon the 
belief that science could both enlighten the human condition and 
improve it. Thus, while the traditional ways of making sense of the 
world were in decline this modern faith sustained many individuals 
with the belief that if we were only free of the superstitions of 
religion and other traditional constraints a more perfect world could 
be built guided by the discoveries of science. While there still are 
some who seem to find their sense of meaning in this philosophy the 
idea of progress no longer seems to stir the imagination as it did in 
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the late nineteenth century. There has been much questioning over the 
past thirty years over the nature of that which we have assumed to be 
progress, combined with the more current sense that we do not seem to 
be progressing in any sense of the term, except technologically. 
We go about our lives in a world that lacks the sense of 
permanence provided by either a transcending order of ideas, or a 
stable material world, or even the permanence of nature. With the 
rise of the scientific mind nature has become viewed as something 
simply to be exploited and controlled, to the point that there are now 
a number of endangered species, including ourselves. Without a sense 
of permanence in either things, nature, or ideas it is very difficult 
to feel at home in the world and to find meaning in life.^ 
This then is our modern human predicament, and there is an 
additional dimension to the problem which William Barrett describes in 
The Illusion of Technique. Barrett points out that not only is this 
problem of meaning a difficult one for us to grapple with at this 
time, but that few of those who might be expected to give us help in 
this regard, the professional philosophers, even address the issue. 
With the rise of scientific thought and its subsequent application to 
all fields of human endeavor, ideas have all become instrumental in 
nature, all a means to the end of controlling the material world. We 
suffer from an "illusion of technique," believing our primary problems 
are technical in nature and can be solved by improved techniques. 
Barrett cites Buckminster Fuller as a representative of this way of 
thinking. Fuller's position is that technology has created grave 
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problems as well as many benefits, so we must perfect our technology, 
create a more comprehensive technology, a technological utopia, or 
technology will lead us to oblivion. Barrett argues that even if this 
technological utopia were realized, it would still fail to give our 
lives a sense of significance: "With life become [sic] empty and 
sterile, even while mechanically perfect, we might very well find that 
utopia and oblivion coincide." 
Rather than improved techniques Barrett argues that we need 
ideas that make a difference in our lives, ideas that "may not serve 
so much as an instrument we use but as something into whose service we 
are called." Stated another way, we need ideas that inspire us at 
least to some extent in the way that the idea of "God" once did. 
In particular he talks about the idea of "being" which as we 
noted earlier, was traditionally considered the highest concept in 
Western philosophy, but now is largely ignored by most English and 
American philosophers. They too suffer from the illusion of technique 
and are busy tidying up philosophy into a science, preoccupied with 
linguistic analysis, telling us what we mean by what we say rather 
than attempting to come to grips with the issue of meaning in its 
deeper sense. These philosophers argue that answers to these 
questions are, strictly speaking, unknowable.-^ 
I have turned to the humanists because individuals such as 
Arendt and Barrett are willing to reflect upon these issues while few 
others are. As if in response to the reluctance of the analytical 
philosophers to think about the unknowable, Hannah Arendt has asserted 
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that "men have an inclination, perhaps a need, to think beyond the 
limitations of knowledge, to do more with this ability than to use it 
as an instrument for knowing and doing." Let us now take an initial 
look at the tradition from which such thought sterns.^ 
Meaning and the Humanist Perspective on Liberal Education 
A university education "is concerned not merely to 
keep an intellectual inheritance intact, but to be 
continuously recovering what has been lost, 
restoring what has been neglected, collecting 
together what has been dissipated, making more 
intelligible, reissuing and reinvesting." 
Michael Oakeshott 
Michael Oakeshott suggests a key element in the humanist 
attitude of mind, the tendency to search the past to make the best of 
it still alive to the present.^ As Hannah Arendt describes this 
attitude, it "knows how to take care and admire the things of the 
world." Engagement with the world through thinking and caring about 
it, and in turn feeling a part of it, gives the humanist a sense of 
meaning. When Arendt, Barrett, and Denneny discuss meaninglessness, 
they do so in a meaningful way in illuminating what has been lost, 
clearing the ground of our confusion and prompting us to think about 
it. 
While "humanism" has come to mean different things to different 
people in this century, it had a singular meaning to the historical 
scholar who coined the term in the last century. It was used to 
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describe the spirit of the renaissance scholars who had 
enthusiastically rediscovered many of the great works of ancient 
Greece and Rome. These scholars were particularly inspired by 
Cicero s portrayal of the human ideal of the Greeks, which he called 
"humanitas," and since Renaissance scholars often referred to this 
"humanitas," in their own works, 19th century historians labelled them 
'humanists." Thus, in the original sense of the term, "humanism" 
referred to those who looked to the Greeks for "that ideal pattern of 
humanity which stirs our imagination," in the words of Werner Jaeger.^ 
Even among traditionalists this meaning has been broadened in this 
century to include the great works and deeds of the past, in general, 
although ancient Greece tends to be given preeminence. 
In the following pages, I will use "humanist" and "humanism" to 
refer not simply to the Renaissance scholars but to the tradition 
which they embodied, a tradition characterized by study and reflection 
upon great human works and acts prompted by the desire to find a 
pattern of humanity that inspires. In this loose sense of the term, 
Socrates may be considered a humanist as well, for he is the paradigm 
of the individual thinking about life, and he has been particularly 
admired for his refusal to give up either his thinking or his 
conversing with others about it, even though this refusal cost him 
his life. 
As with humanists who have followed him, Socrates' thought was 
inspired by "admiring wonder" at the acts of his fellow Greeks. 
Seeing just or courageous deeds inspired him to ask what is justice 
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and what is courage? Socrates attempted to discover the ultimate aim 
of life by exploring the meaning of what we now call concepts. As 
Hannah Arendt suggests, the basic Socratic question was: What do we 
mean by such words as "courage" or "justice" or "beauty" or 
"excellence"? And to this Arendt incisively adds that our inability 
to give exact answers to these questions does not diminish the 
original sense of wonder, but reinforces it. 
How marvelous that men can perform courageous or 
just deeds even though they do not know, can give 
no account of, what courage and justice are.' 
Despite the fact that such discussions do not bring a clear knowledge 
of the nature of courage or justice or excellence, one feels enriched 
by them. According to the philosopher J. Glenn Gray, such 
conversations satisfy our "hunger for the sense and significance of 
human life in terms of the relations we can discover between the world 
of appearance and the world of thought." Stated another way, as we 
relate the particularities of our lives to concepts such as beauty or 
excellence or friendship we give those concepts real content and make 
them our own. Over time this develops our sense of taste, which in 
turn shapes a point of view. It is my sense that this development of 
one's individual judgment is a fruitful pathway towards a meaningful 
perspective on lifej we may feel gratified by what we choose to honor 
and what we chose to despise, and in turn make choices which give our 
Q 
lives a sense of meaning.^ 
In this initial sketch of the humanist attitude of mind, I have 
implied an emphasis on thinking over knowing. I have done so in the 
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light of an important distinction made by Hannah Arendt about a decade 
ago between the need to think and the need to know. She argued that 
thinking is ultimately a quest for meaning while knowing is a quest 
for truth. In the quest for meaning, thinking transcends the 
limitations of knowledge. Therefore, the criteria of "certainty and 
evidence" that we apply to our quest for truth are not the ultimate 
criteria to be applied to our quest for meaning. In other words, 
there are certain matters worth thinking about despite the fact that 
they are unknowable.^ According to J. Glenn Gray, Arendt was the 
first to clearly make this distinction between truth and meaning, 
although it was implied by both Kant and Heidegger. 
Although Gray noted that "it will likely require years for the 
implications of her insight to be realized in full," one implication 
is that this insight placed the old works on liberal education in a 
new light.While a liberal education has always implied an 
attainment of a broad knowledge, humanists have always implied that 
the aim of liberal education was more than the attainment of knowledge 
per se. Plato spoke of the highest form of knowledge, and Aristotle 
of a "liberal knowledge" that gives pleasure in itself. Cicero spoke 
of a philosophic attitude that resulted from liberal studies. Newman 
spoke of an "enlarged mentality" which provided one with the capacity 
to make judgments. This is summed by Whitehead: 
You cannot be wise without some basis of knowledge; 
but you may easily acquire knowledge and remain 
bare of wisdom...(which)...is the way knowledge is 
held. It concerns the handling of knowledge, its 
selection for the determination of relevant issues. 
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its employment to add value to our immediate 
experience. 
Therefore, in the light of Arendt's distinction, while these 
humanists often spoke in terms of knowledge, I think they were 
actually emphasizing thought and its relation to judgment. The aim of 
liberal education was always defended in terms of knowledge, because 
thinking was assumed to be a quest for knowledge, primarily a 
philosophic knowledge, a knowledge related to Plato's ideal forms. As 
I have already indicated with the rise of science this form of 
knowledge was discredited, and since now "knowledge" is the province 
of science rather than traditional philosophy, Arendt's distinction 
seems all the more important. 
Education within a framework of tests and grades puts a premium 
upon knowledge. What if we reversed this emphasis? An education 
guided by the quest for meaning would be shaped differently than that 
guided by the pursuit of truth. And the difference captures a key 
distinction between liberal education, which emphasizes thinking in 
the quest for meaning, and liberalism education, which emphasizes the 
attainment of knowledge, and the application of knowledge to problem 
solving. While we may refashion the world through knowledge, we make 
a home out of it through thought. 
However, before we can think about and discuss this matter of a 
liberal education aimed at meaning, we must first free ourselves from 
the liberal ideology that confuses our thought on the topic. Within 
the framework of our liberal ideology, liberal education has been 
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misconstrued to seem like an education in liberalism. I will now 
begin to describe the nature of this confusion. 
Liberal Education and Liberalism 
For over a decade, it has been argued that the 
liberal arts no longer liberate, that indeed the 
liberal tradition itself is either dying or dead. 
If the latter is true, the obituary will be hard to 
phrase, for the concept of liberal education is 
ambiguous. 
Clifton Conrad and Jean Wyer 
Liberal Education in Transition^^ 
The concept of liberal education has always been ambiguous for 
it has revolved around ideas such as excellence, freedom, and wisdom, 
which are themselves ani)iguous. The problem with the concept today is 
not its inherent ambiguity, but the fact that this ambiguity has given 
way to incoherence. The source of this incoherence is the confusion 
of liberal education with liberalism. In this section I will discuss 
the causes and nature of this confusion, indicating differences 
between the traditional humanist's vision of liberal education and 
that which has evolved out of liberalism. 
Conrad and Wyer seems to share the confusion in referring to the 
tradition of liberal education as the "liberal tradition." As most 
commonly used the "liberal tradition" refers to the political 
philosophy of liberalism that has had an increasing influence on 
Western educational thought over the past two hundred years. However, 
this liberal tradition has its roots in the Enlightenment, not in 
ancient Greece, and is separate from the tradition of liberal 
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education. A primary source of our confusion between the two stems 
from the curious origins of liberal education in this country. It was 
initiated and promulgated for over two hundred years by Puritans who 
rejected the whole pagan theory of life," in the words of the 
historian Harry Elmer Barnes. The liberal tradition in education 
developed out of this Puritanism and has been aimed at freeing 
education from its constraints. However, liberals had relatively 
little interest in the traditional concept of liberal education. In 
other words, the choice in America has been between liberal education 
in the hands of Puritans, or a liberalism education which either 
ignores or distorts the concept of liberal education to fit the 
assumptions and values of liberalism. 
It is important to distinguish between the two traditions 
because each reflects a distinctive mind-set. The mind-set of liberal 
education is best represented by the humanist whose primary 
educational concern is to introduce students to the life of the mind, 
to arouse in them the love of thought, and to persuade them to think 
through their experiences. The liberal, on the other hand, is 
primarily concerned with the perfection of society and the role that 
education can play in this. Thus, the humanist has tried to encourage 
thinking about such thought-things as excellence, freedom, and 
justice, while the liberal has been "bound up with the spirit of 
reform, a sense that education could be consciously arranged to make 
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American society more open, more just, and more democratic." 
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The liberal has attempted to make the tenets of political 
liberalism serve as the guideposts of education. Thus, we have 
President Charles Eliot of Harvard defending the elective principle in 
the last century by arguing that liberty is the best education for 
liberty, and we have the progressive education movement in this 
century making the classroom into a micro-democracy where one learns 
to be cooperative. More recently President Adele Simmons of Hampshire 
College suggested that "the complexity of social and environmental 
i ssues... di c tates interdisciplinary attempts to solve them and 
underscores the value of interdisciplinary training."^^ These various 
attempts at shaping education into an instrument for creating good 
citizens and solving our social problems are examples of liberalism 
education, not liberal education. 
The situation has been further confused by a split within the 
liberal mind itself between an emphasis on the freedom of the 
individual on the one hand and the desire to perfect society on the 
other, a split reflecting the complex historical association of 
liberalism with the rise of capitalism on the one hand and Enlighten¬ 
ment thought on the other. While the principle of individual freedom 
protects individual selfishness, the aim of liberalism education is 
the inculcation of "reason" to transform selfishness into enlightened 
self-interest. In its contemporary form -- well represented by 
Hampshire College and the School of Education at the University of 
Massachusetts -- it tends to emphasize self-directed learning on the 
one hand and a curriculum that points towards reforming society on the 
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other. There is also a concentration on what are called individual 
needs on the one hand and societal needs on the other. Given the 
complexity of our society, and the vast stores of specialized 
knowledge about it, the effort to envision reform requires a great 
emphasis on cognition. To balance this, liberalism educators also 
stress the need to develop the affective realm as guided by the 
theories of humanist psychologists as opposed to humanists. It is my 
sense that this emphasis on exploring the self is a turning away from 
a world that one cannot make sense of, a world in which the liberal 
split-vis ion of rugged individualism on the one hand and perfecting 
society on the other are not as believable or inspiring as they once 
were. 
The meaning of a liberal education, on the other hand, lies in 
the process itself; this is how I interpret the phrase "learning for 
learning's sake," traditionally associated with liberal education. To 
the humanist, thinking and talking about what matters in life is 
itself meaningful. As Hannah Arendt has noted, "thinking does not 
have a real goal, and unless thinking finds its meaning in itself, it 
has no meaning at all." Thought and dialogue about what is important 
to us in this world create a sense of belonging to it. Through shared 
reflection on ideas whose reality lies beyond knowledge, the humanist 
literally creates a human world, together with those that she or he is 
conversing with.^^' 
This concern with the invisible world of thought is quite 
different than liberalism's vision of perfecting society through 
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education. While humanists may be concerned with societal issues, in 
terms of education they are more concerned with specific individuals 
than with the abstraction that we call society. The humanist's aim is 
to develop the quality of being thoughtful, whether one's politics are 
conservative, liberal, or radical. While I would not quite classify 
Daniel Bell as a humanist, he is free enough of his own liberalism to 
state that while he is politically a liberal, he is economically a 
socialist, and educationally a conservative. He reflects the 
humanist's perspective to the extent that he can see that different 
areas of endeavor may be best guided by different principles. 
The humanist also tends to look askance at the emphasis of 
liberalism educators on the development of the affective realm along 
with the cognitive realm as a way of developing the whole person. To 
redress our overemphasis on the cognitive with a new emphasis on the 
affective does not dissolve the split; it maintains it. Instead, the 
humanist tends to think in terms of what Hannah Arendt called 
"passionate thinking, where thinking and aliveness become one." From 
this perspective, the liberal's alternative emphasis on self- 
realization dwells too much on the self, while his or her attention to 
society dwells too much on society, leaving a gulf between the two, a 
gulf not spanned by mixing interdisciplinary attempts at studying 
social and environmental issues with courses on self-realization 
techniques. Instead the gulf is bridged by studying works that cause 
one to reflect upon one's assumptions in an educational setting which 
stresses reflection upon ideas combined with reflection upon 
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experience. The aim is not a clarification of values-another aspect 
of liberalism education--but a thoughtful perspective on what is 
worthwhile, what is worthy of aspiration.^^ 
This is but a cursory attempt to suggest that liberal education 
in a humanist perspective differs from the liberal tradition. While 
there are several reasons why we have lost sight of this distinction, 
the principle one is that liberalism in the form of progressive 
education has come to dominate our educational philosophy. The 
progressives, led by John Dewey, have viewed the traditional concept 
as elitist and archaic. They have attempted to replace the 
traditional concept with one of their own, and in the process have 
dismissed the traditional sense of the term. For example, in terms of 
the tradition of liberal education, the opposite of liberal is not 
conservative but illiberal, referring to those pursuits that are 
conducted not for their inherent worth or pieasure--or, in 
contemporary terms, meaning--but for the sake of something else. 
Under the influence of the progressive education movement and 
the rise to dominance of liberal ideas in Political Science, 
Psychology, and Economic Departments, liberal education has become 
identified with liberalism in the minds of many. In turn, the 
traditional sense of the term as well as the distinction between 
liberal and illiberal have been forgotten or ignored. In a recent 
book on liberal education the author begins by stating, 
"Conservative" in this context is taken as the 
contradictory of "liberal." Thus, some so-called 
"liberal arts colleges" are in reality conservative 
arts colleges.^' 
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Here is a good example of the liberal mind at work. First, it ignores 
the fact that the opposite of "liberal" was not "conservative" but 
"illiberal," and then denies that liberal arts colleges are 
sufficiently liberal. If this definitional slight of hand is allowed 
to stand our historical amnesia concerning the tradition of liberal 
education becomes complete, and liberal education is transformed into 
liberalism education. 
Of course, the attempt of the progressive movement to transform 
the sense of the term has been only partially successful. There are 
too many academics and intellectuals who share the traditional sense 
of the term. Thus, a review of the literature on liberal education 
reveals works written from both perspectives and often one that 
combines elements of each. Since there is also no attempt to 
distinguish the principles from each other, the reader understandably 
becomes confused. Before we can talk about the elements that make 
liberal education meaningful we must first disentangle the two broad 
poihts of view of liberalism and traditional humanism. 
Liberal Education Trapped Within the Liberal Mind 
By experimenting with various types of college 
courses, we in the United States are attempting to 
find the modern equivalent which was once the 
product of "the collegiate way of life"... 
President James Conant of Harvard^® 
What I have called "liberalism education" is best represented by 
"general education," a phrase liberals hoped would provide a 
contemporary equivalent to traditional liberal education. General 
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education" has grown in usage during this century because the concept 
of "liberal education" had undergone so many changes in trying to 
adapt to the twentieth century that for many a new term seemed a good 
idea, especially to liberals who wanted this "modern equivalent" to be 
free of the elitist and archaic connotations of the old concept. As I 
will show, 'general education" has been an empty concept which both 
traditional humanists and liberal progressives have tried to fill with 
their beliefs, which has made the concept signify intellectual 
confusion more than a common search for a modern equivalent to the old 
liberal education. 
The attempt to avoid confusion by coming up with a new term has 
ironically simply created more confusion. As Conrad and Wyer point 
out, there has been an "unbridled diversity" in the number of 
curricular schemes and proposals over the past decade or so, which has 
led a Carnegie Commission to report that "general education is a 
disaster area." Fairly recently a group of individuals have 
attempted to salvage something from this disaster by developing what 
they seem to think is an even newer concept which they call 
"liberating education," which has no common principle other than that 
those involved should feel that the education they are involved in is 
"liberating" to them. 
It is appropriate that "unbridled diversity" has been identified 
as the problem with general education, because to the liberal mind 
diversity is nearly always good, associated with progress and the 
promise of new ideas. Liberals are always willing to "entertain" 
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ideas but rarely seriously; they juggle rather than grasp them. If. 
for example, one proposed a reconsideration of the traditional ideal 
of liberal education, the liberal might well respond: "Fine, if that 
is liberating to you; there is certainly room for another form of 
liberating education." The liberal mind is difficult to struggle with, 
for it is a very tolerant mind that often lauds the idea of liberal 
education and then diminishes it by lauding everything else as well. 
For example, the idea that liberal education should aid one in 
developing a "connected vision" is endorsed by many educational 
leaders today, but they assume that this will lead to an understanding 
of how acid rain in Pennsylvania affects us here in Massachusetts, or 
whether or not American force should be applied to Nicaragua. A 
"connected vision" becomes an analysis of how everything relates to 
everything. This is not exactly what Cardinal Newman had in mind when 
he used the term over a century ago. He was thinking more along the 
lines of Thomas K. Hearn when he writes, "...we must somehow recover 
an enriched conception of reason which emphasizes our quest for beauty 
and goodness as well as truth." Or when Hannah Arendt speaks of 
"moral taste" or David Shuman of an "aesthetic sense." Yes, the 
liberal mind thinks these are good as well; let us have them as well 
as an understanding of how everything relates to everything on this 
planet. With this kind of thinking President Charles Eliot opened the 
way for the rise of the modern American university over a century ago 
by dismissing arguments over what subjects should be taught by saying. 
"We would have them all and at their best.''^^ 
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The primary problem with struggling against the liberal mind is 
that it believes there should be room for everything that we would 
generally consider to be good. The liberal fails to notice that in 
having everything, we have in turn less of each particular thing, and 
furthermore, while the liberal mind would seem to advocate all goods, 
it actually favors some things over others. It favors that which can 
be organized and measured over that which cannot. It favors what it 
thinks to be action over reflection; it favors doing over being. It 
is willing to choose repressive order over chaos. And it favors 
conformity over idiosyncracy. 
Needless to say, those who identify closely with liberalism 
would bristle at such a portrait, but it was Lionel Trilling, a 
liberal, who pointed to the tendency of doctrinaire liberalism to 
undermine its own principles. Trilling saw a number of paradoxes in 
the liberal mind. It is concerned with the emotions in that it 
advocates happiness for all, but it tends to deny emotions in their 
"full possibility." In the abstract the liberal mind "sets great 
store by variousness and possibility," but in trying to organize the 
world in such a way as to give everyone a maximum chance to experience 
"variousness and possibility," it depreciates these values by 
simplifying everything so as "to organize the elements of life in a 
rational way." Thus, "as far as liberalism is active and positive, so 
far, that is, as it moves toward organization, it tends to select the 
emotions and qualities that are most susceptible to organization." 
This is why I suggest the liberal mind favors conformity over 
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idiosyncracy; it is as if idiosyncracies should be kept on hold until 
the entire liberal organizational franiework is constructed. Of 
course, if there did come such a time there would be no idiosyncracies 
left. 
The important point of Trilling's insight for our discussion is 
that some ideas, qualities, and characteristics fit easily within the 
scope and framework of the liberal mind, and others do not. Science, 
analysis, clear definitions, precise measurements, fit well into the 
liberal mind, which rose to prominence along with science. Figurative 
speech, profound ideas, "those exceptions to the rule which may be the 
beginning of the end of the rule,"^^ aesthetic sense, spirit, wisdom, 
being, the mystery of life, do not fit well, and here we begin to have 
a key to making sense of that which passes for liberal, or general, or 
liberating education these days. 
An example of what I mean is provided by the contrast between 
William James and John Dewey. That they have been linked under the 
label of pragmatism seems a great misfortune, for James was not bent 
on social organization and Dewey was, a difference as important as 
their similarities. Thus, while Dewey could have agreed with James 
when he wrote: "Mind, as we actually find it, contains all sorts of 
laws-"those of logic, of fancy, of wit, of taste, decorum, beauty, 
morals, and so forth, as well as perception of fact,"^^ Dewey reduced 
this complexity of mind by making thinking essentially a matter of 
problem solving, which his followers reduced even further to life 
adjustment. 
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While Trilling's humanism and liberalism lay in a delicate 
balance. Dewey was foremost a liberal and secondly a humanist, and his 
liberalism distorted his humanism. Dewey reduced the human mind to a 
tool for problem solving because he believed that education should be 
a preparation for the solving of social problems. Believing education 
to be the primary instrument of social change. Dewey and other 
liberals have proposed reforms to make education more effective along 
these lines, but these reforms have not adequately dealt with the 
chaos and powerlessness individuals experience in their own lives. 
Rather than helping individuals make sense of their lives, the liberal 
has added the burden of responsibility for the improvement of society. 
Based on a combination of simplifications, liberal proposals for 
educational reform either are too simplistic to be taken seriously or 
place such a heavy burden on the individual that the proposals should 
not be taken seriously. They illustrate Trilling's criticism of the 
liberal mind: "it unconsciously limits its view of the world to what 
it can deal with, and it unconsciously tends to develop theories and 
principles, particularly in relation to the human mind, that justify 
its limitation. 
If I were to invent a representative of the limitations of the 
liberal mind at work, I could no no better than the model provided by 
Harland Cleveland, Director of the Hubert Humphrey Institute for 
Public Affairs. In 1981 he was a featured speaker at a national 
conference of higher education, and he called upon higher education to 
go beyond specialization to the development of "integrative brainwork" 
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necessary for enlightened citizenship. Noting that we have largely 
succeeded in making college education into a pathway to success open 
to the large majority of citi2ens--a longstanding liberal goal-he 
asserted that the mission of higher education should now be to produce 
get-it-al1-together people." The citizen of today should have an 
education in "social goals, public purposes, and the ethics of 
citizenship, an education that offers some "practice in real-world 
negotiation," and "the rudimentary knowledge, the integrative tools, 
and...above all the concern to feel a sense of responsibility for the 
situation as a whole"--and he literally means the whole world. His 
"get-it-al1-together" people would understand "the management of 
population, food, energy, and resources," that "the environment is 
clearly a globe as well as a local problem," and "how domestic affairs 
and international policy are linked." 
While Cleveland does include humanities in his vision—so that 
one may attain "some fluency in answering the question "Who am I?"--he 
reflects a bias against taking much time to ponder such a question in 
the motivations he sees for going to college: "education as an 
investment (for the poor), education as a consumer product (for the 
affluent), education as a device for avoiding decisions about what to 
do next (for the unattached, uncertain, and the unemployed)." I 
suspect that those who went to college for leisurely, reflective 
studies would be cast as indecisive malingerers by Cleveland. 
Where do our twentieth century individuals looking for the 
meaning of life fit into Cleveland's scheme? They should obviously 
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decide quickly who they are and what they want to do and join together 
in 
organizations designed to transmute their separate 
expertnesses and their collective insights into 
wise decisions about real world problems--which are 
all interdisciplinary, interdepartmental, inter¬ 
professional and (increasingly) international. And 
the priceless ingredient is this: each of the 
participants in this complex choreography has to 
have some understanding of the whole scene in order 
to play his or her bit part in the big complexity. 
Cleveland s get-it-al 1-together" people are obviously expected to 
find meaning in continuously getting together with others. One 
imagines a life of endless meetings, of incessantly integrative 
brainwork that will help humanity control its destiny. But nowhere in 
Cleveland's vision is there room for individual destiny. 
Cleveland's vision of higher education is simple-minded 
liberalism at its worst, including its marketplace vocabulary, its 
faith in group-work, its emphasis on doing and its sense of urgency 
that the twenty-first century is rushing towards us. In a way I am 
setting up a straw man in citing Cleveland, but it seems noteworthy 
that such people are invited to speak at national conferences of 
higher education, and no one raises a voice of protest against such 
simple-minded visions. Perhaps this is because we tend to think that 
all of this talk of purposes of higher education doesn't mean much 
anyway. But then that is part of my point. While Cleveland is 
inciting individuals to think in terms of controlling the world, most 
of us feel we have no control over our own university, and little over 
our own lives. 
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A less simple-minded example was presented at the conference the 
previous year by John Sawhill. President of New York University. 
Rather than simply suggesting that higher education could be improved 
by more togetherness, Sawhill reflected upon what he would include in 
a general education curriculum. Like Cleveland, Sawhill asserts 
students must be taught to understand their interrelatedness," but he 
makes more specific curricular suggestions. 
He sees several areas of study as more or less "essential." For 
those who wish to go back to basics he offers a reinstatement of 
expository writing for freshman and a re-emphasis on foreign 
languages. To this he adds "some familiarity with one of the computer 
languages," while believing that students should also be 
"scientifically better informed" to deal with social and ethical 
issues related to the "major scientific discoveries and issues of the 
day." He also likes interdisciplinary approaches, and praises other 
areas of study as well. As Sawhill continues to cite studies that 
seem to be an "essential" part of his curriculum, one realizes he is 
advocating just about everything and dropping nothing from the list of 
essentials. It is the liberal's vision of having-it-al1 at work, 
pointing in the opposite direction from his earlier contention that 
each college should have a distinct identity. It also places an 
enormous burden on the student who would try to follow Sawhill's 
suggestions. Sawhill has been called an "avowed workaholic" and his 
vision would require each student to be the same. 
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Now If we turn to Yale University, where Bartlett Giamatti is 
president, we might think we have finally found a university in which 
a traditional sense of liberal education exists, for Giamatti speaks 
the language of the traditionalist. Yale's 
aim is not to make one technically proficient, but 
to instill some sense of the love of learning for 
its own sake, some capacity to analyze any issue as 
it comes along, the capacity to think and to 
express the results of one's thinking clearly, 
regardless of what the subject matter might be. 
However, Mark Ryan, a dean at Yale, reveals what happens to liberal 
education in the competitive atmosphere of a prestigious university. 
He tells us of Louise, a high achiever, who in her junior year "just 
got turned off" by scholarly endeavors. As Louise described her 
feelings which promoted her taking a year of absence: "You get all 
caught up in it, studying like crazy, worried about your grade point 
average, thinking everyone else is going to beat you for a place in 
law school. I guess I just got burned out." This is how Louise 
experienced "the love of learning for its own sake."27 
While Yale may give real emphasis to the idea of the integrated 
curriculum, the message is the same as at other universities, if not 
more so: "Be a leader; scramble for success with high grades and 
honors; attain professional distinction." In this emphasis on 
competition the universities are monuments to nineteenth century 
rugged individualism, the spirit out of which they evolved. To 
counteract this competition and emphasis on the cognitive Ryan would 
like to give "psychological counseling" a place in the liberal arts 
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curriculum. Ryan seems to represent the position of the student 
personnel movement, of which Arthur Chickering is a noted spokesman, 
that stress the "development of the whole person." These people play 
particular havoc with the concept of liberal education, for they often 
refer to humanist psychologists like Abraham Maslow, whose "humanism" 
has little to do with that of the tradition of liberal education, but 
rather stems from their differences with behaviorists. 
In terms of liberalism, the student personnel movement seems an 
off-shoot of the progressive education movement with its emphasis on 
the needs of the child extended to include older students as well. 
Yale exemplifies the efforts of twentieth century progressives to 
ameliorate the effects of nineteenth century rugged individualism. 
But, as I have already noted, this new emphasis on the affective to 
compensate for the liberal's long standing emphasis on the cognitive 
does not in itself bring the two together, and in any event has little 
to do with the traditional humanists' emphasis on integrated thought. 
Ryan does not even see problems in making his affective classes 
part of the competition, arguing that they too could be graded, if 
"very sensitively." Among other things, the instructors could judge 
the way students "verbally handle" their self-data, "the degree if not 
the precise character of expressed self-insight." Are we to believe 
that an instructor might fail a student for his inability to express 
self-knowledge, or if not, isn't there something spurious about graded 
psychotherapy?^® 
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Though Cleveland, Sawhill, Giamatti, and Ryan all make 
suggestions for improving liberal or general education, the direction 
that each would have us go so reflects the assumptions and values of 
liberalism and if acted upon would lead us further away from liberal 
education. Cleveland's vision is simplistic to the point of 
caricature. Sawhill's perspective, while more sophisticated, is 
flawed by his preoccupation with all the knowledge he thinks essential 
while ignoring the frenzy that his proposals make of a student's life. 
While Giamatti speaks the language of humanism well, he ignores the 
conflict between his "love of learning" and the pressures to compete 
fostered by a liberal capitalist society. Finally, while Ryan sees 
how the liberal's vision actually overwhelms individual students with 
the frenzy of Cleveland's incessant meetings and Sawhill's endless 
studies, and the competitive pressures that undermine Giamatti's "love 
of learning," his own liberal assumptions lead him to suggest a 
solution which may be worse than none at all. These are some of the 
ways in which liberal minds attempt to improve liberal education 
today, but rather than enhancing our sense of liberal education they 
bury it further within the assumptions and values of liberalism, or in 
Giamatti's case--fail to acknowledge how humanism is undermined by 
1iberalism. 
The Confused Humanist 
While many liberals are critical of the current state of liberal 
or general education, their criticisms either emphasize the failure of 
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higher education to develop sufficiently enlightened citizens 
(Cleveland) or to attend to the psychological "needs" of students 
(Ryan). In both cases their criticisms lead us away from a 
revitalization of traditional liberal education concerned with our 
Western cultural heritage, though they obscure this by making their 
proposals seem compatible with traditional liberal education. The 
problem is further complicated by the fact that in our liberal society 
most humanists share many of the assumptions and values of liberalism, 
and seem unclear themselves whether they are essentially humanists or 
liberals vis-a-vis education. And even humanists who are aware of the 
distinctions between liberalism and humanism, often state their views 
in terms calculated to influence the liberal mind, minimizing whatever 
may seem elitist, impractical, or archaic in their thought. Since few 
people are aware of the conflict between the values of liberalism and 
those of liberal education, humanists themselves become confused by 
the intellectual muddle made of the two liberal traditions. 
This muddle is unintentionally illustrated by Adel Simnons, 
President of Hampshire College. In "Harvard Flunks a Test," Simmons 
seems a traditional humanist one moment and a progressive liberal the 
next. Simmons sounds like a traditional humanist in criticizing the 
attention that Harvard's latest "core curriculum" has received, noting 
that it is not a core curriculum shared by all undergraduates but 
instead an individually selected group of eight courses from a total 
of one hundred divided into eight areas. Simnons supports her own 
contention by quoting the traditionalist, Mortimer Adler, to the point 
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that Harvard's core curriculum "can hardly be defended as a 
restoration of the truly general education." 
However, when Simmons presents her own vision it is obviously 
not that of a traditional humanist, but instead a combination of 
Cleveland's and Sawhill's. 
I believe that today's undergraduates will need an 
unprecedented breadth of knowledge and richness of 
imagination. The technical and moral subtleties of 
the decisions they will face can leave one defense¬ 
less before the temptation to renounce personal 
responsibi 1 i ty... (and)...the complexity of social 
and environmental issues (to give two examples 
only) dictates interdisciplinary attempts to solve 
them and underscores the value of interdisciplinary 
training. 
But then Simmons again seems a traditionalist by crediting St. 
John's with establishing the modern prototype of the core curriculum, 
mentioning the success of Robert Hutchins in developing a core 
curriculum at the University of Chicago in the 1930s. She seems 
unaware that Chicago's core curriculum was not what Hutchins and Adler 
had wanted, which is why St. John's came into being. She also seems 
unaware that the philosophy underlying St. John's core curriculum 
directly contradicts her belief that colleges today must give students 
an unprecedented amount of knowledge. Rather than an "unprecedented 
breadth of knowledge," St. John's concentrates on a selection of great 
works aimed at developing the "arts of understanding."29 
Simmons' paper is a muddle of ideas, resulting from either a 
superficial understanding of the history of liberal education or a 
willingness to minimize her differences with traditionalists in order 
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to have greater influence. Simmons seems resentful of the attention 
that prestigious universities like Harvard and Yale receive for their 
ineffective efforts to develop a general education, while the more 
serious efforts of small colleges like Hampshire and St. John's are 
largely ignored. However, in portraying St. John's as an ally in the 
struggle for a true general education, she implies a false similarity 
in vision between the two colleges that adds to our confusion.^^ 
Many traditionalists also seem willing to minimize their 
differences with progressives for the purpose of greater influence. 
Mortimer Adler, for example, is clearly aware of these differences, 
but in his recent Paideia Proposal he ignores them. Adler proposes a 
prescribed curriculum for undergraduates divided into three areas: 
acquisition of organized knowledge; development of "intellectual 
ski 11 s~-ski 11 s of learning"; and an enlarged understanding of ideas 
and values. These proposals seem a combination of traditionalist and 
progressive ideas. 
Reflecting the spirit of compromise, the booklet is dedicated to 
Horace Mann, John Dewey, and Robert Hutchins "who would have been our 
leaders if they were alive today.As Adler knows, if Dewey and 
Hutchins were still our "leaders" today, they would most likely lead 
in opposite directions. Dewey's thought led to problem-solving 
curriculums tailored to the individual student at colleges such as 
Bennington, Sarah Lawrence, and Hampshire, in which "integration is 
something to be sought in the individual student, not in the 
curriculum." In contrast, St. John's Reflects the position of 
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Hutchins and Adler, with its prescribed curriculum centered upon the 
great works of Western civilization. 
The proposal is sufficiently vague to allow progressives such as 
Simmons' their own versions. However, when Adler asserts that we have 
known for a long time what the best education is and have simply 
failed to implement it, his version of the "best education" differs 
significantly from that of Simmons'. Adler's position is essentially 
the same as it was in the 1930s, when he argued vehemently against the 
application of Dewey's "progressive" thought to liberal education, and 
Simmons' position is along the lines of Dewey. But Adler enraged many 
people at that time and he has since learned to be more tactful in 
expressing his views, though at the loss of drawing clear distinctions 
between his views and those of progressives. The Proposal obscures 
the conflict between the two positions, reading like a party platform 
worked out through compromise with an eye to what will sway the 
public. 
Simmons' apparent lack of awareness of the history of liberal 
education and Adler's willingness to make vague the traditionalist 
position illustrate two sources of our present confusion regarding 
liberal education. A third source lies in the liberal's continued 
attempts to reconstruct the concept of liberal education to better fit 
liberalism, a tendency reflected in Sinmons' article but even better 
illustrated by Zelda Gamson's study. Liberating Education. Responding 
to the pronouncement of the Carnegie Commission in 1977 that the state 
of general education was a "disaster area," Gamson began her own 
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search for a unifying principle for general education detailed in this 
book. Of particular interest to our discussion is a roundtable 
discussion among Gamson and a "commission" of seven people 
representing "different sectors of higher education" on the question: 
What should liberal education mean?^^ Though the discussion is largely 
shaped by the values and assumptions of liberalism rather than liberal 
education, one of the members, Roland Braithwaite, seems to view the 
matter more from a humanist than a liberal perspective. His 
interchanges with other members of the commission illustrate how the 
contemporary humanist is tripped up by liberal assumptions and 
values—including his own. 
Braithwaite's own liberalism is apparent early in the discussion 
when he supports his belief that liberal education is important by 
citing that studies have shown "college educated people, compared to 
people with less education, are most likely to support civil 
liberties, dues process, and freedom from arbitrary laws; they want 
less protection from controversial ideas. They are also more in favor 
of equality and humanitarianism"--in other words, they become 
committed to liberalism.^^ 
Though a liberal, Braithwaite seems to view liberal education 
more from a humanist perspective. He seems least in favor of the 
contemporary liberal assumption that minorities and others deemed 
disadvantaged should have an education particularly tailored to their 
unique needs. This is interesting because Braithwaite is a Black 
professor teaching at a Black college, whose students have a poor 
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background in the skills of speaking and reading. Though one of the 
white liberals asserts the need of an education fitted to the 
realities of people who are very different" than the "middle-class, 
white, male, Braithwaite emphasizes an understanding of Western 
cultural heritage as the primary aim of a liberal education. 
Unfortunately, he supports this contention with the kind of practical 
calculation that characterizes the liberal mind, but which is 
demeaning to his original assertion. He argues that Blacks have "to 
learn to compete in a European system of standards, deal with the 
Western world and improve their condition in the majority society." 
Rather than a source of personal enrichment the study of cultural 
heritage seems like a tool for dealing with a predominantly white 
society. But I do not think he means that, for he adds: "We want our 
students to learn the ideas of the tradition and carry them out at 
their best." This seems to indicate an appreciation of Western 
cultural heritage, but Braithwaite is trapped within the liberal mind, 
too quick to argue on the basis of the practical and the realistic, 
even though he values the tradition for its own sake.^^ 
With Braithwaite apparently not quite clear in his own mind 
which of his educational values is most important to him, he is swept 
along by the liberal consensus which ignores his emphasis on cultural 
heritage and instead stresses the idea of "empowerment," empowerment, 
for example, "for people who have felt dumb or put down all their 
lives." Earlier another member of the commission had talked about the 
value of women's studies in this regard, and Braithwaite responded 
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that it sounded like she was talking about "indoctrination-the very 
opposite of what a liberal education should be." But the rest of the 
commission seems attracted to the notion of empowerment, so 
Braithwaite only adds the qualification that liberal education is 
"moral to the core, without indoctrination."^^ 
The commission ends the discussion with one member asserting 
that they need a new term for the education they have in mind, and 
someone suggests "liberating education," an education for critical 
awareness, use, which can lead to empowerment. Most of the group seem 
to believe that if individuals become aware of all that limits them, 
they will be on the pathway to freedom (empowerment). However, I 
suspect that Braithwaite understands that this negative sense of 
freedom is but half of the issue, that the concept of freedom also 
requires a positive content which he and other humanists point to with 
the idea of culture. Perhaps he also senses that while "liberating 
education" seems to imply a unifying principle, it actually encourages 
unbridled diversity since it is "whatever is liberating at a 
particular moment in time."^^ I suspect Braithwaite is not quite sure 
himself how his own view differs from that of the others, for it is 
lost within the liberal consensus which allows him to have his own 
idea of "liberating education" while failing to take seriously his 
humanist concerns. 
Brai thwai te's position within the commission seems to reflect 
the position of humanists in general within higher education. We can 
imagine how confused humanists, such as Braithwaite, must get as they 
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attend conferences in which Cleveland talks about "getting-it-all- 
together," and Sawhill provides more and more "essential" subjects for 
their students to study, and Giamatti talks about the "love of 
learning," while the less rugged of their students burn out through 
the competition. Perhaps humanists will also feel the need for new 
courses psycho-therapizing their own students, or confuse Adele 
Simmons as one who shares their views, or be further confused by the 
progressive language in the progressive-traditionalist Paideia 
Proposal. And then when they sit down with others also interested in 
liberal education to discuss what it might be today, they soon find 
that they too are thinking in terms of liberating education, though it 
does not quite seem to fit with their own emphasis on cultural 
heritage. This is what it is like for humanists to try to think and 
talk about liberal education these days. 
Perhaps the commission's separation of liberating education from 
liberal education is a good sign, for it might make it easier for 
those of us still interested in liberal education to revitalize the 
old concept. However, to really be able to do so, we must understand 
the tradition in its historical context, and how in the American 
context the concept was first distorted by Puritan orthodoxy and then 
freed from this orthodoxy by liberalism only to become distorted again 
by the liberal ideology. 
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A Gap in the Literature 
While there are scattered allusions to the incursion of liberal 
thought into higher education throughout the general histories on this 
subject, there is no extensive study relating the rise of liberalism 
to the decline of the traditional concept of liberal education and our 
current confusion over the subject. This seems due to the uncritical 
perspective from which the major historians of education (Butts, 
Cremin, Rudolph, & Veysey) have viewed this history. Their histories 
tend to reflect a neo-enlightenment world view combined with a 
progressive temper to produce a liberal humanitarianism, a view which 
has dominated American social, intellectual, and political life for 
over half a century.^® 
From this point of view the history of higher education has 
essentially been one of progress. It is the story of a higher 
education increasingly fashioned to meet "the needs of individuals and 
society," rejecting elitism and providing a means for a meritocracy, a 
story of the growth of knowledge and the growing accessibility of a 
college education to all. While the loss of the traditional sense of 
liberal education is alluded to with lament, it is a sub-plot in a 
story of progress. For example, Rudolph notes that the elective 
principle "almost obliterated the humanist content of higher education 
and substituted for it an often excessive concern with practical power 
and the equality of men," but he essentially negates this criticism by 
concluding that this same principle "moved the American college and 
university into the mainstream of American life, where it had long 
49 
been sorely needed and where it for long sorely needed to be." Thus, 
the impression one receives is that the general direction of higher 
education has been essentially good and inevitable, and, although it 
has created problems in overspecialization, they are surmountable. 
Thus, Rudolph ends his The American College and University with what 
seems to be an upbeat note describing the American consensus: 
Every American was free to write his own definition 
of both knowledge and enrichment, but no definition 
would avoid a fundamental attachment to the 
American consensus: "Let knowledge grow from more 
to more, and thus be human life enriched. 
Rudolph's "American consensus" suits our liberal ideology but is 
not consistent with liberal education. Our individualism, 
egalitarianism, and preoccupation with new knowledge have created 
conditions hostile to a liberal education. Overspecializing is a 
result of the high value that liberals have traditionally placed upon 
scientific expertise and their willingness to reduce higher education 
to a vehicle for individual success in order to bring it into the 
mainstream of American life. Welcoming the success of liberalism in 
higher education, the liberal historians have taken little notice of 
how our present problem with general education is a result of this 
triumph. 
I admit these historians are not specifically concerned with the 
concept of liberal education, and that is part of the problem. Even 
revisionists such as Clarence Karier and Walter Feinberg are not 
particularly interested in liberal education. While they add a 
critical perspective on the effect of liberal assumptions on 
50 
educational development, their interest is primarily in the disparity 
between what liberalism promises and has to date attained. They, like 
the liberals they critique, are concerned with the broad relation 
between education and society, rather than in the specifics of a 
liberal education offered in a given classroom or school. Though 
Karier is quite conscious of the history of traditional liberal 
education, Feinberg reveals an alarming ignorance when he uses 
"progressive education" synonomously with "liberal education."^® 
Feinberg's mistake suggests the partial success of the 
progressives to promote their own view of liberal education. Since 
Dewey's reconstruction of both liberalism and liberal education, the 
progressives have tried to replace the traditional sense with their 
own, portraying the traditional sense as elitist, archaic, and 
impractical. In their efforts to promote their own views they have 
not bothered to distinguish them from traditional notions of liberal 
education. Thus, they are the least likely to analyze the 
contemporary confusion over the concept; instead they tend to blame 
our half-hearted attempts at liberal education on the "conservative 
nature and plain obstinacy of some faculty. 
If we turn to the traditionalists (Van Doren, Barzun, Foerster, 
Adler, Babbit) we do get insight into the tradition of liberal 
education and the problems it has faced in this century, but 
traditionalists focus on specific villains such as modernism, 
scientism, humanitarianism, or progressivism rather than relating all 
of these to liberalism, of which they are aspects. They rightfully 
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believe that liberal education must be adapted to present 
circumstances, but disagree on the nature of adaptation, and nearly 
always the adaptation requires an acceptance of some liberal 
assumptions. Thus, traditional views have all too often been 
liberalized, further blurring the distinction between liberalism and 
humanism. It is difficult to know which of these adjustments to 
liberalism have come about through changes in philosophical outlook 
and which have been prompted by pragmatic realism. In order to remain 
at the center of educational debate in this century one has had to 
identify one's educational philosophy with the "true" liberalism, and 
deny that one was simply being conservative.^^ 
Another important problem with traditionalist accounts of 
liberal education is that in their effort to defend the ideal they 
have given little recognition to how poorly this ideal has been 
realized in this country's history. Thus, while the progressive 
ignores the past history of liberal education as archaic, the 
traditionalist also tends to ignore this history by idealizing it, and 
adds to our confusion by not acknowledging the validity of the 
liberal's criticism of its actual practice. 
Each attempt at telling the story of liberal education in our 
century leaves out important aspects which are needed to understand 
the path towards our present confusion. Integrating the insights of 
these various works requires supplemental study of the mind-sets of 
Puritanism, liberalism, and humanism. 
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Summary 
In this chapter I have outlined both the possibilities for a 
meaningful education inherent in the ideal of liberal education and 
the primary obstacle to fruitful thought about these possibilities— 
the confusion of liberal education with an education in liberalism. I 
began by describing how traditional ways of making sense of the world 
have broken down and then suggested ways in which the humanist 
tradition of liberal education can contribute to our making sense of 
things. This is not possible, however, as long as we continue to 
confuse liberal education with liberalism education. I supported this 
contention by describing the nature of discussions these days about 
liberal education, showing that these discussions are conducted 
largely from the perspective of the liberal ideology making it very 
difficult for a humanist to be heard or even to think clearly about 
the issue. Finally, I discussed the nature of historical discussions 
on the subject suggesting that the central reason that these accounts 
have not shed much light upon our confusion is that none of them 
examine the relationship between the rise of liberalism and the" 
decline of liberal education. Altogether, this chapter has been a 
description of the nature of our confusion of liberal education with 
liberalism, which in turn has undermined the contribution that liberal 
education can make to our search for meaning. 
The next four chapters will be devoted to an examination of the 
path towards our present confusion. We will begin by examining the 
Greek roots of liberal education in order to develop a sense of its 
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original spirit and meaning. We will then note how the spirit and 
meaning changed as the concept was passed along from the Romans to the 
Christian scholastics, then to the Renaissance humanists, and finally 
to the Puritans who established higher education in this country and 
to the liberals who now control it. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE GREEK SPIRIT OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 
Among the Greeks, then, we find this boundless 
impulse of individuals to display themselves, and 
to find their enjoyment in so doing. 
Hegel 
The tradition of liberal education has two primary elements, 
that which has given it form and that which has given it life. The 
form was clarified as the seven liberal arts by the Romans in the 
third or fourth century A.D., and though changing over the centuries 
has continuously given shape to the idea of liberal education. This 
form stemmed from the admiration the Romans had for the Greek culture 
and was their attempt to emulate it through formal education. 
Breathing life into this form, has been the spirit of ancient Greece, 
or more accurately, our recurring tendency to cast our mind's eye back 
to ancient Greece for inspiration. Liberal education is more than a 
given curriculum; it is a way of teaching and learning, of, in fact, 
living with the ideals of the Greeks. 
There have, of course, been times in which the liberal arts were 
taught in ways that seem totally out of keeping with the Hellenic 
spirit, most notably the Reformation. When v/e look at the Puritan's 
teaching of the liberal arts, firmly based on Reformation experience, 
we sense that it is not quite right to call it a liberal education 
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because the spirit that infuses it is so different from that of the 
Greeks. Such uneasiness is particularly evident in the history of 
American education because Puritans started liberal education in this 
country, and their restrictive influence dominated in the early part 
of our history. Later, when liberals reacted against such 
restrictiveness they presented themselves as advocates of a "true 
liberal education, while, in fact, they were not primarily concerned 
with revitalizing liberal education but rather with developing a new 
education in keeping with their own particular vision of progress. 
In order not to confuse the Greek spirit with that of the 
Puritan or the liberal, in this chapter I will describe this spirit 
relying primarily on the work of Hannah Arendt and Werner Jaeger. I 
will outline what I believe to be the essential elements of Greek life 
in which that spirit dwelled, partly by contrasting the Greek view of 
life with our own, and discuss the relationship between the spirit of 
liberal education and its formal elements, as well as between the 
liberal arts and systematic philosophy. Those tensions, problematic 
as they are, are an inherent part of the tradition of liberal 
education. 
Interpreting the Hellenic Spirit 
Every selection of material in a sense interferes 
with history, and all criteria for selection puts 




Lionel Thrilling pointed out, "every Greece is different from 
every other, each being shaped for a particular purpose."^ In John 
Dewey's Greece, for example, the Greek spirit is essentially 
scientific in nature, moved along by the spirit of free inquiry and 
experimentation. In my Greece there is an emphasis on free inquiry as 
well, though I do not give this scientific bent the centrality that 
Dewey does. A few years ago an advocate of vocational education 
argued that Greek education was essentially utilitarian in nature for 
it gave individuals the skills necessary in politics. It is this 
tendency that we all have to construe the essence of the Greek spirit 
to accord with our own purposes that suggests how the Puritans too 
could find inspiration in the Greeks, despite their obvious 
differences in outlook. 
Therefore, before I describe the Hellenic spirit, let us admit 
that within the parameters of factual evidence this Hellenic Spirit is 
a synthesis we each make of the Greek elements that inspire us. While 
there are similarities in each version, there are also differences 
depending upon our biases. For this reason I state frankly that the 
following is my interpretation of the spirit of ancient Greece, even 
though it is largely based on the interpretation of others whose 
knowledge of the subject far exceeds my own. 
Most interpretations, including my own, focus very narrowly on 
one small part of Greece. Except for certain moments of heroism our 
Greece is not Sparta, nor the other cities of Greece except when we 
can find something extraordinary, such as Ionian science. Our Greece 
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is essentially Athens, and especially Athens of the Periclean age, 
except for philosophy, which rises as Athens declines. And within 
Athens, we are certainly imagining the life of the perhaps 20,000 male 
citizens and not the rest, and, at least for me, ultimately there is 
that one citizen, philosopher, soldier who represents the true Greece, 
as those citizens who condemned him to death do not. As we see, there 
is a great deal of selection that takes place immediately in our 
discerning the true Greece and the Hellenic spirit. 
Most interpretations also emphasize the Greek (Athenian) pursuit 
of excellence ("to be of one's best and to be the best of all"), the 
pursuit of truth through reason, the centrality of politics in 
everyday life, and a sense of beauty that permeated all things and 
endeavors, so that the motive for excellence could be described as the 
desire "to take possession of the beautiful."^ Some version of this 
description of the Hellenic spirit is usually given by educators as 
the basis of a liberal education. 
The problem with the description as a basis for liberal 
education is its potential for varying interpretations. In using any 
of these terms, such as "excellence," "politics," or "freedom," we are 
encumbered by the present day meanings of these words derived from 
American life. What we need to do is to find a way of remaining ever 
conscious of the fact that in speaking of the ancient Greeks, the 
founders of the Bay Colony, and ourselves that we are speaking of 
three different worlds and each world used a different language. 
61 
Compare for a moment our way of life with that of the Greeks. 
While our society centers upon business, Greek society centered upon 
politics, a "politics" whose meaning differs from our own sense of the 
term. Since business is central to our lives, many of our words are 
at least partially colored by the image of the marketplace. Harland 
Cleveland, mentioned in the last chapter, uses metaphors and examples 
drawn from business because the image of the marketplace is in the 
foreground of his thought. However, even when we are further removed 
from the marketplace than Cleveland, the meanings of words such as 
politics, excellence, or freedom are colored by the assumptions of the 
marketplace. 
For example, in the introduction to this dissertation I referred 
to the "marketplace of ideas," in which the truth is supposed to win 
out over time. This assumption reflects our positive sense of open 
competition, in which the best or most worthwhile wins. This is a 
central myth in our lives and shades the meanings of other important 
words. In terms of education, in addition to the high-minded view of 
the marketplace of ideas there is the lower-minded concern with the 
marketability of the skills one learns. In its most benign 
interpretation the metaphor of the marketplace conveys a sense of the 
triumph of the most deserving. While some will deny this and point 
out that many others are at a disadvantage in the marketplace because 
of their race or sex, they rarely challenge the idea of the 
marketplace itself but only its living up to its promise. Their 
response to the problem is usually some form of affirmative action. 
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programs like "Headstart" designed to help the disadvantaged to find 
an equal place at the starting line in the great race towards success. 
All of this is but to suggest that as framed by the marketplace 
we think of life largely in terms of success or failure within the 
standards of the marketplace. Our sense of the word "freedom" is 
similarly colored by the marketplace, a freedom which is essentially 
the opportunity to succeed economically. To understand the 
marketplace, its myths and its inconsistencies, and our reaction to 
them is to understand much about our way of life. However, our image 
of the marketplace obscures our sense of the Greeks, because it was 
not a part of their culture. Consequently, words like "freedom," 
"politics," and "excellence" had distinctly different meanings in 
Greek life than they do in our own. 
The center of Greek life was not business but politics, and for 
them the illuminating metaphor is the polis rather than the 
marketplace. While the youths in our society grow up wondering how 
they will find a place in the marketplace, the Greek youths who were 
free to be citizens were concerned with eventually winning distinction 
among their peers. Rather than a place for making deals, the polis 
was, as Hannah Arendt describes, the "space of appearances" organized 
"out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between 
people living together, no matter where they happen to be."^ It was 
here that the Greek fulfilled "the need, not of mere pleasure, but of 
the display of individual powers, in order thereby to gain distinction 
and consequent enjoyment," according to Hegel. The ultimate goal was 
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to win imperishable fame, or immortality, to become a story passed 
through the ages. 
This basic difference in orientation between the Greeks and 
ourselves leads to numerous other differences as well. As success is 
determined by economics in our society, the fame sought by the Greeks 
related to the idea of arete, or excellence, which Werner Jaeger has 
called "the central ideal of all Greek culture."^ To the Greeks all 
things and human endeavors had a specific form of excellence, for 
example an arete for each art form, an arete for a particular age of 
life, an arete for a man and for a woman, and, most importantly, a 
civil or political arete. This last was called eupraxia and it meant 
"action well done." This distinction did not hinge upon success, as 
it does for us, but upon the quality of conduct itself, who one 
revealed oneself to be through the action. As an example Hannah 
Arendt writes, "man, if compelled to fight, is still free to fight 
bravely or in a cowardly way," and it was the way in which one fought 
that was most important, not that one won. We know of Achilles to 
this day, not because he won battles, but because he chose to avenge 
the death of a friend, knowing beforehand that his action would cause 
his own death as well.^ 
That the actions of the warrior were considered political 
suggests a sense of politics that is both different and broader than 
our own. Literally all that happened within this "space of 
appearances" was political, meaning that political referred to all of 
the shared aspects of the Greek citizens' lives. It is helpful here 
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to note that when Hegel writes of the "boundless impulse of 
individuals to display themselves," that the self being displayed was 
not an independent personality, as we would assume in our more 
individualistic times, but "the ideal that inspires us."^ The self 
being displayed was the individual's response to the arete and in 
"striving to do one's best and to be the best of all," one confirmed 
the shared ideals of the polis. 
While our own sense of politics stems from that of the Greeks, 
it has become so colored by the attitude of the marketplace that 
though our politicians refer to ideals in their speeches, we perceive 
their policies and actions as negotiations and deals. As voters we 
are concerned with getting "a piece of the political pie," and any 
mention of deals makes us shrug our shoulders and say "its all 
politics," meaning that we can ignore the public statements as 
posturing since we know the issue is being decided by behind-the- 
scenes manipulations. 
Rather than images of the marketplace, the Greeks used metaphors 
of the performing arts, such as dancing, healing, and flute playing to 
describe political activities. As with the performing arts the 
excellence of a political act was a matter of virtuosity, which was to 
be found in the performance itself and not "an end product which 
outlasts the activity that brought it into existence." In that the 
action itself is short lived, acting individuals, like play actors, 
need a publicly organized space for their "work," and the "presence of 
others before whom they can appear."^ 
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Their sense of freedom is as different from ours as are the ends 
of the polis and the marketplace. Our freedom of the marketplace is 
the freedom to make deals, to acquire objects and skills which will 
increase our value in the marketplace; over time this is our path to 
success. As Tocqueville observed, this freedom, rather than being 
political, is a freedom from politics, from the public life, the 
freedom to devote oneself to individual pursuits. Also, this freedom 
of economic opportunity focuses upon future possibilities rather than 
the present moment; it is a freedom from restraints and a freedom as 
potential. In contrast, as suggested by the term "virtuosity," the 
Greek freedom is of the present moment, the freedom to perform well 
now. As Hannah Arendt writes, "Men are free...as long as they act, 
neither before nor after; for to ^ free and to act are the same."® 
Thus, free action, actualization of the ideal, and virtuosity, 
are different ways to refer to the same performance of excellence. 
From the actor's point of view what particularly distinguishes this 
free action is that it does not come from internal motivation, but 
springs from principles, such as honor, or glory, or love of truth, 
which "inspire, as it were, from without."^ For the Greek hero, this 
inspiration was so great that he disregarded the dangerous 
consequences of his action. As exemplified by Achilles, he "despised 
danger in comparison with disgrace. 
Altogether, the Greek sense of free action suggests an action 
inspired by a principle and performed with a disregard of 
consequences. While I have cited Arhilles, it was not only in war 
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that such virtuosity could appear. An equally good example is the 
performance of Socrates at his trial. In reading Plato's description 
of Socrates' defense one feels one is witnessing a man free from fear 
and acting solely upon principle - in this case the love of truth. 
Though his life is in the hands of his judges, rather than trying to 
curry favor with them he virtually insults them with the suggestion 
that it is only the dislike of others that has put him on trial. 
Knowing that he is not helping his own position, he states to the 
judges: 
You are wrong my friend, if you think a man with a 
spark of decency in him ought to calculate life or 
death; the only thing he ought to consider, if he 
does anything, is whether he does right or wrong. 
Such was the moral heroism of eupraxia, and it was around such actions 
that the life of the polis centered, where the "raison d'etre would be 
to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as virtuosity 
can appear. 
Such moral heroism was considered the highest form of arete, and 
it is central to our sense of the Hellenic spirit, but not a complete 
description. Any number of fanatics, after all, have an 
uncompromising sense of right and wrong, and what distinguishes the 
Greek spirit from that of the fanatic is the Greek's extraordinary 
capacity for making distinctions. Nearly all the words we use to 
differentiate branches of knowledge and activities, e.g., chemistry, 
theology, politics, comedy, aesthetics, etc., are Greek in origin, and 
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this drawing of distinctions is arguably the intellectual act most 
characteristic of the Greeks. 
We have carried the Greek art of making distinctions to the 
point of separating reason from emotion and ethics from aesthetics, 
while for them these distinctions also assumed connections. Virtue, 
excellence, and beauty were woven together in the Greek view, which is 
why arete at times signifies virtue more than excellence, and why it 
could be said that the aim of arete "is to take possession of the 
beautiful." There was not a clear line drawn between ethics and 
aesthetics because the good was thought of in terms of the excellent 
and the excellent was thought of in terms of beautiful. 
This tendency to think and speak in terms of the beautiful is 
well illustrated in the Symposium. Alcibiades praises the beautiful 
soul of Socrates, whom Alcibiades thinks most able to help him "attain 
the height of excellence." Socrates responds: 
If what you say is true about me...and if there is 
in me some power which can make you better, you 
must see some inconceivable beauty in me immensely 
greater than your own loveliness.^^ 
Here virtue, excellence, and beauty mirror each other and provide a 
viewpoint from which can be seen "every part as subordinate and 
relative to an ideal whole" {Jaeger).The problem of doing right 
was not a matter of the will but a matter of knowledge, a knowledge of 
the beautiful, and it was the beauty of virtue which moved one to be 
virtuous. 
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The formal studies of Greek youths reflect this emphasis on 
aesthetics. Music, gymnastics, and epic poetry formed the curriculum, 
giving the youth a sense of beautiful sounds, beautiful forms, and 
beautiful deeds. This was the preparation for the way of life of the 
free man, free to devote himself to the beautiful. The "liberal" of 
liberal education refers to the pursuits worthy of this free man and 
the quality of liberality, or generosity with one's possessions, which 
characterized the free man's spirit, though the Greeks themselves did 
not think in terms of liberal education per se. The concept of 
liberal education as study of the liberal arts was conceived by the 
Romans Yarro and Cicero as a way of emulating the Greek way of life 
through formal education. The Greek word "paideia" denotes education, 
culture, and the ideal altogether. 
Paideia was particularly the ideal pursued in daily life. In 
the Symposium a youth is advised "to love one body and there beget 
beautiful speech" and "from one to two, and from two to all beautiful 
bodies, and from bodies to beautiful pursuits and practices, and from 
practices to beautiful learnings, so that from learnings...he may know 
at last that which is the perfection of all beauty.As the youth 
becomes a young man he is advised to spend his time in the company of 
those whose knowledge of the beautiful is most complete, which is why 
we imagine Socrates accompanied by numerous young men, including 
Plato, Xenophone, and Alcibiades. When Leo Strauss writes, "Liberal 
education supplies us with experience in things beautiful," he is in 
accord with the Hellenic spirit.^^ 
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However, the Greek spirit has not been simply a matter of 
aesthetics. The analysis that we are now doing is also a legacy of 
Greece -- its greatest contribution being reason and the idea that 
mankind could be rational. To the rhapsody of spirit unified and 
moved by beauty to pursue excellence, we must add the divergent note 
of reason. As Auden has suggested, the Greeks were the first "to 
think about our thinking, to ask such questions as "What do I 
think?"^® And it is Socrates who is credited with asking this 
question most persistently both of himself and others, and, in so 
doing initiating the individual conscience. 
I have argued that Greek individuality was a reflection of group 
ideals, and thus the opposite of our notion of individual ism. 
Socrates initiated philosophic individualism. Earlier we noted a 
similar heroism between Achilles and Socrates, but there is also a 
very significant difference. Achilles' sense of right followed 
traditional values while Socrates reasoned his way to a sense of 
right. As Jaeger has stated, the Homeric man "measured his own arete 
by the opinion which others held of him. Yet the philosophic man of 
later times could dispense with such external recognition."^^ There is 
no reason to believe that Socrates was indifferent to the attraction 
of enduring fame that moved his fellow Greeks, only that he found 
living in harmony with himself to be even more important than the 
praise of his fellow citizens, especially since their opinions did not 
seem well thought out. 
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Rationality was the crowning glory of the Greek spirit, but it 
emerged only as Athens was declining. Educational consciousness, as 
developed by the sophists, and individual conscience, as developed by 
Socrates, came about as the nature of Athenian life was changing and 
traditional standards were breaking down. That theories on the 
pursuit of arete were first developed during this period indicates, I 
suspect, that the paideia of the Greek way of life was no longer 
adequate to teach arete. Nietzsche at least finds that "the summer of 
Greece" occurred before reason evolved. 
In Socrates, however, there does seem that momentary balance 
between the traditional unity and the new individualism, in which 
excellence, beauty, and reason all are prized. In Socrates we seem to 
have found the civilized man in whom unity and diversity exist without 
strain. His individualism is not a denial of shared ideals but his 
own assessment of what they mean. Early in his life Socrates turned 
away from Ionian science since he could not find any illumination into 
the ultimate purpose of human life. While most things we do are the 
means to ends, Socrates asked what is the ultimate end which is not a 
means to something else but which is an end itself. It is this sense 
of ultimate purpose that underlies the idea of "liberal pursuits that 
Aristotle will later describe as ends in themselves. 
The image of Socrates is one of irony and paradox. In fact, one 
wonders if Socrates taught Plato the meaning of irony. Here in this 
world which so emphasized the beauty of the senses, we find the most 
beautiful of souls in an ugly body. We find the individual who is 
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most commonly held up as the Ideal teacher to be one who claimed to 
know nothing and to have nothing to teach. And perhaps most Ironic is 
that he who died in disgrace in the eyes of his fellow citizens should 
become arguably the most immortal of the Greeks, the individual whose 
fame seems least likely to perish. 
The Spirit and Form of Liberal Education 
Just as others are pleased by a good horse or dog 
or bird, I myself am pleased in an even higher 
degree by good friends....And the treasures of the 
wise men of old which they left behind by writing 
them in books, I unfold and go through them 
together with my friends, and if we see something 
good, we pick it out and regard it as a great gain 
if we thus become useful to one another. 
Socrates 
At the beginning of this chapter I distinguished between the 
spirit of liberal education and its form. When considering Socrates 
and liberal education there is a corresponding distinction between 
seeing Socrates as the inspiration of our idea of liberal education on 
the one hand and understanding Socrates' role in the formalization of 
liberal education on the other. The spirit of Greece is a combination 
of excellence, beauty, and reason, but in the legacy of Greece reason 
has come to dominate, particularly in the form of scholarship. But 
reason as scholarship is not well suited to grasp the spirit that gave 
rise to it, the spirit of Socrates and Athens. This is simply because 
scholarship is based on analysis, a breaking into parts, while spirit 
must be captured as whole. It seems that the better we are at 
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breaKIng something down Into parts, and the better we can define these 
parts - I.e., the clearer our formal knowledge - the further removed 
we are from the overall spirit. This d11enr,a has been pointed out by 
Jacques Bartun In an article describing why our contemporary 
university with Its emphasis on scholarship Is particularly unsuited 
for an education In culture, the traditional aim of liberal education. 
Barzun argues that the mind does not work analytically in the 
process of cultivating culture. For that process we need "intuitive 
understanding which is derived from the experience directly and 
cannot be conveyed in definitions but only suggested by analogies and 
imagery. His main point is that culture must be grasped gradually 
through reflection, meditation and conversation, and this statement 
takes us to the heart of the idea of liberal education -- to what 
Socrates and his friends were doing and what would still be worthwhile 
for us to do.^^ Thinking and dialogue concerned with excellence 
gradually teaches us what is praiseworthy and what is not. In this 
integration of mind and spirit, thought and feeling, we gradually 
place our experiences in order, which leads to a considered point of 
view, and one which is much more than simply a reflection of our 
prevailing liberal ideology. Such dialogue is the central dynamic of 
liberal education and the primary legacy of Socrates and Athens. 
Throughout the history of liberal education the centrality of 
conversation about excellence has given way to other concerns. Formal 
education, whether directed by Church or State, has largely been a 
matter of socialization into the predominant ways of thinking and 
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acting of a given society, and the actualization of liberal education 
has in turn been shaped by these concerns. Again as exemplified by 
Socrates, the idea of liberal education is always in conflict with the 
prevailing ideology of the day, any ideology, simply because ideology 
limits the capacity for thought. In turn, no ideology, whether 
Puritan or liberal, emphasizes this process of working out one's own 
sense of excellence, for each has its own doctrines of what to praise 
and what to condemn, although this is obscured in the latter's case by 
its rhetoric of freedom. 
This problem of imbuing liberal education with a spirit and 
purpose foreign to the Greeks is not only a modern problem. For as 
long as the tradition of liberal education has existed, there has been 
a tendency for its spirit and its aim to be obscured in the 
formalization of that spirit. By formalization I am referring to two 
interrelated developments, the creation of systematic philosophy on 
the one hand and the liberal arts on the other. While both began in 
the life of Greece and were inspired by Socrates in particular, the 
path pursued by each was largely away from that which inspired them. 
Though systematic philosophy stems from Socrates' application of logic 
and definition to his pursuit of excellence, the emphasis of 
philosophy soon changed to the method itself, to a matter of logic and 
formal knowledge. Its origins in conversation concerning excellence 
were largely forgotten. And the liberal arts, which stem from the 
Greek assumption "that the only genuine forces which could form the 
soul were words and sounds, and-so far as they work through words or 
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sounds or both-rhythm and harmony" (Jaeger) would become categories 
of knowledge, emphasizing the memorization of rules and the analysis 
Of passages. This preoccupation with truth, logic, and formal 
knowledge can be seen as the legacy of one part of the Greek spirit, 
analytic reason, dominating at the expense of both beauty and 
excellence. The pursuit of formal knowledge has become the primary 
goal of all education, taking us away from conversation concerning 
excel 1ence. 
As I interpret it, the aim of liberal education in the Socratic 
mode is not knowledge, but thought, which orders our knowledge in a 
way that we find fitting. While most writers familiar with the 
tradition of liberal education share this emphasis on thought rather 
than knowledge, the traditional tendency to emphasize knowledge as 
superior to mere opinion has led these writers to defend the tradition 
in terms of knowledge. For the purpose of clarification let us 
briefly consider the origins of the formalization of liberal education 
in order to understand how a tradition essentially inspired by the 
ability of one man to make others think would become a tradition which 
became identified with knowing. 
Liberal education must ask whether cultural excellence can be 
taught. While the pursuit of excellence had been central to the Greek 
way of life for centuries, it was not until the Sophists of the 5th 
and 4th century B.C. that theories were developed on how to achieve 
this ideal of culture. According to Jaeger, the Sophists were the 
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first to conceive the conscious ideal of culture, and In turn "made 
Greece conscious of her own culture."25 n was the Sophists who 
invented rhetoric and transmuted the old educational tradition of 
poetry into the language and ideology of rationalism. In particular, 
it was the claim of these itinerant teachers to be able to teach 
excellence, particularly of the political sort, that we must note, for 
this is where Socrates enters the picture asking the Sophists and 
others exactly what they mean by "excellence." 
In Plato's early dialogues we find Socrates investigating the 
nature of arete and its relation to the soul. He asks: What is 
arete? Can it be taught? Is it knowledge, and, if so, what kind of 
Knowledge? If it is knowledge, doesn't someone have to know it well 
enough to teach it, yet no one seems able to quite say what it is? Is 
this a knowledge by which to attain arete or is there a knowledge 
which is itself arete, where "knowledge is the being of him who acts 
weii?"26 Throughout all this questioning Socrates claims not to 
know the answers himself, and though others accuse him of using this 
supposed ignorance as a trick, he asserts to the contrary, "It isn't 
that, knowing the answers myself I perplex other people. The truth is 
rather that I infect them also with the perplexity I feel myself. 
Do we believe him? Here we are touching upon the question of 
"Socratic irony," made more questionable because we cannot be sure 
where to draw the line between Socrates and his portrayer, Plato. For 
some, such as the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, this irony is "that 
disconcerting affection of ignorance and simplicity which was Socrates 
76 
most effective dialectical weapon."28 por those who think this 
defines the essence of his Irony, Socrates Is a rather Irksome 
individual, undeserving of his acclaim. Yet, I think It can be safely 
assumed that this Is not the Image of Socrates which Inspired 
humanists from Cicero to Erasmus to John Adams. For those who have 
been fascinated with Socrates over the ages, the Irony Is much more 
profound than this. It Is not that Socrates never uses his Ignorance 
as a weapon, but that in the deepest sense he does believe himself 
ignorant, the irony steiiming from the sense that in his awareness of 
his ignorance he knows more than those who falsely believe they know. 
There is also irony in the possibility that he knows that the method 
he uses, the pointing out of contradictions and the pushing for 
definitions, will not directly lead to the knowledge that he seeks, 
but will only clear the ground of false knowledge. Dialect clears the 
mind of false knowledge so as to be open to perceive the "flying 
spark" of truth. 
He often implies that if we could see the good clearly it would 
be impossible not to choose it over the bad. He is fully aware that 
this clarity of vision is beyond our reach, yet in the process of 
talking about it one somehow comes to care for virtue (excellence). 
Although the equation "virtue is knowledge" is often attributed to 
him, it is not clear what he means, his sense of knowledge having an 
ironic twist to it. What he does say clearly in the Apology is that 
he is most concerned with persuading others to "care more exceedingly 
for the soul, to make it as good as possible.Exactly how making 
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the soul good is to be accomplished we cannot be sure, so Socrates has 
always remained a source of controversy, infecting us to this day with 
his perplexity. He has had a unique place in history, able to 
continue his self-described function as midwife, able to bring our 
thoughts to birth rather than instruct us. 
This vision of Socrates has inspired both the tradition of 
liberal education and the development of systematic philosophy, but 
it has generally been lost in the course of the formalization of each. 
Formal education, even v/hen called liberal, is more concerned with 
instruction than infecting people with perplexity, and philosophers 
have not been content to leave philosophy as a matter of circular 
discussions revolving around the questions of excellence and virtue, 
as a brief look at each will reveal. 
As for philosophy, Hannah Arendt well captures the difference 
between Socrates' idea of philosophy and what was to follow: 
It seems that he, unlike the professional 
philosophers, felt the urge to check with his 
fellowman if his perplexities were shared by them 
-- and this urge is quite different from the 
inclination to find solutions for riddles and then 
to demonstrate them to others. 
In short, systematic philosophy took the idea of liberal education 
away from its initial home in conversation about the questions of 
excellence and made the central question that of truth and the central 
activity solitary analytic reasoning. Some, such as Nietzsche or more 
recently Robert Pirsig, would even blame Socrates for making truth the 
central category of thought rather than excellence, but most arguments 
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on the issues revolve around the differences between Plato and 
Ari stotle. 
I am not certain who characterized all individuals as either 
Platonists or Aristotelians but certainly the distinction points to a 
conflict in liberal education as well as in philosophy. Platonists 
tend to think Aristotle missed the subtle sense of the meaning of 
truth to Socrates/Plato and firmly believe that the dialogue was not 
simply a literary device but essential to the pursuit of this truth. 
Those who favor Aristotle see Plato as an eloquent but rudimentary 
precursor of Aristotle. The Aristotelian distains Plato's mixture of 
prose and poetry, and the Platonist sees Aristotle as dwelling too 
much on logical forms and categories. The Platonist seems to see the 
truth as a personal vision, the Aristotelian as a matter of verifiable 
propositions.^^ 
The significance of this debate for our purposes is that 
Aristotle would become the central figure of Christian philosophy. 
Aristotle set the foundation for a philosophy that would become 
preoccupied with matters of truth and logic rather than excellence, a 
philosophic bent more suitable to the priest than the political 
individual. Aristotle does not seem to have attached any particular 
significance to the method of dialogue itself, and in noting the 
importance of Socrates he only praises the systematic aspects of 
Socrates' search. Then, in his system he placed the issues of 
excellence in the relatively minor philosophic category of ethics. 
Rather than logic applied to dialogue aimed at the clarification of 
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knowledge about excellence, dialectic came to be a study of logic 
itself, with Aristotle systematizing, for example, the logical 
strategems used in an argument.As the preeminent philosopher of 
the Christian world, Aristotle's influence led to the scholastics of 
the medieval period "whose philosophy was so logical in its nature as 
well as its method that even modern scholars have found it all but 
impossible to differentiate between the logical philosophy and the 
purely didactic logic,It would be this abstract theology 
accessible only to minds trained in scholastic logic which would be 
the main target of the polemics of Eramus and the other Christian 
humanists. 
If we turn now from philosophy to the development of the concept 
of liberal education itself, we will note a similar pattern for the 
two are largely intertwined. What became clarified as the seven 
liberal arts in the third or fourth century A.D. stemmed from the 
admiration the Romans had for the Greek culture and their attempts to 
emulate it through formal education, Cicero in particular felt the 
Greek arts and letters to have a civilizing effect and were essential 
in cultivating humanitas, from which the term "humanist" comes. 
Cicero viewed these arts as a preparation for a life of politics and 
philb'sdphy, as did the Greeks. What would become the trivium of 
grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric can be traced to the Greek study of 
poetry, the rhetoric of the sophists, and the dialectic of Socrates, 
but as Cicero imagined it, all of the liberal arts were a preparation 
for philosophic thinking and political action. Philosophy as civility 
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and peace of mind, politics as the ability to persuade through oration 
and the wisdom to know what was the best—this is what Cicero and his 
friend Varro had in mind when shortly before the fall of the Republic 
they envisioned an education to civilize their fellow Romans. As the 
polis and republic receded into history and Christianity expanded in 
influence, the liberal arts became an education for priests rather 
than political men. Philosophy became an aid to Christian theology 
rather than a civilizing influence in politics.^^ 
Summing up the paths of philosophy and educational history in 
such a general fashion misses much indeed. But it does seem helpful 
in terms of our discussion to note, if very roughly how the rise of 
systematic philosophy and the formalization of liberal education go 
together. Though the inspiration of Socrates was central to both, the 
more philosophy became a matter of solitary individuals working out 
their systems of thought rather than as an aid to conversation, and 
the more the liberal arts petrified into seven subject areas with 
rules and principles to be memorized, the further removed were the 
forms of liberal education from its original spirit. 
Summary 
In this chapter I have portrayed the Greek spirit and in so 
doing have given some sense of how their view of life differed from 
our own. I have also described how the ideal of liberal education has 
been inspired by the Greeks, and in particular Socrates, and how in 
the process of giving form to the spirit as the liberal arts or as 
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systematic philosophy the spirit was often lost to a deadening 
formalism. Therefore, there is much in the tradition that even a 
traditional humanist world not embrace. This is particularly true in 
the period after the Renaissance when the humanist spirit gave way to 
that of the Puritan, and liberal education became an instrument of 
discipline and piety, as I will show in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
HUMANISM AND CALVINISM: THE GREEK SPIRIT 
FOUND AND LOST 
Nothing in human experience has been less in accord 
with the spirit of Hellenism than the study of the 
classics in western European and American 
education...In spite of their pagan origins the 
cl assics.. .were inculcated in a strongly Christian 
atmosphere which rejected the whole pagan theory of 
life.^ 
Harry Elmer Barnes 
There is every evidence that the learned class of 
Massachusetts Bay became cultivated men, interested 
in humane letters as well as theology, and that 
they successfully brought to the Mew World much of 
the best of the heritage of European civilization.^ 
Richard Hofstadter 
The quotations above illustrate a fundamental conflict in the 
roots of liberal education in this country. From the perspective of 
Barnes, to call the education the Puritans practices “liberal 
education" seems ridiculous even though they thought of it as such. 
However, from Hofstadter's perspective the contention does not seem so 
ridiculous, for they did indeed prize the life of the mind and 
maintain the traditional forms of liberal education. Since the 
Puritans now seem left behind, this ambiguity does not evoke much 
attention. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, the Puritans 
were leaders upon the pathway to our present confusion about liberal 
education, so we need to clarify our sense of Puritan liberal 
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sducation. In this chapt6r and thG nsxt I will dGscribG how the 
Calvinist Puritans maintained the tradition of liberal education and 
the nature of the spirit in which it was maintained. I will also 
describe the humanist revival of the Greek spirit of liberal education 
in the Renaissance and how Calvinism evolved out of this humanism. In 
the process I will describe significant differences between the 
humanist and the Calvinist, their differing views of the ancient 
Greeks and their differing sense of the purpose of liberal education. 
To understand the Puritans and their version of liberal 
education requires some understanding of what is and is not 
encapsulated in Hofstadter's phrase "much of the best of the heritage 
of European civilization " If one considers the spirit of Hellenism 
an essential element of our European heritage, Hofstadter's contention 
is misleading, for the Puritan sense of right stands in stark contrast 
to that of the Greeks or even to the Renaissance humanists who revived 
this spirit. While the Puritans certainly did study "humane letters," 
there was little of the enjoyment of study, the play with words, the 
sense of toleration and intellectual freedom that characterized the 
Renaissance scholar. And while the Puritans inherited an emphasis 
upon the intellect from their humanist and scholastic predecessors, 
theirs was an intellect aimed at defending a rigid Calvinist theology. 
They studied Plato, but their interpretations of his works and their 
appreciation of Socrates as a model of a life well-spent was not that 
of a humanist scholar such as Erasmus. Erasmus would declare upon 
reading about Socrates... 
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A heathen wrote this to a heathen, yet it has 
justice, sanctity, truth. I can hardly refrain 
from saying Saint Socrates, pray for me..."^ 
but to the Puritan it was clear that none of these heathens would be 
found in heaven, that, as Perry Miller writes, "the best of heathens 
fell short of the least of Christians." 
While the Greeks turned their attention outward with their love 
of public self-display, the Puritans turned inward to personal 
struggles in preparation for an afterlife. Their actions were aimed 
not at glorifying themselves, a form of sinful vanity, but at 
glorifying God. 
The Puritan is characterized by a degree of internal struggle 
unknown to the Greeks; he epitomizes what Socrates feared. He is the 
individual in almost constant disharmony with himself, seeing his own 
depravity in contrast to the stainless purity of God. Yet, something 
in this contrast draws him zealously onward, gives him a sense of 
mission, makes of him an instrument of the Lord. Socrates is the 
image of the civilized individual in whom unity and diversity are 
balanced with little strain; the Puritan is a fanatic who holds unity 
and diversity together only with the greatest of effort, but perhaps 
as Perry Miller states, with a "delight in ordeal." The Puritan loves 
perfection because he sees so clearly his own imperfection. With this 
love he will be a radical force in Europe, for he will not tolerate 
anything short of his vision, and for the same reason he will be a 
conservative force in the New World. 
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The Puritan vision includes an escape from Catholocism on the 
one hand and a purification of Catholocism on the other and is nicely 
captured in a sentence by Sebastian Frank: "You think you have 
escaped from the monastery, but everyone must now be a monk throughout 
his life."^ While the marketplace suggests the central image of our 
own world, and the polis that of the Greeks, the corresponding image 
for the Puritahs was the world-as-monastery. 
This vision and spirit are the legacy of John Calvin who brought 
the city of Geneva under his sway approximately a century before the 
Puritans came to the New World. To understand how liberal education 
and Calvinism came together we need to consider the role of the 
Renaissance humanist as a reviver and conveyor of the Greek spirit on 
the one hand and a progenitor of the Reformation on the other. 
The Renaissance is often thought of too simply as the rebirth of 
ancient learning. However, Jaeger placed it in the right perspective 
by noting that the 4th, 12th, and 13th centuries also had periods of 
revival of interest in antiquity; what we know as the Renaissance was 
merely the greatest of these revivals. From about 1350 to 1600, 
certain scholars turned away from an ascetic and abstract 
scholasticism and searched for a new criteria of a life well spent. 
They found it in the literary remains of Greece and Rome, "the 
manuscript evidence of which had to be literally recovered from 
medieval garrets and forgotten scrap heaps.While there are many 
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generalizations that one encounters about these "humanists," the one 
clear-cut characteristic they shared was "the desire to establish 
clear and correct versions of the ancient classics." They originated 
scholarship as we know it. 
From the standpoint of education, what was particularly 
noteworthy about the Renaissance was that there was a greater emphasis 
upon teaching. More significant than the humanists' scholarly 
accuracy was that as they discovered the ancient world and related 
these discoveries to their own lives they revealed to students how to 
do the same. Men of wide culture, if they taught French, for example, 
did not simply teach the language but also taught history, geography, 
and literature. Gilbert Highet suggests that these were men "who 
could teach...how to read, to talk, to think, to know, to act, to 
live."^ 
Thus, we see humanists such as Erasmus and his friend More not 
only learning Greek and translating ancient texts, but also enriching 
their lives with the spirit of Greece. Their works are spiced with 
the irony and humor that reflect the Socratic-Platonic tradition, 
"that teasing wit, that gently mockery, that vivid sense of the 
absurd." They seem to have what Walter Ong has called "the sense that 
utterances can somehow touch mysterious depths which analysis can 
never quite fathom," the sense that the deepest truths cannot be 
communicated directly. Erasmus shocked the graver of his fellow 
scholars with a book which mocks his and their efforts, suggesting 
they were all ruining their eyes for no good reason. And More 
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referred to himself as too old a fool to change his ways as he awaited 
his own execution for refusing allegiance to his Protestant king.^ 
One can imagine Socrates smiling at such self-mockery. 
Renaissance humanists, however, lived in a vastly different 
public space than 5th century Athenians. Most notably there was no 
polis, no space of excellence in which to perform. The unity of 
spirit of Socrates was not possible for them, since politics and 
philosophy were no longer interwoven. It was now hard to reconcile 
free thinking with public service. More took the path of public 
service, rising to be Lord Chancellor of England, only to liken civil 
life to a prison--this before the metaphor became literal. Erasmus 
said of his friend, "he disliked the court and the company of princes 
because he had a peculiar hatred of tyranny and love of equality." 
For his own part Erasmus chose to keep out of politics, other than to 
advise princes through a book. As Hugh Trevor-Roper describes the 
choice, he "preferred poverty with scholarship and freedom to the 
golden servitude of court life."® The humanists also differed from 
the Greeks in their tendency to see culture very narrowly, solely in 
aesthetic terms, so that the very word "aesthetic" comes down to us as 
largely a matter of refinement, usually excessive refinement, without 
the more robust political connotations. 
These differences between Renaissance humanists and the Greeks 
are similar to the differences between ourselves and the Greeks. 
Though the Greek way of life compels admiration, their world was so 
different from ours, or of 15th and 16th century Europe, that we are 
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left with a major problem of translation; How can we translate that 
which was admirable in their lives into our own? 
The Renaissance humanists dealt with the translation problem in 
one way, largely in reaction to Scholasticism which was itself an 
attempt to emulate what was perceived as a classical, rational 
approach. There have been many other attempts at translation 
including those of the Platonists, Epicureans, Neo-Platonists and 
rival camps of Aristotelians, and by the Reformation all of these 
currents of thought were present in the universities.^ 
Calvin and his followers, however, differed significantly from 
the other humanists. Many Renaissance humanists made an effort to 
approach the ancients on their own terms seeking illumination from 
them for their own lives. The Calvinist, on the other hand, 
approached them with his mind made up. While the humanist's pursuit 
of truth was a matter of developing clear and correct versions of 
ancient texts, encouraging free discussion and varying views, the 
Calvinist looked solely to the Bible for a singular truth--God's 
divine plan”-giving rise to a uniformity of thought. Let us examine 
how this singular mind evolved out of the intellectual diversity of 
the Renaissance. 
In 1523, six years after Luther had posted his theses, and while 
Erasmus was reaching his 58th year and bemoaning the direction of 
events, a 14 year old Jean Cauvin became a student at the Sorbonne. 
We know him as Calvin because in the fashion of the day he had 
Latinized Cauvin to Calvinus, an indication of the humanism that was 
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still vital at the time. During his years of education, it seemed 
that Calvin himself was destined to become a humanist scholar. While 
he studied the law in obedience to his father's conmand, his real 
passions as a student, according to one biographer, were for the 
languages, literatures, and cultures of antiquity. His first 
published work was solidly in the humanist vein, a study of the 
political thought of Seneca which barely mentioned scripture. He had 
even given up the law and was preparing to enter the priesthood, when 
as he put it, the Lord "subdued my heart (too hardened for its age) to 
docility. 
Since Calvin was not of a self-disclosing nature, biographers 
have not been able to specify the exact date of his conversion, and it 
is hard to know whether it was prompted by the proceedings of heresy 
that the Sorbonne brought against him in 1533, or vice versa. For our 
purposes it does not matter, but had he been born a few years earlier 
it is easy to imagine him lost in obscurity, living the life of a 
little known scholar, for this is the life that he always wished for, 
if we are to believe his statements on the matter. Calvin describes 
himself as timid and retiring, shrinking back from conflict with 
others, desirous of the contemplative life. That the path he took 
seems so contrary to his human tendencies is typical of the Calvinist 
spirit of self-denial, of being subdued by the Lord to an instrument 
of his will, despite personal considerations. 
Calvin's public views are most evident in his work in Geneva. 
Though ordered to leave Geneva in 1538, he was asked to return three 
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years later to help them enact the religious and social reformation of 
the city. Calvin's desire was a reaction to what R. H. Tawney has 
described as the "cynical materialism which seemed a denial of all 
that had been meant by the Christian virtues, and which was the more 
horrifying because it was in the capital of the Christian church that 
it reached its height." The humanists felt a similar repulsion but 
they chose to believe in "the gradual regeneration of mankind by the 
victory or reason over superstition and brutality and avarice. 
Calvin either did not believe this or found the consequences 
unacceptable; the Lord expected more than this. Calvin knew how 
"stubbornly addicted to the superstitions of the papacy" he had been 
himself until he received the Lord's grace, and he never 
underestimated the extent of human depravity. Believing that "any 
grace which a man possessed came from the free action of God alone" 
left Calvin with little faith in the power of reason to regenerate the 
world, particularly a reason which itself was corrupted by the fall. 
As John S. Brubacher has suggested: 
The confidence that the pagan and, to an extent, 
the Humanist had in being able to lift themselves 
by education alone, Calvin could only look upon as 
vain conceit and pride. 
Only with a reconstructed Church and State, in which every department 
of life, public as well as private, was penetrated by religion could 
society be renewed. Thus, while Thomas More set up a school in his 
home, Calvin sought to make all of Geneva "the most perfect school of 
Christ that ever was in the earth since the days of the Apostles, 
which is how John Knox later described it. 
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From Geneva, Calvinism spread through France, Holland, Scotland, 
and England as visitors, such as Knox, were fired by the Calvinist 
vision. And as the Calvinist spirit spread. Calvinist education 
reflected both his conviction of human depravity and his revolutionary 
sense of mission, inculcating the discipline necessary for a Christian 
life of self-denying labor based on scriptural authority. 
The following description by Barnes refers to the general 
influence of the Reformation upon education, and reflects the value 
Calvinists placed upon tedious mental labor as an instrument of both 
mental and physical discipline. 
From the use of classical literature and philosophy 
as a preparation for life, the classical tradition 
degenerated into a stereotyped and dull cultivation 
of syntax and linguistics.^^ 
Education came to be largely a memorization of Latin passages and 
grammatical rules, and this was the kind of education the Puritans 
brought to America. 
There is another aspect of this education, however, which gives 
the Puritan a certain intellectual stature. The Puritan 
minister-leaders were exceedingly logical in their approach to the 
Bible. This was the legacy of the scholastics whom the Puritans 
derided while using methods of thought inherited from them. It is the 
now little known Petrus Ramus who acted as intermediator in providing 
the Calvinists with a way of thinking similar to the scholastics but 
without their Papal connotations. Although not a household word 
today, there was an "astounding circulation" of his works around the 
academic world of the 16th and 17th centuries. 
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Calvin provides us with paradigm of the soul of Puritanism, but 
Petrus Ramus shows us the Puritan mind. Described as a "pedagogue's 
pedagogue," by Walter Ong, Ramus lived in mid-sixteenth century 
France, a scholar with a strong Calvinist bent. Ong describes him as 
a "singularly unimaginative person," lacking interest in making 
conversation, with a positive aversion to witty and pithy sayings, 
such as those that dotted the works of Erasmus. He was exclusively 
interested in developing a systematic and efficient curriculum, and 
wrote extensively on educational methods, particularly on how to 
develop suitably organized textbooks. His primary legacy was his 
logic, which was a noteworthy part of the Puritan's European heritage. 
As Lawrence Cremin has stated, he was one of the three authors most 
emphasized by the educated American Puri tans.Ramist logic was a 
logic of what was given, not a logic of speculation or inquiry. His 
approach to a subject was to search for relevant matter, and then to 
arrange it in statements and syllogisms, an approach reflected in 
early American Puritan sermons. 
This logic was used to order growing knowledge of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. It was particularly attractive to the 
practical minded Puritans who were primarily of the commercial classes 
and preferred clear-cut thought—things to manipulate and rearrange— 
to "the imponderables that haunted the world of learning." The 
Puritans were accustomed to dealing with commodities and preferred 
their knowledge to be of the same order, unappreciative as they were 
of the elusiveness of wisdom. Ramist logic was also well suited to the 
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Calvinist inclination towards useful knowledge, plain speech, and a 
literal interpretation of the Bible. It would be used to analyze 
Biblical passages in order to deduce the "true" message out of what 
often seemed conflicting messages. 
Along with Calvinism, Ramist logic made its way to England where 
it was in vogue in Cambridge and, to a lesser extent, in Oxford in the 
1620's where the Puritan leaders who would create the Bay colony were 
being educated. They attended Cambridge and Oxford against a backdrop 
of political and religious tension than in 12 years would erupt into 
civil war. Both the education they received and the political 
atmosphere of the English universities affected the curriculums the 
Puritans would establish in the Mew World, so a brief consideration of 
those universities is necessary. 
In the already beginning contest between Catholic and Protestant 
points of view--with the Church of England being the bone of 
contention--theology was "the one great, absorbing intellectual 
interest" at Oxford and Cambridge, not to mention the general society 
as well. According to Mori son, we have no subject that compares today 
to the pervasiveness of theological discussion in the seventeenth 
century. Of course, this interest in religion was not new. Since the 
middle ages, "the main, almost exclusive, scholarly preoccupation of 
the English universities" had been "theology in both its aspects. 
First, there was the form the church would take in relationship to the 
state. Second, there was the question of "divinity—the philosophical 
aspect of Christianity, the relation of man and nature to God and the 
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nature of God himself." This should be kept in mind as a balance to 
Hofstadter's assertion that Cambridge and Oxford at this time "had 
long since been thoroughly infused with humanist scholarship." This 
seems an excessively simplified sunniation, for, as Mori son states, the 
"deep and fruitful labors of Renaissance humanists in collecting and 
editing texts of ancient classics went on outside university walls." 
Also, these universities "did not foster creative literature" nor "do 
much to foster creative scholarship...outside the important branch of 
theology." And neither Oxford nor Cambridge had any teacher to 
compare with the Italian, Dutch, and French humanists of their day. 
Lastly, the great figures in Elizabethan literature who did go to 
college, men such as Spencer, Marlowe, and Milton, "regarded their 
college careers as a waste of time," an opinion that John Locke would 
concur with a few decades later. Such was the "intellectual life of 
Cambridge" (which set the pace for the intellectual life of New 
England) as described by a very sympathetic observer of the 
Puri tans.^® 
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THE FOUNDING OF LIBERAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA 
The tradition of liberal education was brought to America by the 
Puritans and infused with their spirit. Samuel Eliot Morison, the 
historian of Harvard, has pointed out that though the Puritans did not 
possess the gentle spirit of the humanists, we should nevertheless be 
grateful that they maintained the humanist tradition at all, since 
"the mere physical labor of getting a living in a virgin country is so 
great as to exhaust and stultify the human spirit unless it has some 
great emotional drive." In such situations, he claims, the 
"alternative to intellectual Puritanism is intellectual vacuity." Our 
concern here is not to praise or blame the Puritans but to understand 
their contribution to our present confusion. Until the late 
nineteenth century in this country, liberal education was infused with 
a Puritan Calvinism that carried with it a quite particular 
interpretation of the classical past: the Greek sense of excellence 
became Christian virtue and the Greek gods were seen as angels of the 
Lord. Thus, while the Puritans did maintain the classical tradition, 
they altered it in ways that led to its rejection. As Alfred North 
Whitehead noted early in this century, "Of all types of man today 
existing, classical scholars are the most remote from the Greeks of 
the Peri clean times. 
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While the Puritan origin of liberal education in this country 
sewed the seeds of our present confusion, we do not find this clearly 
spelled out and reflected upon in the literature on the subject. At 
times Puritan liberal education is portrayed as something fortunately 
transcended and now forgotten. At other times, as with Morison, they 
are honored for maintaining the classical tradition, but it is not 
made clear how in altering the spirit of the tradition they altered 
the tradition itself. Thus, we receive a blurred picture of the role 
of Puritanism in the course of American higher education, a picture 
that we aim to bring into focus in this chapter. 
From 1636 to the last half of the 19th century, American higher 
education was generally conducted and controlled by Calvinists. As 
Lawrence Veysey has noted: 
In nineteenth-century America, educational and 
theological orthodoxy almost always went together. 
Orthodox Christianity, as the college president 
usually understood the term, meant a diluted 
Cal vini sm.^ 
Although dominated by Calvinism, throughout this period there was a 
growing rebellion in higher education against the constraints of the 
Puritan way of life or at least a liberalization of these constraints. 
The issues of academic freedom, student election of courses, and, in 
the 1960s, the student rebellion against in loco parentis, were all 
reactions to the "College Way" initiated by the Puritans at Harvard. 
In this chapter we will examine the nature of the Puritan mind and its 
version of liberal education as a first step towards an understanding 
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of the struggles between the Puritan and the liberal for control of 
higher education. 
A Learned Clergy and a Lettered People 
We shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eies of all 
people are upon us; soe that if wee shall deale 
falsely with our god in this wee have undertaken 
and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help 
from us, wee shall be made a story and by-word 
through the world. 
John Winthrop 
(in a sermon while aboard 
ship, heading to the New 
World)^ 
Winthrop well expresses the Puritan sense of destiny in coming 
to the New World. They left England believing that the efforts at 
reform of the church were failing, that the Protestant efforts to 
reform Europe as well had only gone part way, that they needed further 
guidance, and that they, the Puritans, were being called into the 
wilderness to establish a true orthodoxy, a City upon a Hill. As a 
Puritan said "...that which other Nations have not attained to this 
day, may by the blessing of God be reached by us." 
While some of their Puritan brethren in England viewed their 
migration as a flight from the battle, they viewed their move as a 
maneuver against the Anglican Church, which they were still determined 
to dominate eventually. It was in this spirit that the Puritans 
founded the Bay Colony in 1630, and subsequently Harvard College in 
1636.^ 
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In the introductory chapter of The American College and 
University, Frederick Rudolph suggested that there has been too much 
emphasis on the "narrow religious purpose" Harvard and other early 
American colleges, a position echoed by Richard Hofstadter as well. 
Indeed, Morison argues that "the two cardinal principles of English 
Puritanism which most profoundly affected the social development of 
New England and the United States were not religious tenets, but 
educational ideals: a learned clergy and a lettered people."^ 
While this emphasis on the Puritan concern for "education for 
posterity" dispels one false impression-^namely that they were 
unintellectual religious enthusiasts--it seems likely to create 
another, an impression that the Puritan concern for education was 
somehow separate from and more important than the place religion held 
in their lives. Nothing was more important than their religion, but 
they thought of religion in the broadest terms, penetrating all 
aspects of society, as did Calvin. That they were not solely 
concerned with training ministers is true: they were equally 
concerned with educating their magistrates in piety, so that they 
would work harmoniously with the ministers in maintaining the City of 
God. It was not that theology alone was studied but that all was 
studied from the perspective of theology, as we will discuss later. 
On the other hand, the Puritans were more concerned with the 
intellect than an emphasis on their piety might suggest. They prized 
both intellect and piety, and there was an ongoing tension between the 
two, as Hofstadter points out: 
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Puritanism has always required a delicate balance 
between the intellect, which was deemed as 
essential to true religion in New England, and 
emotion, which was necessary to the strength and 
durability of Puritan piety. This balance proved 
to be precarious...” 
In one sense. Harvard College was founded in order to maintain this 
balance. Therefore, much of what follows is an examination of the 
relationship among intellect, emotion, and piety. 
When I speak of the "Puritan" in the following pages, it is 
primarily the minister-leaders, the purest of the Puritans, whom I 
have in mind, and their concerns were not always identical with those 
who followed them. As Norman Petit writes: 
The settlers were mainly concerned with preserving 
their freedom and economy, while the clergy 
struggled to preserve the ritual structure of the 
churches; and indifference to the inner life became 
more and more pronounced.' 
Even in the early days, as the story goes, one minister preaching to 
an outlying village congregation was told" "Sir, you are mistaken: 
you think you are preaching to the people of the Bay; our main end is 
to catch fish." 
That the "mood" varied among the ministers according to their 
individual temperments may also be assumed; some would emphasize the 
depravity of their audience in order to humble them into submission to 
the word of God; others would emphasize the importance of striving for 
individual salvation. There was nevertheless a certain shared frame 
of mind concerning God's relation to man, with clear lines separating 
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orthodoxy from heresy, and it is these rudiments which we will now 
consider. 
The Problem of Human Nature 
To the Puritan "the infinite variety of the world's misery (is) 
reducible to a concrete problem, the relationship of the individual to 
the One. ° And this problem was man made in the form of Adam's fall 
from grace which "has put all out of order, and has brought Confusion 
and Desolation on the works of God." God created a splendid universe 
based on a majestic plan, but man ruined it through his own weakness, 
and in the process lost his ability to comprehend God's will. An 
inner conversion was the door through which one regained a feeling of 
harmony with this divine plan. Thus, as with Calvin, the conversion 
was the most significant event in the life of the Puritan, and it 
was not wrought by "morall perswasion" but by God's powerful 
intervention. While the process of regeneration remained a mystery, 
"the translation from sin to grace was so abrupt that a man could tell 
when it happened to himself, and others could recognize the outward 
evidence. 
And more hinged upon this conversion than a feeling of harmony 
with God's divine plan. One's salvation was at stake, or at least 
seemed to be. While Calvin had believed that only a comparatively few 
individuals were predestined to be saved, and all others damned, it is 
not surprising that the Calvinists after him came to think that they, 
being the best people that they knew, were probably the elect. The 
American Puritans tended to go a step further and believed that true 
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conversion Implied true election. Believing also that this true 
conversion was detectable by their fellow Puritans gave them even more 
essurance on this score. Yet, one could never be sure, since one 
could only be imperfectly sanctified, given human depravity; thus, 
even those who thought they were "the elect were not always certain; 
they had their fluctuations of doubt and their melancholy lapses from 
grace." Their ministers played upon their fear that God might 
withdraw his help in this life, even though they might be saved in the 
next, using plagues and crop failures as evidence of God's displeasure. 
However, to explain the Puritan striving simply in terms of fear 
of damnation or disaster befalling them is to miss the heart of the 
true Puritan, although we may suspect fear to be the motivation of the 
less devout. According to Miller the true Puritan has motivated by 
the "rellish and taste of the sweetness of God's love" rather than 
fear. Thomas Hooker, a Puritan Minister, used the metaphor of two 
women and a physician to explain true piety, the one woman being sick 
and wishing to be healed, the other wishing to marry the physician, 
pointing out that the "soule that is carried in a kind of love and 
affection to godliness, he would not have Christ only to heale him, 
but he would be married to Christ. 
Though we may today view Puritan piety as a "gloomy, 
otherworldly, and tragic conception of life," Perry Miller argues that 
the Puritans did not experience it this way. The true Puritan 
welcomed the opportunity to serve God and glorify him in a corrupt 
world. The Puritans thought they had "not only their assurances, but 
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also sometimes their extasies,"—those moments when they would see a 
glimpse of the divine plan and feel harmony with God. Therefore, all 
ordeals were tests to be met with delight. Rather than having a 
tragic view of the world. Miller contends that they lacked a sense of 
tragedy, which, as the sense of sin became less urgent in the 18th 
century, led them to smugness and snobbery. 
The problem the Puritan faced was that he could never be quite 
certain that his actions stenmed from a love of Christ rather than a 
concern for his own salvation and his crops. As Miller sums it up: 
A Puritan was forced to go through life thinking 
that if what he had supposed was his regeneration 
was authentic, he was secure; if it was not, he was 
worse off than ever.^^ 
The machinations of his own depravity must have seemed infinite to the 
Puritan, "for he could undertake self-search, perceive his sin, pray 
for repentance, and then was secretly so satisfied with himself for 
becoming humble as to spoil the whole enterprise." Thus, the Puritan 
was often embroiled in "meticulous and unceasing self-examination," 
and at times so distrusting of himself as to prompt the following 
advice: "Therefore, you had need pray for the repentance of your 
repentance and to beg pardon of all your prayers.Guilt or 
innocence before the Lord did not hinge on what one did but on what 
one intended, so they unceasingly attempted to decipher what their 
true intentions were (and undoubtedly the intentions of others as 
well). 
Thus, Puritan piety was characterized by brief moments of 
ecstasy and clarity and undoubtedly longer periods of doubt and 
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despair. As Miller states: "Puritanism had no use whatsoever for the 
saint who was pure by nature and holy without struggle and 
temptation." However, they did not want their internal struggles to 
become externalized in religious bickering and factionalism. Thus, 
discipline was emphasized, both self-discipline as well as of the 
community upon the individual. And to inform this discipline, to give 
the saints criteria to separate the work of Satan from that of God, a 
system of religious tenets were scrupulously upheld. It was also 
however a traditional aspect of Protestantism that such tenets were 
not simply to be taken upon trust--a notion scorned and attributed to 
Papists—but must be supported by reasons and arguments as well. 
Reason 
If the religion of the Puritans was simply a matter of the 
ecstasy of conversion there would have been little need for the 
founding of Harvard. However, their religion was not simply a piety 
but an intellectual system as well. As Augustine had, the ministers 
argued that one must first believe in order to know, that revelation 
indeed superceded reason and that knowledge itself would not save. 
But while faith was a prerequisite, faith itself was not simply an 
emotional experience but a matter of understanding. The Puritan 
minister Samuel Willard argued: "Faith is grounded upon knowledge, 
for how can a man choose the ways of god unless he knows what they 
are?" If knowledge without faith is empty, "zeale is but a wildefire 
without knowledge," argued John Cotton.And, as we shall soon see. 
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Cotton and other Puritan leaders were very wary of a "wildefire" 
burning out of control. 
The Puritans seem paradoxical because their piety was both 
emotional and intellectual, in a "delicate balance" as Hofstadter 
mentioned. In support of conversion they would condemn reason; in 
support of reason they would condemn overzealousness; what they wanted 
was a perfect combination of the two. The ideal, as Miller states, 
was "guidance of the heart by the mind," but it was a mind guided by 
the truth of Scripture. 
The Protestantism of Luther had begun with the notion that God's 
truth was in the Bible for anyone to see--thus, negating the need for 
the Catholic Church as intermediary between man and God. It quickly 
became evident though that in reading the Bible individuals could see 
different truths. The general conclusion drawn by each of the 
Protestant sects was not that the Biblical message was ambiguous, but 
that their opponents were not using the proper method of 
interpretation. Thus, the truth of the Bible, though not exactly 
self-evident as originally thought, was there to be found by those who 
used logic properly. At least this was the Calvinist view; some sects 
were more anti-rationalist. 
Thus, while the mind was to guide the heart, the mind primarily 
consisted of an ability to interpret the Bible logically. As Charles 
Chauncy, a president of Harvard, argued: 
Yea how shall a man know when a Scripture is 
wrested, or falsely applyed, or a false use is made 
of it, or a false consequence is drawn out of it, 
or a true, without some principles of logick. 
108 
Most Skilled, of course, in the use of this logic were the ministers 
themselves, who would have to defend the orthodox theology against 
heresies" and simple "errors." However, they did not reserve their 
carefully reasoned disquisitions for controversies with other scholars 
but used them in their sermons as well, which were lessons to the 
congregations in Ramist logic as well as theology: 
A Puritan preacher never surrenders to feeling; he 
does not celebrate the glories of religion in 
sustained paeans or bring home its terrors by 
shouting, but argues his way step by step, 
inexorably disposing of point after point, quoting 
Biblical verses, citing authorities, watching for 
fallacies in logic, drawing upon the sciences for 
analogies, utilizing any information that seems 
pertinent. 
The Puritans would support piety with reason, but would not 
acknowledge reason when it was used to criticize his doctrines. As 
with John Cotton, "in fundamental and principall points of Doctrine or 
Worship, the Word of God in such things is so clear, that he cannot 
but be convinced in Conscience of the dangerous error of his way after 
once or twice admonition..." The dissenter who illustrates the 
fallibility of reason "is not persecuted for Cause of Conscience, but 
for sinning against his Owne Conscience.The Puritan was not about 
to have his tenets undermined by reason; reason used in such a way was 
obviously not "right reason." We can see how such fine distinctions 
were confusing to the layman. 
Given this somewhat arbitrary application of reason and logic by 
the clergy, their warnings about its fallibility, and the great 
emphasis placed on emotional conversion, it is not surprising that the 
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layman came to question exactly why such a learned clergy was 
necessary. For the clergy this was exactly the wrong conclusion to 
reach from their preachings, especially when one argued for it 
publicly as did Anne Hutchinson. 
The Hutchinson controversy is particularly significant for our 
purposes, since it formed the backdrop of the founding of Harvard and 
forced the magistrates and ministers to delay the actual establishment 
of the college until Hutchinson and her followers were dealt with. 
Not only did Hutchinson question the need for a learned clergy, she 
also argued that once "the Holy Ghost dwells in a justified person" 
the saint should "surrender his will to the promptings and propulsions 
from within." This was the "wildefire" of which Cotton warned, for 
who knew what one might be prompted to do or say by an inner voice? 
Governor Winthrop imagined such thinking leading to ethical anarchy, 
and, after a church synod excommunicated Hutchinson, he banished her 
from the colony.^^ 
If there had been any doubt among the Puritan leaders about the 
urgent need for a college, the Hutchinson controversy quelled it. 
Whatever fine phrases were used, such as "learning for posterity, the 
founders of Harvard must have also been motivated by the fear of the 
overzealousness of their own followers. Harvard would help to 
maintain the balance, which would tip once again towards emotion in 
the Great Awakening of the 18th century. 
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The Purpose of Harvard College 
Now, what was the purpose of all this effort? The 
usual explanation is that Harvard and the other 
colonial colleges were intended to educate 
ministers. This is only a half-truth. The dynamic 
motive, to be sure was to train up a learned 
ministry...But the purpose of the founders was much 
broader than that; and the curriculum they 
established was not a divinity curriculum.^® 
Samuel Eliot Mori son 
Mori son is the recognized authority on the history of Harvard 
College, and his views have influenced all others writing on early 
American higher education. In reading Morison it is helpful to 
understand that his major works were written in the 1930's in reaction 
to the anti-Puritan histories written in the 1920's , most notably 
those of James Truslow Adams and V. L. Parrington. Morison's works 
balance his predecessor's harsh portrait by emphasizing the more 
humane aspects of Puritan life, not always, unfortunately, entirely 
accurately. He tells us, for example, that in Harvard's early years 
the liberal arts were studied as well as theology, implying that 
Harvard offered what we might think of as a traditional, balanced 
liberal education. Yet Perry Miller writes that the curriculum was an 
attempt "to combine in one systematic belief both piety and the 
inherited body of knowledge," suggesting a clear subordination of 
knowledge to systematic belief. Morison's desire to humanize the 
Puritans leads him to minimize the fact that the liberal arts were 
addressed to a training in orthodoxy just as theology was. 
Ill 
Miller, once a student of Morrison and eventually the most 
acclaimed scholar of Puritanism, could see the conflict between the 
Puritan s style of humanism and liberal education. Their aim was for 
students to absorb not reflect upon knowledge: 
Puritan education did not intend that students 
think for themselves, but it did intend that they 
should take in the vast quantity of received and 
orthodox information.^^ 
With Miller's help let us reflect a moment on the nature of 
Puritanical humanism by focusing upon two aspects of the early Harvard 
College: its role in maintaining the Puritan orthodoxy and the 
organization of the college and its curriculum which were designed to 
fulfill this role. 
In reference to the contention of Harvard's founders that the 
college was formed with broad educational purposes in mind. Perry 
Miller comments: 
instead of being a charter of academic liberalism, 
it was rather a manefesto of orthodoxy against 
radicals who had contended, or were then 
contending, that religion and preaching should be 
taken out of the control of colleges and 
professors. 
On the other hand Mori son sees the issue as intellectual versus anti- 
intel 1 ectual, assuming falsely that "the advancement and perpetuation 
of learning was one and the same with a succession of literate 
ministers" (Miller).The followers of Hutchinson were hostile 
toward classical learning ("What has Christ to do with Apollo?") but 
their hostility was particularly aimed at the assumed connection 
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between this education and religion, a position held by some In 
England as well and known as Antinomianism. 
Antinomians were not tolerated in the Bay Colony, so we have no 
direct evidence of their reaction to the situation there, but we can 
look at their counterparts in England. There, two well known 
advocates of Antinomianism, William Dell and John Webster, professed 
to have no quarrel with education per se; they objected to making 
learning "...the criteria of a candidates fitness for the ministry." 
They argued that ministers, like geniuses, were not made by education 
but born of the spirit. 
Miller suggests that ministers defending the necessity of a 
learned clergy had not entirely disinterested motives: 
The clergy had a base and ulterior motive in 
defending the schools...they loved learning neither 
for its own sake nor for its assistance to faith, 
but simply because it got them privileges and 
worldly power. 
Learning and worldly power and privilege were all one, united issue to 
the mind of the Puritan founders for whom society, economics, and the 
will of God were one and the same. They perceived themselves as the 
indispensable instruments of God's will and, without any consciously 
self-interested motives, defended learning because they themselves 
were learned; what was good for them and their kind was identical to 
what was best for society. In defending learning the founders were 
defending orthodoxy and the social status quo as well, most 
particularly their own. 
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We should consider the purpose of the intellect as understood by 
the Puritan minister-founders. The Puritans placed a high value on 
the intellect, but it was an intellect expected to deduce the truth in 
that which was already acknowledged. When Henry Dunster, the second 
president of Harvard, concluded through his own thinking that infant 
baptism was unscriptural, he was forced to resign for upholding such a 
Baptist heresy.23 And, as we all know Roger Williams was rewarded for 
his arguments in favor of religious tolerance by banishment. 
If the Calvinist "slogans and injunctions...were not conceived 
as limiting the scope of learning," as Mori son asserts, it was only 
because whatever was to be learned was to be learned in a way 
congenial to Puritan orthodoxy. As Charles Chauncy, the third 
president, declared in 1655, "only those works suitable* to 
Christianity were to be used in the classroom." Many Greek and Roman 
works were included, but only because of the Puritan ingenuity in 
finding support for their orthodoxy in them. As Miller states; 
They tortured texts of great writers and did 
violence to meaning in order to prove that the 
agreement between pagans and revelation resulted 
not only from the inherent similarity of the law of 
nature with the Gospel, but from actual 
plagiarizing by Greeks and Romans of Jewish lore. 
They particularly interpreted Plato in this 
fashion.2^ 
They studied a broad curriculum but not in the spirit of inquiry or 
speculdtion. Instead, it was a way of verifying the troth of 
orthodoxy by revealing that God's plan was so imprinted in nature that 
even the poor pagan could perceive some of it 
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Still It would have been impossible for generations of students 
to have read the classics without some glimmerings of the 
possibilities beyond orthodoxy. Lawrence Cremin sagely speculates: 
...whatever the spirit in which the classics were 
taught, there was certainly immense diversity in 
the manner in which they were learned; indeed the 
ideas gleaned from them were doubtless discussed, 
disputed, and eventually acted upon in ways quite 
at odds with what Harvard's founders had 
intended. 
And Miller has also suggested that while studying the liberal arts 
students encountered ideas that could not entirely be subjugated to 
orthodox interpretation. Surely education at Harvard did stimulate 
some thought, enough thought, in fact, that by 1716 good Puritans like 
Cotton Mather could no longer look upon it as a bulwark of Puritan 
faith. 
The founders of Harvard wanted their lay leaders and their 
ministry to share a common knowledge and a common logic so that the 
magistrates would agree with John Cotton and his successors "that in 
fundamental and principal points of Doctrine or Worship the word of 
God is so clear" that Church decisions would be supported, as the 
banishment of Anne Hutchinson was supported by Governor Winthrop, a 
governor as well as minister of the Church. And they wanted the logic 
taught at the college to trickle down through sermons to the 
unsophisticated layman, for logic was seen as a corrective to sinful 
passions and heresies, which might wreak havoc upon the established 
order. Mori son sees the founding of Harvard as the creation of a 
bulwark of the intellect "in a country where social and economic 
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conditions fostered crude materialism, pietistic conceit, and 
complacement ignorance," but it can also be seen as a bulwark for 
maintaining the pietistic social order and the place of the ministers 
on top of this order. 
Although we have not considered it in this light, the Puritan 
piety, as well as Protestantism in general, ironically nurtured 
individualism by its emphasis on the personal relationship God had 
with each individual, "who in the final analysis had no other 
responsibility but his own welfare." While it was assumed there was 
only one correct interpretation of the Bible and God's plan, some 
individuals could not be prevented from concluding that since it was 
their own salvation which was at stake, the interpretation should be 
their own. To combat this, Protestant theologians developed 
increasingly elaborate systems of "proof" to safeguard the "right" 
interpretation from the many wrongs ones. In establishing Harvard the 
founders were protecting against such "misguided" individualism and 
thereby protecting the pietistic social order itself.*^' 
This brings us to our second point-~the organization of the 
college and its curriculum that would maintaih this orthodoxy. It was 
not enough for the studeht at Harvard to take in "the vast quantity of 
received orthodox information"; he was also expected to make use of 
it. The curriculum was organized according to a doctrine called 
"technologia," which was "an assertion that the arts direct conduct to 
ends enunciated by God."^® Whatever was seen as "unserviceable" for 
translating the will of God into rules and precepts for action was 
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ruled out. Logic in order words was primarily addressed to the 
organization of knowledge rather than inquiry or speculation. To be 
learned was the logical system of interpretation that had been 
developed over the previous decades by Calvinist theoreticians, and 
the essential point conveyed was that the right doctrine had already 
been deduced. All that was left was the essential task of applying it 
to one's life and to society at large. 
Puritans would have been surprised to know that over the next 
two centuries their educational ideas were attacked for their lack of 
utility, since to them they were eminently utilitarian; theirs was an 
education in how to make a world in keeping with God's will. As many 
Harvard theses would repeat during the seventeenth century: "Art is a 
method of various precepts useful to life."^^ In this they were 
echoing the words of William Ames, the teacher of their ancestors at 
Cambridge, who had written: "Every art consists of rules, whereby 
some Act of the creature is directed.To Miller, the ingeniousness 
of this approach lies in "its integrating conduct with the very 
definition of knowledge." And he concludes that "there can be no doubt 
that Protestantism in its Calvanist form encouraged the shift of 
emphasis in theology and philosophy from contemplation to action, from 
beatitude to utility." Having prescribed "the limits and ends of all 
disciplines and faculties" the Puritans came to believe that there was 
no need for "metaphysics as distinct from other disciplines," and in 
1653 theses metaphysicae disappeared in the Harvard commencement 
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exercises, and theses technologicae were added the following year. 
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To the Puritan the imponderables of knowledge had been pondered and 
organized; the purpose of higher education was to inculcate in the 
student this way of seeing the world. 
The desire for such inculcation and the attendant power of 
control was evident for years to come in the lay board of trustees and 
the development of the "Collegiate Way." Jergen Herbst suggests that 
historians, such as Morison and Rudolph, have not looked closely at 
the governmental structure of the early colleges. In the case of 
Harvard they have inferred from curriculum similarities with Emmanuel 
Col 1 ege--where many of the Puritan elite were originally schooled— 
that the American college was modeled after the English, with some 
changes made out of necessity. To Daniel Boorstin lay control was 
just good old Yankee ingenuity at work: "...lay boards of control 
helped marshal...limited resources and kept the college in touch with 
the whole community, without whose support there would have been no 
college at all."^^ However, as Herbst points out, lay boards of 
control had long been a characteristic of Protestant education, 
stemming from the desire of these reformers to bring educational 
institutions under the control of representatives of the civil and 
ecclesiastical order. Before 1636, such boards were operating in 
Geneva, Leyden, and Edinburgh as well as in the post Reformation 
English grammar schools. Given the Calvinist insistence upon 
orthodoxy, one might well infer that the board members had more in 
mind than simply marshaling the support of the community. 
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As for the collegiate Way of Living," Morison suggests "it was 
only by living as members of the same collegiate community, in 
constant association with one another and their tutors, that the young 
men could really be educated." This rosy image of a community of 
scholars takes on a different coloration in David A11mendinger's 
description of communal dining at Harvard. 
Communal dining in this style involved much more 
than convenience and economy. Commons was an 
instrument of discipline, manners and power. The 
Harvard laws of 1734 required students to sit in 
their places, "behave themselves decently and 
orderly," and wait for the blessing before eating, 
"and whosoever shall be rude or clamorous at such 
times, or shall go out of the Hall before thanks be 
returned. Shall be punished by one of the tutors, 
not exceeding five shillings."^^ 
This was how "young men could really be educated," and why Cotton 
Mather spoke so approvingly of the "Collegiate Way," for it was a way 
of overseeing the manners and morals of the students, and of 
"protecting" them from the vices of the surrounding community. 
Learning at Harvard was, from its founding, subservient to the 
Puritans' emphasis on remaking the world in accordance with God's 
plan, their reliance on compulsion and regulation in doing so, their 
tendency to reduce knowledge to make it more useful to enacting the 
plan, their intolerance of any opinions that contradicted the one true 
Christian way, and their dislike of intellectual novelty. Certainly 
when learning came to challenge orthodoxy, as it did in 18th century 
Harvard, it had advanced too far for the true Puritan s taste. He had 
no desire to perpetuate this learning to posterity and switched his 
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allegiance to Yale, which, in Rudolph's words "proceeded to make a 
place for itself in the sun by being what it was said Harvard had 
promised to be—a safe, sound institution where the faith of the 
fathers was carefully protected."35 
Conclusion 
While liberalism often is portrayed as a rejection of what I 
have been describing, it is rather the case that liberalism grew out 
of Puritanism and retained much of its spirit. All the Puritan 
virtues were retained in the Protestant work ethic as was the Puritan 
emphasis upon reasoned self-control. Liberalism continued the shift 
in emphasis in religion and philosophy from contemplation to action 
and retained the Puritan sense that right reasons leads to right 
action. And liberalism retained the Puritan zeal for perfecting 
society, but put its faith in science rather than Biblical revelation 
for determining the outline of God's plan. 
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CHAPTER V 
LIBERALIZING LIBERAL EDUCATION 
In the first chapter I described the "liberal mind" and its 
ideology that colors and shapes our present day thinking. In this 
chapter I will outline how the liberal ideology developed in this 
country and also trace its incursion into higher education, showing 
how it has become our prevailing mode of educational thought. 
The cornerstone of the liberal ideology has always been the 
primacy of the individual and his or her "natural rights" over and 
against those in authority. The liberal tradition in American 
education--as distinct from the tradition of liberal education—has 
most importantly been the gradual incorporation of this principle of 
liberty into the thought and structure of higher education. Along 
with this principle of liberty came a whole set of related assumptions 
and emphases, developed largely by Locke and the 18th century 
philosophes of the Enlightenment. Liberalism is characterized by the 
secular nature of its thought, its faith in science, its acceptance of 
capitalistic individualism, and its emphasis upon future possibilities 
and new knowledge rather than traditional arrangements of thought. 
Another point to keep in mind is that our present day sense of 
this ideology has been influenced by the natural equalitarianism of 
American history. Classical 1 iberalism was not democratic, and the 
European philosophes tended not to share Rousseau's optimism about 
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human nature. However, our interpretations of the Enlightenment have 
tended to stress both equality and optimism about human nature, and 
our liberalism has become democratic. 
In the last chapter I focused on the Puritan perspective which 
is necessary to understand because the liberalization of American 
higher education has largely been a matter of replacing the Puritan 
perspective with that of the liberal Enlightenment. Just such a shift 
in perspectives led to the rise of the universities in the late 19th 
century. This process of liberalization freed the concept of liberal 
education from the Puritan emphasis on discipline and piety but led to 
a new set of emphases, and a new way of thinking that has distorted 
and confused the concept of liberal education as much as the Puritans 
did. 
My chapter begins with a description of the origins of the 
liberal ideology in the thought of Locke and the philosophers who 
succeeded him. I will then describe the interplay among Puritanism, 
Classical liberalism, and American equal itarianism which made 19th 
century liberalism largely a liberal Puritanism wrapped in democratic 
rhetoric. I will then discuss the three stages of the liberalization 
of higher education: The first stage was a period of the gradual 
incursion of Enlightenment thought into higher education, and the 
formulation of an enlightened liberal vision of higher education as a 
challenge to the vision of the conservative Puritan. The second stage 
began after the Civil War when laissez faire liberalism, in the form 
of the elective principle, opened up the classical college to become a 
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university in accordance with the enlightened liberal vision. The 
third stage began in this century with John Dewey's reconstruction of 
liberalism which gave "liberal education" a whole new meaning. 
The chapter will also emphasize the difficulties traditional 
humanists faced earlier in the century trying to revitalize the 
tradition of liberal education amidst the burgeoning universities. 
Dewey's influence added an entirely new dimension to the problems the 
humanists faced, for while they were trying to renovate the 
traditional concept of liberal education, Dewey was proposing an 
entirely new model, from a new perspective. 
John Locke and the Enlightenment Theory of Progress 
John Locke: Progenitor of the 
Modern Liberal Mind 
Though the word "liberalism" was not used until the 19th 
century, its fundamental principles can be traced to John Locke. 
Locke lived through a period of great political turmoil in England, 
turmoil infused with religious hostility between Protestants and 
Catholics, as well as between the Anglican Church and its own Puritan 
faction, and other Protestant sects. Locke sought a principle of 
political legitimacy that was based neither upon divine right nor 
tradition. 
In A Second Treatise of Government, published in 1690, Locke 
argued that the authority of government derives from the consent of 
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the governed, and that government's sole purpose is to protect the 
hatural rights of property, to protect the interests of the mercantile 
class, of which he was a part, from a government dominated by nobles 
and the king. In ascribing natural rights to individuals, Locke 
initiated a new idea in political philosophy, and gradually these 
"rights" would expand to include freedom of the press and free speech 
as liberalism evolved.^ 
Locke's thought was modern in that he based his arguments upon 
natural law rather thah upon God's will or tradition, and he made the 
political event which had given him the freedom to publish the 
Treati se, the Revolution of 1689, seem a triumph of natural law. In 
the preface to the Treatise Locke stated that the new king of England, 
William of Orange, was "the only one of all lawful governments" to 
govern by the consent of the people.^ The revolution could have been 
viewed simply as one group of nobles overthrowing another, but Locke 
gave the event a new and different meaning. In the minds of the 
philosophes who came after him it would signify progress in human 
affairs, a first step towards an international community of nations 
governed by the consent of the people.'^ 
Locke was also modern in his emphasis on religious toleration, 
which he believed not only humane but also necessary for political 
stability; a theory of knowledge based upon empirical observation; and 
an emphasis on an education that is useful and pays attention to 
student interests. Over time these educational emphases would become 
magnified, even distorted, and certain of Locke s overstatements were 
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used to represent h1s views, e.g., "of all men we meet with, nine 
parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their 
education," and "I imagine the minds of children as easily turned this 
or that way as water Itself."'' In such statements lie the beginnings 
of the liberal's faith In education as the primary Instrument for 
perfecting society. It Is Important to note, though, that Locke's 
emphasis on a practical education was particularly aimed at those 
people who were not destined by social class to become gentlemen. 
This is significant because Lockeian liberalism is rooted in the 
assumption that only a few will be sufficiently educated to be 
reasonable enough to govern. Locke was not a democrat, and he 
addressed his educational essay to the "gentlemen" rather than to 
"those of the meaner sort." He looked to the gentlemen, for if they 
"are by their education once set right, they will quickly bring all 
the rest into order.Thus, Locke's sense of liberal education, like 
the American Puritans' was an education based upon the classics, and 
his primary criticism of this education was that too much time was 
spent in rote memorization of Latin and in disputations.^ 
Just as Locke was not a democrat, neither were most of the 
philosophes who succeeded him in the 18th century. They shared with 
him the emphasis upon the secularization of ideas and politics, the 
attendant emphasis on reason and science, the toleration of religious 
differences, and the faith in the power of education, for at least the 
few if not the many. 
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Lib6rd1is[n and the Theory of Progress 
In the 13th century philosophes such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, 
and our own Franklin and Jefferson further developed and publicized 
the modern mind as in Locke. Most notably they developed a theory of 
progress which included a faith in the perfectibility of society. 
Central to the philosophers thought was the question of social 
organization. As Henry Steele Commanger has pointed out, what 
distinguished the philosophe from the philosopher was that the former 
was interested in "those truths which might be useful here and now," 
while the philosopher carried on a "search for truth which was both 
universal and permanent."^ For useful truths, the philosophes 
particularly looked to science. Though Locke had influenced their 
thinking, they based their theory of progress upon the science of 
Newton. Following Newton's conception of natural law, which had 
influenced Locke as well, they believed that society could be 
organized in such a way as to allow for the continuous improvability 
of the human condition, if in the process mankind could be freed from 
the superstitions of organized religion and tradition. With the 
noteable exception of Rousseau, the European philosophes did not have 
a particularly high estimate of human nature--no higher than 
Locke's--but their faith in science was sufficient for them to believe 
that society could be organized to become more humane despite the 
Q 
limitations of human nature.° 
The philosophes' emphasis on enlightened social organization was 
always interwoven with Lockeian political theory in the evolution of 
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liberalism. In the course of such evolution, however, emphases and 
interpretations changed, and it will be helpful to keep the general 
nature of these changes in mind. While both 19th and 20th century 
liberalism share the assumption that society will progress if it is 
organized in accordance with natural law, the interpretation of the 
right social organization and education has changed as society has 
become more complex and democratic. To the classic liberal, natural 
law suggested that laissez faire economics and politics formed the 
best approach to increasing the wealth of nations and in turn 
developing a more humane society. As Kenneth Dolbeare has stated, 
classical liberalism "emphasized self-interest as the principle 
motivational force in social life."^ The classic liberal believed in 
giving this motivation free reign, based upon the argument that 
laissez faire economics expressed the natural law of the marketplace. 
As Adam Smith had argued in 1776, organized interests, such as the 
guilds and the privileged companies, were bad for society since they 
worked against the natural law of the market. Capitalism was fit into 
the Enlightenment vision of progress and gave material substance to 
this sense of progress. Enlightenment humanitarianism also had a 
place in this theory, but was guided by the principle of laissez faire 
as well. The classic liberal tended to believe that education, 
charity, and personal matters in general should be left to private 
initiative, using the increasing wealth of the free market economy. 
This sense of liberalism peaked in the rugged individualism of the 
late 19th century. 
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The rapid urbanization, industrialization, and democratization 
of American life in the late 19th early 20th centuries gave rise to a 
new interpretation of natural law. In John Dewey's view, mankind did 
not best survive as individuals but as collective groups, and the 
rugged individualist was not an answer to social problems but a source 
of them. While the classic liberal believed government should do as 
little as possible, the 20th century liberal would place increasing 
emphasis on the positive use of state power both to regulate the 
marketplace and to create a more humanitarian society through support 
of educational and social programs. 
The hineteenth century liberal viewed liberalism education as 
central to progress, but it was an education aimed at developing 
stauch individualists who would lead in the direction of the 
enlightened society. The liberal vision of education in this century 
is far more pervasive and the liberal's reliance upon it much greater. 
Education will control the "future through shaping the thought, 
action, and character of its citizens.In this all pervasive sense 
of an education in liberalism, the traditional concept of liberal 
education has largely disintegrated. It is this disintegration that 
we will now trace. 
Liberalism in the Young Republic 
The histories written in this century have too often been 
written from what Clarence Karier has called a liberal humanitarian 
perspective in which the liberal, the enlightened, and the democratic 
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all blend together into a theory of progress which, in turn, is 
implicitly equated with the good. As commonly told, the story becomes 
one of ascension from the somber darkness of Puritanism into the light 
of the liberal democratic Enlightenment.^^ Such liberal histories 
obscure the Lockeian roots of liberalism and its general compatibility 
with Puritanism. They also tend to ignore the fact that Jefferson's 
liberalism was elitist and that the college presidents who led the 
rise of the universities were liberal Puritans. It was precisely 
their Puritanism that provided the zeal with which they sold the idea 
of higher education to a public largely indifferent to it, if not 
hostile. 
Therefore, in this section I will describe 19th century 
liberalism by suggesting how it evolved out of the interplay between 
Puritanism, the Enlightenment, capitalism, and the equalitarian nature 
of the American context. In broad ways I will describe similarities 
and distinctions among the liberal and conservative Puritans, 
democratic liberals and the populist democrats. I emphasize the broad 
nature of these distinctions since they will necessarily be 
simplistic, but they must be drawn if we are to free ourselves from 
the blinders of 20th century liberal humanitarianism. 
Let us begin by placing Lockeian liberalism in the American 
context with the help of Louis Hartz. In The Liberal Tradition in 
America, Hartz argues that our liberalism especially begins and ends 
with Locke, that we have not progressed in terms of our liberalism but 
have simply maintained it in the face of changing circumstances. The 
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colonists even before the American Revolution were "born free" with 
the Lockeian principles of private property, the atomistic society, 
popular sovereignty, and natural rights already established. For 
Hartz, the outstanding point to keep in mind is that American 
liberalism had no feudal system to struggle against, no aristocracy 
for the liberal to assault in the name of the people.As a 
consequence, after the Revolution Lockeian liberals like John Adams 
and the federalists were left in the awkward position of imnediately 
becoming conservative, facing too many Americans who mistakenly took 
the rhetoric of equality to include them. Alan Heimert points out 
that when it came time to develop a constitution Adams was most 
concerned with placing checks on the power of the multitude, in spite 
of years of arguing for the arousal of the "people" as a control upon 
arbitrary government. 
Adams was a liberal Puritan and his view reflects that of the 
Puritan elite in general, whether liberal or conservative. What 
distinguished the Boston "liberals" from more conservative Puritans 
was their religious beliefs not their political ones. The Boston 
Puritans were "liberal" because they based their Calvinism upon 
empirical observation and reason, believing that "God's will could 
best be derived, not from His word, but from His works.Their 
particular emphasis on reason also made them more receptive to the 
Enlightenment emphasis on "useful" education based upon the sciences 
and other modern subjects, though they preferred to keep "Harvard a 
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house of learning under the spirit of religion" rather than be secular 
in nature.^^ 
Politically, the liberal and conservative Puritan elite were 
united in their fear of the irrational or selfish multitudes and their 
desire to keep government in the hands of the well-born and 
well-educated. The liberal, or rationalist, clergy of Boston was at 
best tepid in its support of the Revolution. They "were in the 
1770's, nearly to a man, if not outright Tories, then praying that the 
magistrates and merchants to whose judgment they deferred would subdue 
the revolutionary enthusi asm. Over the previous fifty years the 
Puritan elite had faced enough revolutionary enthusiasm in the form of 
the Great Awakening. 
The Puritan elite were also liberals in terms of capitalist 
economics. Calvinism had always been congenial to capitalism, and 
most of the American Puritans had come from the mercantile class in 
England. Although the early Puritan theocracy held capitalism in 
check, by the 19th century they too tended to believe in laissez faire 
economics. Henry May has summed up the situation: Organized 
Protestantism supported the dominant economic beliefs and institutions 
even more unanimously than it accepted the existing forms of 
government.Calvinism had always seen value in the hard work and 
saving of capitalism, and the protestant work ethic is perhaps the 
most obvious legacy of this Calvinism. 
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All Of this suggests that by the time of the Revolution 
liberalism and Puritanism were hardly opposites. Such tension as 
there was lay between the Puritan elite and the democratic liberals 
such as Jefferson and Tom Paine, between the Boston view of liberalism 
and that of Philadelphia. Jefferson welcomed the French Revolution 
Adams decried It and Its slogan: "Liberty, equality, fraternity." 
Jefferson was optimistic about government In the hands of the 
multitudes; Adams was pessimistic. We now see Jefferson as the 
liberal and Adams as the conservative. 
Such a distinction is hardly accurate though, since Jefferson's 
liberalism was as elitist as that of Adams. Jefferson shared with the 
liberal Puritans the belief that the nation needed an elite of highly 
educated leaders. The most significant difference between Jefferson 
and the liberal Puritans was their disagreement about whether this 
elite should be a "natural aristocracy" culled from all classes or 
should continue to be made up of the rich and well-born. 
The significant similarity of Jefferson's liberalism and the 
Puritans' is most evident in contrast to the populist or Jacksonian 
"liberal" who saw no need for specialized training for democratic 
leadership, and viewed Jefferson's University of Virginia as simply 
another bastion of privilege. Yet even here the distinction blurs 
when we realize that a typical Jacksonian was one who had almost, but 
not quite, succeeded in becoming privileged himself, and that "every 
stroke of his axe and hoe made him a capitalist. Richard 
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Hofstadter states: in the Jacksonian period the democratic upsurge 
was closely linked to the ambitions of the small capitalist."22 
These distinctions and their tendency to blur suggest a far more 
complex situation than that presented in liberal humanitarian 
histories in which heroes and villans are clear. My own summary, 
though necessarily oversimplified, would emphasize these points: In 
the 18th and 19th centuries a vision of liberalism education was 
developed by liberal Puritans and Jeffersonians who largely agreed 
upon the kind of higher education America should have. The vision was 
opposed by the conservative Puritans who controlled the colleges and 
soon would also be opposed by the Jacksonian democrats who resented 
their exclusion. The enlightened liberal vision of higher education 
emphasized "usefulness," but only a very high minded "usefulness." 
The enlightened liberals were no more inclined to let the people 
decide what higher education should be than were the conservative 
Puritans. 
However, in order to sell their vision of an intellectual 
aristocracy to the Jacksonians, whose support they needed, the 
liberals increasingly portrayed this vision in terms that most 
Americans could appreciate. At a time when "being good" was giving 
way to "making good"--as Randolph Bourne describes the nineteenth 
century--the liberals promoted their vision as a vehicle for economic 
and social mobility. 
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Higher Education Before the Civil War 
Prior to the Civil War, higher education emphasized the 
conservative Puritan values of discipline and piety. The broad thrust 
of the liberal's efforts was to replace the Puritan emphasis on the 
supernatural and biblical revelation with an emphasis on the natural 
world and reason. The liberal tradition was centered upon efforts to 
free higher education from the influence of religious orthodoxy, and 
was most clearly represented by Jefferson's enlightened liberal vision 
of higher education embodied in the University of Virginia. Such 
liberal reformers and their enlightened views had only very limited 
success during the period before the Civil War, but they initiated the 
direction higher education would take in the latter half of the 19th 
century and so must be understood. 
Even prior to the Revolution the Enlightenment vision had made a 
few inroads into the eight colleges of the colonies. The broadest 
influence upon the curriculum was that of Newtonian empiricism, 
largely because even the conservative Calvinist ministry tended to 
believe that empirical science could be harmonized with scripture. By 
1766, six of the eight colleges supported professorships of 
mathematics and natural phi 1osophy.The particular bent of 
Philadelphia towards the Enlightenment is suggested by the 
establishment in 1756 of a three year course of study at the College 
of Philadelphia based upon the principle of usefulness. The 
curriculum placed considerable emphasis on the mastery of written and 
oral English and upon training for government service. Altogether 
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about a third of the program was devoted to science and practical 
studies. According to Frederick Rudolph, this was the first 
systematic course of studies in America that did not derive from the 
medieval tradition nor serve a religious purpose. 
There were several attempts at reforming the colleges along 
liberal Enlightenment lines between the Revolution and the Civil War. 
However, the ascendancy of the Enlightenment vision, asserted by 
Rudolph, was a very slow ascendancy. Most of the attempts at reform 
were short lived, stifled by Puritan conservatism within the colleges 
and "a lack of any overwhelming popular demand for a new kind of 
higher education.The reforms are significant however in what they 
suggest of a new vision of higher education, and we will discuss three 
of those attempts, Jefferson's plan for the University of Virginia, 
George Ticknor's reforms at Harvard, and the experiment at Amherst 
College to integrate the new studies with the old into a core 
curriculum. Jefferson's vision is significant in its articulation of 
the democratic liberal rationale for higher education that we still 
use today, while Ticknor's vision seems to have had more influence and 
is a clearer indication of the interests of liberal academics. The 
Amherst experiment illustrates an attempt to reconcile the liberal 
vision with that of traditional liberal education. 
In order to keep these attempts at reform in perspective, we 
should note that while the number of colleges increased in this period 
from 8 to over 160, most of these colleges had only a handful of 
students and were in continuous financial difficulty. Over "seven 
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hundred colleges died in the United States" before 1860.26 jhus. 
while the liberal reformers were envisioning the development of great 
universities most colleges were barely surviving. 
Jefferson's plan for the University of Virginia, which opened in 
1825, embodied all the elements of the modern liberal university, 
including an emphasis on specialized knowledge. It was relatively 
free of sectarian control, gave students some freedom in their pursuit 
of knowledge, and aimed at placing them in a "high state of 
science."^' Jefferson also provided the rationale for state support 
of higher education by claiming that the central purpose of the 
university was to train democratic leaders. Today in discussions of 
higher education we tend to blend together Jefferson's emphasis upon 
an enlightened citizenry and training leaders for a democracy, but in 
Jefferson's time they were separate issues. In fact, in the 
legislative proposal for the university, Jefferson had included a 
system of public primary schools and academies, but the legislature 
rejected that part of the proposal.2® 
Jefferson's organization of the university emphasized 
specialization. The university was divided into eight schools 
encompassing knowledge old and new: the ancient languages, modern 
languages, mathematics, natural philosophy, natural history, anatomy 
and medicine, moral philosophy and law. While students were allowed 
to proceed at their own pace and choose the order of courses, if they 
wished a degree they were expected to select one school and, once they 
29 did so, they were restricted to taking courses within that school. 
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Student freedom was an aspect of Jefferson's philosophy, but greater 
value was placed on mastering a particular area of knowledge. The 
democratic leader was already becoming a specialist. 
George Ticknor's reforms at Harvard in the 1820s seem another 
indication of the liberal bent towards specialized expertise. After 
four years studying in Germany and traveling through Europe, Ticknor 
joined the Harvard faculty in 1819. A few years later he proposed 
that the Harvard instructional staff be divided into departments of 
study, that students have a degree of selection in their courses, that 
classes be divided according to proficiency, and that everything be 
taught more thoroughly.^® The reforms were strongly opposed by the 
faculty and finally established only in Ticknor's department of modern 
languages, but, according to R. Freeman Butts, Ticknor's reforms were 
in the long run more practically influential than Jefferson's. Both 
Ticknor and Jefferson emphasized student freedom, but Ticknor seemed 
to have little sense of Jefferson's vision of the true place of a 
university in a democracy, while Jefferson had little notion of 
Ticknor's penchant for methods of attaining the most advanced 
scholarship. Eventually American higher education adopted Ticknor's 
emphasis on scholarship using Jefferson's rationale of democratic 
leadership.®^ The experiment at Amherst College in the 1820s 
represents an attempt to integrate the old with the new; it was a 
compromise between conservative and liberal Puritans. The stimulus 
for the change seems to have been the fear that the colleges were "in 
danger of being left behind, in the rapid march of improvement," as 
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stated in a faculty report. The report eventually led to a two-year 
experiment in which a parallel course of study was added that 
emphasized the modern languages and sciences, while many subjects were 
shared with those taking the regular classical course. The experiment 
was abandoned after two years due to lack of funds, lack of student 
interest, and an "undercurrent of faculty skepticism" about the 
project, according to Rudolph. 
From these three examples, it seems that as to the question of 
liberal education, the energy of the liberals pointed in a new 
direction altogether and the energy of the conservatives was aimed at 
maintaining the status quo. 
The problem facing these reformers was the same: either the 
colleges would survive upon their religious zeal, or try to court the 
public by emphasizing a more useful course of studies. The humanist 
sense of liberal education that I have talked about was hardly a 
consideration, for, after all, there was no particular demand for it 
nor any particular advocate. The central question was whether the 
colleges would remain small, pious, and on the periphery of American 
life or whether they could be made into something that more of the 
public wanted or believed they wanted. The central concern for the 
liberal was how to bring the latter alternative about. 
The Dilemma of the Liberal Reformers 
Until late In the 19th century, the liberal reformers faced the 
dilemma of promoting their vision of the liberal university against 
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the opposition of conservative Puritans who controlled the colleges, 
the hostility of the Jacksonian democrats, and the general 
indifference of the public at large. The year 1828 was significant in 
terms of these struggles for it was the year of both the Yale Report 
and the election of Andrew Jackson. As Rudolph states, "the Yale 
Report put the weight of a great American college behind things as 
they were." Mental discipline through the study of the classics as 
well as student recitations was defended and the "ludicrous attempt" 
to emulate the German universities were disavowed. Harvard and 
Virginia might stir up some discussion of educational reform, but 
neither exerted the national influence of Yale or Princeton, which 
supported Yale's conservative stand. These two were training many of 
the enthusiastic founders of new colleges in the West and South and 
clergymen who would become their presidents. 
On the other front the liberals along with the conservatives had 
to face Jacksonian democrats who saw the colleges perpetuating old 
privileges rather than training citizens for democratic leadership. 
The liberal and democrat views of education were at odds in several 
ways. To begin with, the Jacksonian believed no special education was 
necessary for an individual to serve in public office. Secondly, 
while the Jeffersonians were in favor of publicly supported lower 
education as well as higher education, the democrats noticed the 
distinctly unegalitarian education offered at the University of 
Virginia. An editorial in a Virginia newspaper of 1845 reflects the 
Jacksonian spirit in criticizing the state for using public money for 
141 
"instructing from one hundred to one hundred and fifty youths, all of 
whom have the means of finishing their course through their own 
resources.The democratic reputation of the University dropped one 
step further when, in 1856, the legislature revoked the room and board 
provision for state scholarship students because, it was alleged, it 
encouraged "idle habits. 
Another reason the Jacksonians were suspicious of the colleges 
stemmed from the Dartmouth College case of 1819, in which the Supreme 
Court ruled that privately founded colleges were private corporations 
not subject to control of the state even if they received state 
support. The liberal applauded this decision as protection from the 
misguided ideas of the multitudes, while the Jacksonians did not want 
to support colleges they could not control. The result was that 
legislative generosity fell to a low point. 
The Jacksonians believed that institutions should serve all 
equally, and this did not fit well with the ideal of a university 
which obviously only some could attend. The frustration the 
Jeffersonian felt with the Jacksonian is well illustrated by the 
situation faced by President Philip Lindsley of the University of 
Nashville. Arriving in Nashville in 1824 with a vision of a great 
university in the making, he realized by 1829 that was not what the 
natives had in mind: 
The levelling system, which is so popular and 
captivating with the multitude, may be made to 
operate in two ways, with equal success.. .Colleges 
and universities, as implying odious pre-eminence, 
may be prevented from growing up among us: or 
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©very petty village school may be dignified with 
the name and legal attribute of a college.^' 
The liberal's ideal of the university was beset on all sides, and the 
liberal was in a tricky situation. He needed to persuade the democrat 
to believe in his ideal. In his baccalaureate speech of 1829, 
Lindsley sounded the theme that would eventually convince the 
democrat. He argued that the tendency to associate higher education 
with privilege was a relic of the European idea of class which was not 
relevant in America. Thus began the notion of higher education as an 
invitation to achievement in an open and mobile society--Horatio 
Alger, welcome to the university. 
In order for the liberal vision to become believable, the 
college had to change from being largely a ritualistic endeavor in 
which students received diplomas after four years (if they hadn't been 
too unruly)," to a "creation of a professional relationship between 
professors and students willing to compete with other students for 
meritorious recognition."^® The change would produce what Burton 
Bledstein has called a "culture of professionalism,"®^ and required a 
change in the attitudes of the professors, the students, and in the 
institutions themselves. Professors needed to see their work as 
vocations requiring advanced learning rather than being administrative 
and supervisory positions. Students had to think in terms of personal 
identity and destiny rather than the esprit de corp of the dormitory 
or the class, and they had to accept the idea of written examinations 
which had not been a part of the college experience. (Harvard did not 
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conduct its first written exam until 1833, and it was not until 1842 
that President Wayland proposed written examinations at Brown.) 
Altogether the colleges had to be reshaped to fit what Bledstein has 
called the "drive for self-distinction and self-assertion" that 
characterized the 19th century man.^^ 
This movement towards rugged individualism seems to have been 
nurtured by liberal Puritanism. William Ellery Channing, the leader 
of the Boston liberal clergy wrote early in the century: "The only 
elevation of a human being consists in the exercise, growth, energy of 
the higher principles and powers of the soul."^^ Though Unitarians, 
such as Channing, are credited with replacing the Puritan emphasis on 
depravity with an image of the excellence of human nature, there was a 
certain burden that accompanied this new vision. In a pinch, the 
early Puritan could throw up his hands at his own depravity, see his 
dire need for the Grace of God and beg mercy for his undeserving soul. 
But the liberal Puritan blessed with natural excellence was expected 
to elevate himself and to show through his works that he had done so. 
This opportunity for individual elevation became transmuted by 
Ralph Waldo Emerson into the right of every individual to his chance 
of success according to his own uniqueness. Called the "Horatio Alger 
of Education" by Gary Wills,'^^ Emerson strongly influenced audiences 
of college students and young men's associations in the 1840s and 50s. 
Andrew Dickinson White, who would become the president of Cornell, 
recalled that Emerson's lectures "made the greatest impression on me." 
And Charles Eliot reportedly came to know Emerson's essays as well as 
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knew the Bihle. In lectures and essays Emerson told the young .en 
W10 were trying to decide what to do with their llves-with al, that 
natural excellence they were both with-that what was missing In 
American education was an emphasis on each of them, the unique 
interests and talents of each. He also excited them with a vision of 
a distinctly American Intellectual culture, rather than one which 
tamely submitted to a prescribed curriculum from the Old World. A new 
education would be based on "respecting the pupil," understanding that 
"nature arms each man with some faculty which enables him to do easily 
some feat Impossible to any other, and this makes him necessary to 
society." Therefore, education should be shaped so "that each is 
bound to discover what his faculty is. to develop it, and to use it 
for the benefit of mankind. 
Thus was the vision that inspired many of those who would build 
the universities, and it was a vision that they in turn would sell to 
the public. Such individual drive for "self-distinction and 
self-assertion of the "captains of erudition" initiated the rise of 
the universities. As Laurence Veysey has stated: "During the early 
years of the American university movement, until about 1390, academic 
efforts burgeoned largely in spite of the public, not as the result of 
popular acclaim.Such individualism diluted the Jacksonian 
hostility to the budding universities, and at the same time, the 
universities broadened their curriculum options as public primary and 
high schools multiplied late in the century. The Jacksonian hostility 
towards the esoteric knowledge of the professional was assuaged by the 
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possibility that each could become a professional if he, and gradually 
she, had sufficient talent and will power. By the time of the Civil 
War the liberal reformers had hardly solved their dilemna, but its 
hard edges had softened. The appeal of individualism, either 
Emerson s version or the Horatio Alger version, provided a basis for 
an educational consensus between Jeffersonians and Jacksonians. 
That this individualism contradicted the traditional belief in 
the value of a shared learning seemed to bother only the 
conservatives, but in the face of the rapid expansion of knowledge 
they failed to develop a core curriculum that integrated the new with 
the old. The conservative's stance had been to grudgingly allow new 
courses to enter the curriculum while dropping none of the old ones, 
making all courses more superficial in nature. Even the experiment at 
Amherst College seems to reflect a compromise between liberals and 
conservatives rather than an example of a new core curriculum. As 
individualism, in the form of the elective principle, gained greater 
acceptance, core curriculum requirements were continuously reduced, 
undermining the ideal of a shared 1 earning. 
The Eliot Period--1869-1909 
From the Civil War to the end of the century there were drastic 
social and economic changes which aided in the creation of the liberal 
university. This was a period of amazing growth in machine technology 
and large scaled industry; the exploitation of the West proceeded 
faster than ever, aided by the transcontinental railroad; urbanization 
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rapidly increased, and a growing middle class was preparing to pursue 
the "culture of professionalism." 
These developments created a greater demand for more practical 
education and greater private and public funding for education at all 
levels. The number of public high schools, increased from 1,026 in 
1870 to 6,005 by 1900, an indication of the growth and prosperity of 
the period. The Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 provided funding for 
the establishment of state schools of agriculture and engineering. 
Some of these funds helped already established schools, such as 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and California, expand. Accumulated wealth among 
the captains of industry provided funds to endow other colleges such 
as Johns Hopkins, Chicago, Stanford, and Tulane.^^ 
A number of energetic individuals fired by Emerson's words and 
their own desire to make their marks would, as presidents, make 
universities out of colleges: Eliot of Harvard, Noah Porter at Yale, 
Daniel Coit Gilman at Johns Hopkins, Andrew Dickinson White at 
Cornell, Frederick Barnard at Columbia, James McCosh at Princeton, 
James Burrill Angell at Michigan, and John Bascom at Wisconsin, were a 
number of what Thorsten Veblen would later sarcastically call the 
"captains of erudition.These men were themselves partaking of the 
culture of professionalism, and they and their institutions were 
consciously competitive with each other. At mid-century they looked 
around them and saw what Henry James, son of William, would later say 
of the period, that most men of law, medicine, journalism, science, 
public service, and industry were not college educated. Their mission 
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was to Change this, to place higher education in the mainstream of 
American life.^® 
There was also the pressure within the colleges to make more 
room for the growing sciences and incipient social sciences, modern 
languages, etc. The culture of professionalism was demanding the 
means for fair competition. As Rudolph notes: "Everywhere more 
attention was being paid to various sectioning, grading, and marking 
schemes as instruments of scholarly stimulation."^^ The conditions 
were finally ripe for the implementation of the liberal vision of 
higher education. In the process the idea of liberal education would 
be redefined, and since Harvard led in this redefinition, let us take 
a good look at what was happening there and at Charles Eliot, the 
foremost of the captains. 
Eliot's presidency (1869-1909) spanned the emergence of the 
American university and he is generally considered the most commanding 
figure in higher education in the last half of the 19th century. 
Laurence Veysey has called him a "true liberal of his century," and 
the elective principle that he championed has been called by Rudolph 
"the academic application of 19th century liberalism."^^ 
He began his career as a conscientious but unpopular teacher of 
chemistry at Harvard who showed little promise as a scholar, and he 
left after losing a bid for a professorship. However, he had shown 
considerable ability in all matters of administration, from devising 
written examinations to overseeing construction of a new building, and 
he left that impression as well.^^ In addition, Eliot had a vision of 
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the "New Education" which matched that of those who believed that 
Harvard must expand with the country. As outlined in two articles in 
the Atlantic Monthly in 1868, Eliot argued for a greater use of 
electives to match student needs, more reasonable preparation for 
practical pursuits, and the need for advanced study beyond 
graduation,^^ 
Eliot's vision fit well with the course set by the previous 
president, Thomas Hill, and many associated with Harvard wanted an 
expansion and acceleration of what Hill had begun. Hill had expanded 
electives in 1865 and 1867 , advocated the establishment of graduate 
education, and spoke of liberal education not solely in terms of the 
classics, but as creating an understanding of history, political 
economy, and philosophy. 
Those who favored Hill's reforms talked of foreign universities 
as models, practical studies, and "a liberal enlargement of the list 
of elective studies." Opponents were those who felt that a classical 
education was the most important distinction between the college man 
and the common man and anything diminishing it would lead to anarchy. 
These men also relished the bonds formed between classmates and 
generations of students who largely shared a common learning. But the 
battle lines were not always clear-cut. There were differences among 
those who favored change, such as that between the scientists who 
disdained the talk "of a practical education" and those who saw 
science in terms of its practicality. Another schism was between the 
classicists and those who, while favoring literature over the 
sciences, wished to expand the idea of liberal education to include 
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the modern languages and literatures. The attractiveness of Eliot's 
vision was that there seemed room for everybody; everyone's fear was 
that there was too much room for everyone else. After quite a bit of 
controversy, Eliot was selected president by the board of overseers. 
Eliot wished to make Harvard into a university, of which there 
were none in this country in 1860 to his mind, though many, including 
Harvard, used the title. Like Ticknor, Eliot had visited Germany and 
France and was impressed by the range and variety of subjects offered 
to students for their choice, and he wished to provide the same at 
Harvard. He also firmly believed that a young man could choose his 
own course of study better than anyone else could for him, and that 
all non-vocational courses had equal value as long as they were well 
taught and studied. All of these beliefs pointed to the use of the 
elective principle which Eliot made famous and to some infamous. 
With the elective principle Eliot was able to free the hold of 
the classical subjects on the curriculum and to make room for the new 
fields of knowledge--modern literatures, sciences, history, and 
political economy. He was also able to attract donations for 
professorships in these subjects, and teacher to teach them. For 
example. Harvard's first professorships in history and political 
economy were endowed in 1869 and 1876 respectively. With the 
development of more specified student interests and departments, Eliot 
could also build a graduate school which was begun in 1873. This last 
was against much resistance from the faculty but Eliot encountered 
resistance on most of his proposals from those who did not want the 
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familiar patterns to change. Over his forty-year tenure Eliot's 
patience and perseverance won out. He either wore down, out-argued 
or in the end, outlasted his opponents. During his administration the 
number of faculty members increased from 60 to 600 and the 
institution's endowment increased from slightly more than two million 
to twenty million dollars.^^ 
Eliot continuously wrung faculty concessions for electives, 
until by 1894 only freshmen had a required course, and that was one 
year of rhetoric. Eliot's Harvard would also do away with compulsory 
chapel and even temporarily abandon attendance regulations. Eliot's 
foremost theme was student liberty, and he followed this principle 
even when it forced him to tolerate things he did not like, such as 
the undergraduate clubs which were snobbish and used sadistic 
initiation practices.^^ 
Yet Eliot was still a Puritan as well. At the center of his 
educational thought was the same emphasis on moral character building 
that was found in more conservative presidents, like Noah Porter at 
Yale and James McCosh at Princeton. What made him liberal was that he 
believed the exercise of liberty built character more effectively than 
external discipline. As he addressed the Harvard freshmen in 1906: 
Do you want to be automata?...The will is the prime 
motive oower, and you can only train your wills in 
freedom.^' 
In arguing for this student freedom, however, Eliot assumed a genteel, 
moral context established by the examples set by the faculty. Eliot 
placed a great emphasis on the selection of his faculty, and he looked 
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for men who took an active interest in public affairs, but did so in a 
gentlemanly fashion (he is even known to have vetoed at least one 
candidate because his wife was considered ill-bred). True to the 
liberal belief in the marketplace of ideas, Eliot often hired men 
whose views were contrary to his own, as long as he believed they 
provided a good moral influence for the students. With the liberal's 
vision of progress, Eliot saw the university "as the paradigm for the 
eventual world...teaching diverse kinds of men to express their 
differences in an atmosphere of self-control."^® In this the 
professor as exemplar of manners and morals was key, and while he 
liked his professors to be both reasonable and restrained he also 
sought a strain of rugged individualism. 
Eliot, the liberal Puritan, thought his students could build 
their characters in an atmosphere of freedom, and he hoped the process 
would teach them self-control. As Mori son notes, "what he wished to 
do in higher education was to apply in that field the shift in control 
that Jefferson wished to apply to government, and Emerson in society 
as a whole--the shift from external compulsion and discipline to 
internal compulstion and discipline." He had none of Rousseau's 
romanticism concerning human nature that would characterize later 
liberals, and he expected that many students would misuse his elective 
system. He wasn't concerned about those educational misfits: He 
intended liberty primarily for the strong and able who knew what they 
h59 
wanted and were willing to work for it. 
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He could speak as a democrat: "In a democracy the interests of 
the greater number will ultimately prevail, as they should," yet one 
has the sense that the "as they should" is largely a concession to the 
inevitable, what Veysey calls "the patrician's intelligent adjustment 
to a new threat from 'below'." His democracy was actually that of 
liberal individualism, democratic only to the extent that he allowed a 
wider variety of people to compete, both students and professors. As 
E. K. Rand describes the Eliot period: "His remedy was to upset the 
hierarchy of the Arts and to put all academic subjects on a democratic 
level. Free field and no favor. Let the best art win. Liberte, 
egalite fraternite?"^^ 
How did Eliot's vision effect the practice and concept of 
liberal education? According to Rand, who studied at Harvard during 
the Eliot years: "Those of us who were in college in those days had 
no doubt that we were enjoying a liberal education. We were free to 
wander in whatever field invited." Rand's observations are 
particularly noteworthy because he would become a renowned classicist. 
Eliot opened up the possibility for him to further develop his 
knowledge of the classics, just as for another student it might be 
chemistry or history. And Eliot encouraged his student's freedom by 
taking steps to improve teaching and give good teaching greater 
credit. Prior to Eliot students did not know who would teach a given 
course until the course began. Under Eliot, they not only knew who 
would teach the course but were encouraged by their president to 
choose the professor, not the course. 
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With the elective principle. Eliot abandoned the "scale of 
merit" in which students received only half as many merits for taking 
elective courses as required ones and which deducted merit points for 
poor conduct. In 1871, it was decided that "every instructor may 
assign his marks in such a manner as he shall judge most equitable and 
effective." And most importantly, a similar latitude was allowed in 
teaching methods, though since Eliot strongly disapproved of daily 
recitation, it had largely disappeared by 1880. Lectures, discussion, 
and Socratic colloquies between teacher and student became the 
prevailing methods. In 1886, a commencement speaker put Eliot's 
contribution to teaching in perspective: 
Formerly, the only business of a teacher was to 
hear recitations, and make marks for merit. Now, 
he has the opportunity of teaching. This is one of 
the greatest educational discoveries of modern 
times—that the business of a teacher is to teach. 
Thus Eliot opened up the possibilities of a liberal education more in 
keeping with the Greek spirit, and the ideal of "liberal culture" 
found a home at Harvard. 
Eliot opened up Harvard to the possibilities of liberal culture, 
but he also planted the seeds of its demise. In opening Harvard up to 
growth and freedom, Eliot had redefined the cultured gentleman as one 
skilled in a particular area, thereby redefining the nature of liberal 
education as well. While holding on to the term, Eliot "liberalized" 
it, freed it from its attachment to the classics and, in effect, 
demoted them to a place equal to all other subjects which were 
"liberally taught"—taught with the aim of culture or knowledge rather 
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than vocational preparation. He maintained the distinction between 
liberal and vocational studies, but only by broadening liberal studies 
beyond the recognition of conservatives and the advocates of "liberal 
culture." The situation was further confused by Eliot's tendency to 
speak for popular effect in terms of education for "utility" or 
"efficiency." Eliot considered a course useful if it built character, 
but surely others felt he was speaking of vocations and careers. Such 
confusion was perhaps deliberate, even manipulative; it was certainly 
fruitful 
If Rand and his friends could feel they were getting a liberal 
education it was because Eliot's Harvard was a combination of old and 
new. Until Eliot's last years the subjects required for admission 
were virtually unchanged and the classics still flourished in the 
pre-college education; there was a unifying bond resembling that of 
the old school. Also, Harvard was still small enough (about 1000 
undergraduates in 1887) and the literary tradition sufficiently 
ingrained that, given freedom, students were more inclined to study 
the new humanities--modern languages, history, etc.—than they were 
either the sciences or incipient social sciences. Rand recollects; 
"We felt that despite the diversity in the feast of learning that 
tempted us to different dishes, we were sitting at the same table. 
Old and new were in a delicate balance in Eliot's day and in 
committing Harvard to continuous growth Eliot was threatening the 
equilibrium. Outside changes threatened as well. The curriculum of 
the high schools began to emulate the colleges in permitting elective 
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courses, and when Eliot dropped Greek as an entrance requirement the 
effect was to further dilute the classical emphasis in the high 
schools. The commoh learning that bound Rand's class within Harvard's 
diversity was rapidly eroding. 
Meanwhile the graduate schools were coming into their own and 
Eliot's attention was dangerously divided. While Eliot's primary 
focus was upon the teaching of undergraduates, he also wanted to keep 
Harvard in the vanguard of the university movement. At Johns Hopkins 
Daniel Coit Gilman gave graduate studies clear priority, and Eliot had 
no choice but to accept the competition and further develop Harvard's 
programs. Eliot's vision of a new liberal education seemed lost in 
the process of growth, specialization, and individualism. 
At minimum, the idea of liberal education requires the presence 
of bonding elements, either a shared curriculum or a similar approach. 
During Eliot's presidency the bonding elements were all left over from 
tradition, and his own energies were directed towards organizing the 
university in the service of individualism, in opposition to 
tradition.^^ Such emphasis on the individual and his liberty weakened 
the old bonding elements and offered no new ones to replace them. 
With Eliot begins the idea that a liberal education is what each of us 
decides it is; liberal education is a private experience. Eliot's 
assumption that "authority curbs the will power of the individual" 
obscured the humanist's sense of authority, an authority that one 
submits freely to, "consents to undergo the ordeal of being fashioned, 
formed, shaped.Eliot's "individualistic persons" would become 
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isolated individuals incapable of revealing their individuality 
because individuality requires a cohesive community to judge this 
individuality. In 1942, E. K. Rand would nostalgically look back on 
his undergraduate days and complain: "Under President Eliot one might 
specialize; now one must." It was Eliot's liberal abolutism. his 
faith in individualism and science, and his rhetoric of utility that 
opened the door to the age of the specialist. 
Liberal Education in the Aftermath 
of the University Movement 
The years 1908-1910 witnessed much talk about reassessing the 
direction of higher education and much criticism of the intellectual 
chaos in the curriculum brought about by the rapid growth of the Eliot 
period. Even the university builders seemed to be having sudden 
changes of heart. President Lowell, Eliot's successor, spoke of the 
need for "an intellectual and social cohesion" in the university, 
placed restrictions on student electives, and built dormitories to 
give greater social cohesion. At Princeton, Woodrow Wilson introduced 
a preceptorial system to develop closer ties between students and 
teachers and attempted to build a residential graduate school, which 
even then must have seemed like a quaint idea. There were other 
efforts to revitalize liberal education as well; central to them all 
was the idea of "liberal culture. 
The elective principle and the secularization of higher 
education opened the way for a version of liberal education more in 
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keeping with the Greek spirit than that of Puritan discipline and 
piety. The redefined aim of this new version was often called 
liberal culture," and, though its proponents tended to be sympathetic 
to mental discipline, they also emphasized the importance of 
maintaining our Western culture heritage, indeed even made a religion 
out of the idea of culture as developed by Matthew Arnold, who was 
often quoted. These advocates tended to emphasize the literary 
tradition and they were usually found in departments of English and 
other modern languages. They wrote a great deal about the course of 
higher education and "preached the same gospel of civilization" as did 
the editors of the nation's leading monthly magazines and the 
organizers of the fine arts in the major cities. As a result they 
were able to focus a considerable amount of attention on curricular 
issues.^® 
The amount of attention given to the ideal of "liberal culture" 
is not necessarily a true indication of its importance. Its advocates 
had a cause and pushed it, but those in the educational center, the 
utilitarians and researchers, were doing quite well with the way 
things were going, and were not even sufficiently threatened by such 
talk as to respond seriously. Thus, began the somewhat schizophrenic 
discussion of liberal education in this century, in which the ideal 
has been given much attention precisely because it has so little 
effected the course of higher education. To paraphrase a comment by 
Lionel Trilling, the more we hear talk about a tradition the more 
certain we can be that it is dead. A primary reason we have become 
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confused about the ideal of liberal education is that it has found 
little in the way of implementation, other than in a few classrooms, 
or an experimental program or college here or there. Higher 
educational philosophy has meant nothing compared to the guiding light 
of science and the "unspoken assumption that institutional rather than 
intellectual factors determine the central course of educational 
development." 
The traditional humanist faced many problems trying to revive 
the idea of liberal education. First, the new universities were 
organized in accordance with individual pursuits rather than shared 
learning. Secondly, the equal status of areas of knowledge, which was 
Eliot's original idea, turned into a reversal of the old order with 
the sciences on top. And thirdly, those who wised to maintain or 
revitalize the ideal of liberal education were divided among 
themselves about what it should be, and divided by their own 
individual interests. In this section I will elaborate upon each of 
these points, showing that part of the reason we have lost a sense of 
the ideal of liberal education is that almost nothing within the 
colleges and universities perpetuates it. 
The new universities became as tied to the scientific method and 
the ideal of research as the old colleges had been to the classics. 
Coupled with liberal individualism the ideal of advanced research in 
pursuit of the truth established an organization geared for 
specialization. The prominence science attained by the early 20th 
century and the tendency of scientists to claim "possession of the 
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only truth” gave rise to an ideal of research and a scientism that 
undermined the traditional ideal of liberal education in several ways. 
The model for research in science and other fields was found in 
the German university, which, since the beginning of the century, had 
stood for true scholarship. By the end of the century some 10,000 
Americans had studied in Germany, and these German trained 
professionals came to dominate American colleges with their ideal of 
painstaking investigation. That the Americans either misunderstood 
the German method, or simply Americanized it, now seems clear, for 
underlying the German method was a sense of underlying spiritual 
unity, shared by scientists and philosophers, that did not survive the 
transplant to American soil. Veysey speculates that Americans 
combined a British philosophical empiricism with the German attention 
to particulars and made the practice of research into an "all- 
encompassing ideal. 
The ideal of research and specialization pointed to the graduate 
school. By the 1890's, graduate schools developed an autonomous 
existence at a number of American campuses, most notably Harvard, 
Columbia, Chicago, and Wisconsin. The undergraduate curriculum became 
preparation for the graduate, and this too undermined attempts at a 
shared liberal or general education. The esteem given graduate 
education reached a peak early this century when the board of trustees 
at Columbia University seriously considered disbanding the 
undergraduate college, considered worthless as compared to the new 
graduate school 
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Research became practically the only basis for the prestige of 
individual professors, departments, and universities. Although 
lengthy I quote the following from Edward Shils for I think it well 
illuminates the result of the emphasis upon research. 
The effort to be among the best institutions or 
departments was spurred by the growing prominence 
of research. As long as universities and colleges 
confined themselves to teaching, to the formation 
of character and the "molding of men," they were 
visible only locally and to those who had direct 
contact with them. Few easily and widely 
recognized marks of accomplishment resulted from 
such pedagogical activities. However, achievements 
in research were discernible not so much by the 
general public as by the public consisting of other 
workers in the same or related fields. Colleagues 
at other universities were more effectively present 
in the minds of those academics who did research 
than was the case with those whose affections were 
given in the first instance to teaching. The 
audience of the latter was the student body, 
locally circumscribed; the audience for the former 
was national and international.'^ 
In this situation teaching, of course, is of little value. Against 
this background the efforts to revive the tradition of liberal 
education seemed little more than curious anomalies. 
Real headway in reviving the tradition of liberal education 
against the tendencies of the university would have required 
considerable agreement among its advocates, which was hardly the case. 
The defenders of liberal education were fundamentally divided among 
themselves about what a liberal education should be. Over the last 
century "liberal education" and "the humanities" have become 
synonymous, at least to those with a sense of the tradition. However, 
as Laurence Veysey has revealed, the term humanities fundamentally 
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Changed its meaning between 1870 and 1940, when the term became a 
rallying cry for an intensive interdisciplinary campaign to resurrect 
once again a flagging ideal. This change in meaning provides a sense 
of the schisms among the humanists. 
The new subjects introduced under the elective principle (modern 
languages, history, philosophy, art and music) competed with the 
classics for inclusion under the title "humanities." Advocates of 
these new disciplines allied with the classicists as representatives 
of the heritage of higher civilization, though the classists did not 
exactly welcome them. Classicists such as Paul Shorey and Andrew F. 
West died in the 1920s still insisting that the "humanities" should 
only refer to Greek and Latin language training. What is striking to 
Yeysey, is the tendency of the new claimants to the label of 
humanities to assert that their own particular study is one of the 
humanities without developing a broader conception of the term. 
Sometimes, humanists implied that the humanities comprised all those 
subjects that were nonscientific, but humanists were split between 
those who emphasized an education in culture and those who were 
believers in the German ideal of advanced research applied to their 
own fields.And the humanists exercised their own individualism 
along with everyone else. 
Such was the rather confused situation before 1940. It seems to 
have taken the self-conscious arrival of the social sciences to make 
the humanities a concrete grouping of academic disciplines. Whatever 
we might think of the advocates of science within the humanities. 
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scientism had a "shred of the capacity to unify learned men in 
intellectual terms. Those who reject the dominant scientific 
conception of the pursuit of knowledge can only wander off in a score 
of mutually unrelated directions," as Dorothy Ross has described the 
situation.^^ Even though the scientist was often as critical as the 
traditional humanist of the claims to science of the social scientist, 
all advocates of the scientific method could at least agree what 
scientific thinking was: "It abstracts what is measurable from finite 
things in the interest of formulating precise and entirely unambiguous 
concepts about them."^^ Despite antagonisms between pure and applied 
scientists and between scientists and social scientists, there was a 
unity of approach to scholarship itself that gave this perspective a 
strength that the traditional humanists did not have. 
The humanists were fragmented between the classicists and the 
advocates of a more inclusive sense of liberal education. As the 
position of the classics declined there was no unity of approach among 
humanists to compensate for the divisiveness of the departmental 
structure. The historian John Higham points out, "we have no single 
humanistic strategy. Perhaps the most that can be said is that 
humanistic approaches predominate in all efforts to preserve and 
appreciate the complexity of experience.Divided among themselves, 
pursuing their own careers, trying to protect themselves from the 
growing scientism, advocating a shared learning in an educational 
structure that militated against it, the humanists stood on weak 
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ground, which weakened further as the influence of John Dewey grew 
Stronger. 
John Dewey and Liberal Education 
The ends he sought were public, not private. Truth 
was, to him, not merely what worked for the 
individual but what worked for the group, and it 
was achieved by cooperative action. Morality was 
social not individual.'' 
Henry Steele Commager 
John Dewey's new liberalism was based on pragmatism, relativism, 
and empiricism. The traditionalists were trying to piece together 
some of the old and some of the new in a vision of liberal education, 
but Dewey wanted to change the pieces entirely. To him liberal 
education was that which would foster his vision of a progressive, 
liberal society. In other words, it was progressive education. 
Dewey's new liberalism switched the emphasis from the individual 
to society. All those things that in the previous century were 
thought of in terms of individuals, e.g., philosophy, education, 
morality, freedom, were now all social questions. Freedom, for 
example, was not a matter of individual struggle, as it had been for 
Charles Eliot or even William James, but a matter of the "social 
medium" in which one found oneself; one's own degree of liberation 
depended largely upon the liberating nature of the environment. 
Dewey's new liberalism was to have profound results. I will 
begin by describing Dewey's vision of the new liberalism and how he 
tied liberal education to it. I will then describe how Dewey's vision 
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eventually came to predominate. As further indication of Dewey’s 
influence I will describe the progressive/traditionalist split within 
the movement for general education, which eventually led to Dewey's 
denouncing the traditionalists as "reactionaries" in 1944 and forcing 
them to defend their own liberalism, I will conclude this section by 
outlining the general nature of developments in higher education from 
1945 to the present that have led to our confusing Dewey's vision of 
liberal education with that of the traditionalists. 
Ih Liberalism and Social Action Dewey evaluates the old 
liberalism and gives his sense of the new. He applauds the emphasis 
on individual liberty and "the central role of free intelligence in 
inquiry, discussion and expression" of the earlier liberalism, but he 
is critical of the fact that this sense of liberty was tied to 
individual economic self-interest. He felt freedom to indulge 
economic self-interest should have been viewed as merely the means for 
the eventual "satisfaction of the needs of man in non-economic 
directions," and not as an end in itself. As an end in itself, 
economic self-interest accentuated materialism and individualism to a 
degree that he considered anti-social 
He complained that the early liberals failed to realize that 
"effective," as opposed to "legal," liberty is a function of the 
social conditions existing at any given time. Thus, the primary 
social quest at any given time is to find "that form of social 
organization, extending to all areas and ways of living, in which the 
powers of individuals shall not be merely released from mechanical 
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external constraint but shall be fed, sustained and directed." He 
gives us a sense of what this means when he suggests that intelligence 
IS not "an individualistic possession, at best enlarged by public 
discussions; it is primarily a social phenomenon."79 
A liberal or liberating education in Dewey's sense has a two¬ 
fold meaning. First, the classroom or school is itself a "social 
medium that is liberating, sustaining human growth. Second, a 
liberating education will provide skills and attitudes that will 
direct students to make society a liberating "social medium" as well. 
As Dewey states in Democracy and Education, education should give 
"individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, 
and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing 
disorder."®^ The classroom then is the micro-liberating environment, 
which, through the cooperative, socially minded individuals it 
produces, gradually makes the wider environment more liberating as 
well. These liberated individuals would believe in social liberalism 
and want to put "the mechanism of abundance at the free disposal of 
individuals" rather than allow it to serve a small elite class. They 
would also be schooled in the scientific attitude of mind, for Dewey 
spoke often of the great aid science had been in the development of 
industry and suggested it could be equally useful if applied to social 
and political problems. 
Our contemporary tendency to relate liberal education to problem 
solving, to innovation, and to the non-authorian teacher stems from 
Dewey's influence. In his vision the student is as a potential agent 
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of social change, given experience In cooperative action, directed 
towards an Interest In social relationships and control, and equipped 
with a scientific attitude of mind to be applied to the problems of 
society. The teacher is non-authoritarian because of the tendency of 
conservative Puritan teachers to abuse their authority. The teacher 
is instead what some now call a "facilitator" of this problem solving, 
helping the students solve the problems of their iimediate environment 
and gradually turning their attention to the problems of the wider 
environment. Thinking is a matter of problem solving and practical 
intelligence, rather than an intellect to be cultivated. Since this 
problem solving is tied to "experimental observation," students are 
generally learning to be social scientists, and experiments in 
education, as in any aspect of social life, are much valued. This 
perspective underlies much of the discussion on liberal or general 
education that takes place today. 
Dewey's influence upon the concept of liberal education at the 
college level was gradual and developed indirectly, since his own work 
dealt mostly with primary education. Although he wrote comparatively 
little about higher education, his position as America's most 
influential philosopher and educator gave a disproportionate weight to 
that which he did write. In The Educational Situation (1902) he 
argued for the elimination of the tradition-bound college as an 
independent entity. Such colleges maintained an elitist mentality, 
did not deal with the centrality of vocation in human life, and were 
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preoccupied with the past. As he would later write in Democracy and 
Education. 
The mistake in making the records and the remains 
of the past the material of education is that it 
cuts the vital connection of present and past, and 
tends to make the past a rival of the present and 
the ore sent a more or less futile imitation of the 
past.®^ 
Altogether, Dewey challenged the traditional concept of liberal 
education for not being consonant with contemporary "social facts." 
He wrote, "Liberal education must be consonant with realistic science 
and with machine industry, instead of a refuge from them." To those 
who argued that the traditional colleges were sanctuaries of culture, 
Dewey responded that culture was meaningless if it could not operate 
"in the conditions of modern life, of daily life, of political and 
industrial life."®^ While traditional humanists were seeking ways to 
find sanctuaries for culture, fearing that the idea itself was 
becoming lost in the expanding universities aimed at research and 
utility, Dewey was demanding that it either exist in the mainstream of 
American life or not at all. 
More important than his attacks on higher education, however, 
was the influence that he and the progressive education movement had 
upon pre-college education. Between 1900 and 1940 the percentage of 
the age group attending high school rose enormously, from 10 percent 
to 60 percent. A large number of these students were first or second 
generation immigrants or Blacks who previously had been denied the 
possibility of secondary education. This population demanded a useful 
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education, and so the scene was set for progressive influence. 
According to A. Whitney Griswold this influence of "instrumentalism as 
Dewey and his followers applied it to our schools" created "an 
enormous new secondary school population, most of which was entirely 
innocent of the liberal arts and their purposes."®^ The ideal of 
liberal education in the traditional sense became somewhat esoteric, 
and few had the preparation to pursue it ever if they happened to be 
aware of it. 
Also, schools of education, most notably Teachers College at 
Columbia, were producing theorists who applied progressive theory to 
the idea of liberal education. Traditional humanists, such as Norman 
Foerster, found themselves vying for the term "liberal education" with 
what he called "disciples" of John Dewey. In an article published in 
1939 in an educational yearbook devoted to the concept of liberal 
education, Foerster accused these "disciples" of transforming the 
traditional concept of liberal education beyond recognition but his 
complaints had little effect.Even his own Dean, a recently 
graduated Ed.D., "called for ending most required courses and for 
liberalizing the program to fit individual needs.A "liberal 
education" tied to the new liberalism was gaining ground. 
Through Dewey's direct attacks on the traditional idea of 
liberal education, through the influence of the progressive education 
movement in shaping the nature of pre-college education, and through 
his "disciples" who applied his theory to higher education, liberal 
education became an education in the new liberalism. C. Wright Mills 
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once Observed that Dewey did not write for popular audiences as much 
as for “the new professional academics who became leaders in the 
social sciences who in turn became policy advisors and interpreters 
for men of power in both the political and corporate worlds."86 It is 
the influence exerted by these academics combined with progressive 
liberal politics that peaked in the "Great Society" of Lyndon Johnson 
which have largely shaped our contemporary meaning of the word 
"liberal." 
There is a fundamental and unbreachable gap between the liberal 
ideology and the traditional humanist perspective. The liberals 
believe in progress and assume that in education lies "the fundamental 
method of social progress and reform." The general humanist position 
has been that to develop thoughtful, cultured individuals is 
tremendously difficult in itself. Humanists do not feel that 
education can guarantee social progress and reform, and fear that the 
more education is aimed in that direction, the less it is education 
and the more it is indoctrination. 
General Education 
The general education movement in this century has been an 
attempt to find a modern equivalent to the curricular unity once 
provided by the old liberal arts curriculum. Curiously, both 
advocates of liberal and liberalism education have used the term 
"general education," though they mean quite different things by it. 
The progressive had little use for the traditional concept of liberal 
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education and they used the term "general education" to describe their 
alternative, the one which, in fact has dominated. However, the 
traditionalists also spoke in terms of general education, for it was, 
so to speak, the only game in town. They did not want to forsake the 
traditionalist perspective, but they did want to be influential 
participants in the search for the modern equivalent to liberal 
education which had developed connotations of elitism and 
i mpracti cal i ty. In this section I will briefly outline the general 
education movement, distinguishing between the efforts of 
traditionalists and progressives within it, and also show how the 
traditional sense of general education was relegated to obscurity when 
Dewey pronounced it was "illiberal" in 1944. 
As the story is generally told, Dewey initiated the movement 
with a call, in 1902, for a new "philosophy of unity" to organize the 
curricular chaos that had resulted from the rise of the universities. 
Rather than glorifying the elective principle, as Eliot had, Dewey saw 
it as unfortunate, arguing that students needed to be given "a survey, 
at least, of the universe in its manifold phases," from which stems 
the survey course.®^ Alexander Meiklejohn was the most notable 
of those who initially applied this idea to higher education, 
introducing a survey course in "social and economic institutions" 
first at Brown in 1910, and later in 1914 at Amherst. In the 1920s he 
also organized and directed the experimental college at Wisconsin, a 
two year program divided between a study of the ancient world in the 
first year and modern America in the second. 
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Meiklejohn's position towards general education has often been 
identified with Dewey's since Meiklejohn also spoke of education for 
democracy. Actually he was critical of the simplistic relationship 
that Dewey as "social reformer" drew between education and democracy. 
As he wrote in 1939: 
Dewey is both social reformer and philosophical 
thinker. He has devised both slogans and ideas... 
Leading men by means of slogans is not the same as 
leading them into the use of ideas. 
Meiklejohn's position is roughly located between the traditionalists 
and the progressives and was an attempt to synthesize elements of 
each, as the experiment at Wisconsin suggests. I bother to point this 
out because the misunderstandings that have evolved about Meiklejohn's 
views show how difficult it to maintain clarity in the midst of these 
ideas. 
The traditionalists rejected Dewey's contention that the unity 
of general education should be based on the principles of science with 
a corresponding emphasis on the social sciences, and, instead, 
believed that a study of the preeminent works of the past, chiefly 
those of the humanities, was the best way to develop the "whole man," 
and in turn was the best direction that the undergraduate curriculum 
could take. The progressive emphasis, on the other hand, was towards 
the study of modern society and the social sciences, "keeping higher 
education closely attuned to current affairs, for it was there that 
problems arose and in that context that solutions had to be tested."®^ 
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The movement for a general education gained momentum after the 
First World War, with Columbia University leading the way. The 
progressive position was manifested in the Contemporary Civilization 
course which was the center piece of Columbia's general education and 
acknowledged the "direct responsibility of the College to the stated 
democratic needs of society."^0 The traditionalist alternative first 
appeared in the "great books" course initiated by John Erskine, which 
was the model for the program Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler 
advocated for Chicago, and later the St. John's curriculum, and the 
Great Books Program. 
Many of the prominent defenders of the traditional sense of 
liberal education were involved in Erskine's course or its subsequent 
facsimiles, as Mortimer Adler tells us in his autobiography. Adler 
and Mark Van Doren were section leaders of the course and Lionel 
Trilling and Jacques Barzun were among their students. Gilbert Highet 
also taught the course, and Barzun and Meiklejohn were later on the 
board of advisers of the Great Books Program, which involved the 
publication of sets of these books along with instructions on how to 
set up seminars for their discussion. It might also be added that 
Scott Buchanon, who along with Stringfellow Barr founded St. John's, 
had also participated in a senior seminar with Meikeljohn at Amherst 
and was a long time friend of Adler's, as was Robert Hutchins. Thus 
the most prominent defenders of a traditional liberal education were 
to a great extent a coterie of friends, which suggests how narrow was 
their general base of support. 
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The traditionalist position as advocated by Hutchins and Adler 
received the greatest national attention in the 1930s. The platform 
that Hutchins' presidency gave him combined with his own charisma made 
him a very prominent spokesman for the traditionalist position. 
However, his real influence upon the nature of general education at 
Chicago was actually quite limited according to Adler and neither of 
them considered their efforts successful. Chicago was at least as 
much of a stronghold of progressive thought as Columbia. Dewey had 
been at Chicago as a professor and had been a member of the "Chicago 
School" of philosophy, led by George Herbert Mead. The empiricism, 
pragmatism, and relativism of these philosophers formed the main 
tradition of the university since the beginning of the century. 
Therefore, when we look closely at the situation it is rather ironic 
that Chicago should be identified with the great books program and the 
traditionalist position. Though Hutchins was able to garner 
considerable publicity for the traditionalist position, the great 
books seminars were but a small part of the general education 
experiments at Chicago, and not a particularly welcome part at that. 
The attention the traditionalists were able to gain is 
misleading in terms of its actual influence on higher education. It 
is my sense that the traditionalist position was always advocated by 
only a small minority, who had to struggle even to be considered. 
They were only able to gain the attention that they did by their 
literary talents, the quality of their thought, and the particular 
weight that Hutchins gave their arguments as the outspoken president 
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of a prestigious university. And the publicity that Hutchins was able 
to gain for the traditionalists was a mixed blessing; it aroused the 
ire of John Dewey who would eventually attack Hutchins and the 
traditionalists. 
Though Hutchins was the most prominent advocate of an education 
that emphasized the great books, his position and that of Adler's was 
not really representative. They placed an emphasis on the 
^^^sTotelian tradition that the others did not, which is why they tend 
to be labelled rationalists rather than humanists. The authority that 
Hutchins and Adler gave to the Aristotelian tradition made the most 
prominent defender of the great books also, the biggest target of 
attack by the progressives, for Hutchins' arguments not only went 
against the grain of their general education but against their 
liberalism as wel 1. 
Publication of Hutchins' Higher Learning in America aroused the 
wrath of many progressives. His basic argument was that higher 
education needed a philosophy of unity, but not one based on science. 
Instead he proposed the development of a metaphysics based upon the 
philosophical truths of Aristotle and Aquinas about the nature of man, 
the nature of truth, and the nature of value. In the minds of many, 
Hutchins' argument was captured by his oft-quoted syllogism: 
"Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowledge 
is truth. The truth is everywhere the same. Hence education should 
iiQ? be everywhere the same. 
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Nothing could have been more contrary to Dewey's theory of 
education and society, and he attacked Hutchins' position in two 
articles published in 1937. He attacked Hutchins for his 
authoritarianism," his "contempt for science," and his appeal to 
fixed and eternal truths." Hutchins in turn responded with a sharply 
worded reply, to which Dewey responded in a similar tone.^^ 
Over the next few years the controversy continued, with Adler 
attacking the progressives for their "false liberalism" in an article 
published in 1939 titled "Liberalism and Liberal Education." This 
article is noteworthy for it is one of the few works that directly 
addresses the link between liberalism and liberal education, but in 
broadening the question to one of politics rather than education, 
Adler would provoke Dewey to do the same. 
In 1944, Dewey published an article in Fortune magazine that 
seems to me the coup de grace to the traditionalist position. He 
titled the article "The Challenge to Liberal Thought" and portrayed 
Hutchins and those of like mind as "reactionaries," suggesting that 
they were holding on to distinctions left over from an aristocratic 
framework no longer valid in a democracy. He argued that the 
traditional dualism of the "liberal" and the "mechanical" studies was 
no longer valid, because most Americans were involved with "industry 
and useful commodities and services," and that technological progress 
epitomized "rational insight or science," that which liberal education 
is supposed to cultivate. He developed his argument further in two 
additional sections of the article. In the first, he argued that we 
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should be liberalizing our technical and vocational education by 
making all workers "aware of the scientific basis of the industrial 
processes." He then argued that his opponents, while seeming to 
reflect the spirit of ancient Greece, actually reflect the spirit of 
the middle ages during which the authority of books replaced what 
Dewey called "the Greek view of knowledge as a product of intelligence 
exercised at first hand," Thus, not only did opponents seem elitist 
and behind the times, they did not even represent the Greek spirit.^^ 
He concluded the article by describing the traditionalists as 
"reactionaries," generally of literary backgrounds with little 
appreciation of science, proponents of a "philosophy of fixation," 
mistakenly believing that "linguistic skills and materials" should be 
at the center of education, and that "an adequate education...can be 
obtained by a miscellaneous assortment of a hundred books, more or 
less..." Finally, he summed up the issue as follows: 
At bottom the issue is drawn between dogmas (so 
rigid that they ultimately appeal to force) and 
recourse to intelligent observation guided by the 
best wisdom already in our possession, which is the 
heart of the scientific method. 
And as if Dewey had not buried his opponents deeply enough, he implied 
a link between their thinking and totalitarian Germany. It was 
Germany that had been the home of the practices and the philosophy 
based on strict separation between sciences as technical therefore 
everchanging, and morals based upon fixed and unchanging principles. 
What seems obvious here is that Dewey is exemplifying the 
dogmatism he attacks, and, despite his emphasis on observation, I do 
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not think he ever bothered to observe the actual life of St. John's 
College, the most notable actualization of the thought of the 
traditionalists whom he attacks. Six months after Dewey's article 
appeared. Fortune published a rejoinder by Alexander Meiklejohn. 
Among other things Meiklejohn pointed out that approximately half the 
classroom hours were devoted to a study of the sciences, which was 
more education in science than most students received. He also 
stressed that what they strove to do at St. John's was to "develop the 
processes of critical intelligence," and not to develop an allegiance 
to the authority of the past. Finally, he pleaded with Dewey not to 
characterize those who opposed his views as "illiberal"; though they 
disagreed with Dewey's assessment of science and the relationship of 
fact to value, they were themselves liberals in the best sense of the 
word.^^ 
Despite its validity, Meikeljohn's rejoinder had little effect. 
Nothing could stand up to Dewey's ability to tie together the 
prejudices of the liberal mind. He would be echoed by spokesmen for 
the progressive viewpoint for years to come. 
Denouement 
The traditionalist's position had lost much of its stature. 
Dewey's assumptions were accepted, frequently without much 
examination, by many influential academics, and, as a large number of 
students were graduating from high schools with little sense of the 
traditional liberal education, the old concept lost its 
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distinctiveness, blurred with the progressive's vision of liberal 
education, especially since the progressives seldom thought it 
necessary to distinguish between the two, after the Hutchins-Dewey 
exchanges. 
There were other contributing factors to the traditionalists' 
downfall, such as the even greater accentuation upon research provided 
by federal grants after the Second World War, money which has gone 
largely to the sciences and social sciences rather than the 
humanities.^® Also, since the Second World War the United States has 
become more closely tied to the rest of the world in its position as 
"leader of the free world." Thus, the progressives' tendency to think 
in terms of societal problem solving has been further accentuated and 
broadened to include the rest of the world, leading to the dismaying 
notion expressed by Harland Cleveland that we must come to understand 
how everything relates to everything on a global scale. And there was 
the political and social upheaval of the 1960s with its demand for 
educational relevancy that made the traditional position seem 
particularly archaic and staid in the face of the demand for immediate 
social and political action. 
Of course, all of these influences had cumulative effects, and 
it is impossible to give an exact date to the demise of the 
traditional position. Lionel Trilling asserted a decade ago that the 
traditional humanistic ideal was at the center of the general 
education movement through the thirties, forties, and fifties. This 
may be an overstatement of the strength of traditional humanism in the 
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general education movement, but it certainly suggests that there was 
still considerable life to it. at least at Columbia University.99 
However, as Trilling states "by the sixties, something had happened to 
reduce the zeal for such education as set store by its being general." 
When Daniel Bell produced his thorough study of general education in 
1964 there was hardly any interest in it at all. The demise seemed 
complete. 
To summarize: First there was and there remains the problem of 
the university structure which has not been congenial to any type of 
shared learning. Second, among advocates of a general education there 
has been a stronger inclination towards Dewey's position which in 
effect rejects that of the traditional humanists. Third, Mark Van 
Doren reported in 1940 that there was little general knowledge of the 
history of liberal education, and there is much less knowledge of it 
today. When "liberal education" is mentioned, people are either 
confused about it, or, even more likely, identify it with liberalism. 
Finally, in the most recent renewal of interest in the idea of general 
education beginning in the mid-seventies, the discussion has usually 
begun with Dewey's sense of liberal education as a premise, 
emphasizing either interdisciplinary efforts aimed at societal problem 
solving, or student freedom to choose the particular problems they are 
interested in. Many would still applaud the traditional humanist's 
aim of introducing students to the beauty of reason and virtue as 
expressed by the great minds and souls of the past, but such knowledge 
is no longer central to the educational endeavor. It is instead 
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merely one more educational commodity to consume, one more area of 
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CONCLUSION: HINTS FOR WOULD-BE HUMANISTS 
Roman humam'tas applied to mon who woro froe in 
every respect, for whom the question of freedom, of 
not being coerced, was the decisive one—even in 
philosophy, even in science, even in the arts. 
Hannah Arendt 
Having heard, and read, my criticism of liberalism's 
encroachment upon liberal education and liberalism's insidious effects 
upon the humanistic ideal, a friend suggested I conclude on a more 
positive note: How would I organize a conference for humanists on the 
future of the humanist ideal? It seemed a good idea, and I was 
pleased by its possibilities until, as suddenly as she had suggested 
it, she dismissed it as too improbable: "No.. .humanists don't go to 
conferences like that." "What do they do?" I asked. "They write 
letters to each other," she answered. 
Rather than imagine a conference, I continued to think about my 
friend's closing comment and gradually perceived a distinction between 
humanists and those of us who are interested in organizing efforts to 
protect the humanities and revive the humanistic ideal. In our 
efforts to organize, I suspect there are some elements of the liberal 
Puritan, and often we lose sight of the spirit of humanism that we are 
trying to protect. So, I would like to conclude with an open letter 




In contrast to the organizers, the humanists rarely talk about 
liberal education, but tend to go about their business of cultivating 
their own intellects and sharing this cultivation with others. While 
there are noteable exceptions, humanists don't usually write much 
about liberal education. Hannah Arendt, for example, wrote more books 
and articles than I can count, but only one essay about education. I 
think that humanists who exemplify the life of the mind and treat 
teaching as an art are reticent to talk about the intellectual virtues 
they cultivate, fearing a certain priggishness in talking about those 
things which are cared about for their own sake.^ These humanists are 
not drawn to conferences on education, because they don't believe that 
one can learn much there about the art of teaching, and they dread the 
endless talk of "new visions of educational purpose and possibility," 
which tells them nothing that they have not heard before. 
Akin to their reluctance to talk about education, humanists tend 
to resist organization, even if the purpose of the organizational 
efforts is to protect the humanities and themselves. Because of the 
absence of effective organization among humanists, the American 
Association for the Advancement of the Humanities was founded in 1977 
but disbanded a few years late due to lack of support from humanists 
themselves. 
The apathy of humanists towards such organizing efforts is often 
attributed to excessive individualism on their part or even their 
narrow preoccupation with their own specialized areas of study. This 
may be true for many, or even most, professors of the humanities--! 
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don't know-but there is also a quality of individuality possessed by 
the best humanists and I think we must distinguish such individuality 
from an excess of individualism. 
When organizers assert that "humanists especially should take a 
greater interest in teaching the humanities well" or suggest that 
people in foundations of education should band together with teacher- 
educators to cooperate in the planning of revitalized humanities," 
they are failing to grasp the nature and purpose of humanists.^ Such 
suggestions are an insult to true humanists, who regard teaching as a 
natural extension of the life of the mind and treat teaching as an 
art. The implication that educators can teach humanists to be better 
humanists is quite naturally offensive to them. Those who make such 
suggestions are implying that many professors in the humanities are 
not true humanists, which is surely true, but I think we are misguided 
if we think we can help them to be so through pedagogical aids and 
discussions of curriculum. We might be able to help some professors 
become more competent instructors, but this has little to do with 
reviving the humanist ideal. We are instead trying, in our own way, 
to patch-up the cracks in the humanist ideal resulting from the 
liberalization of higher education. Such efforts have little to do 
with making our universities more of a home for the cultivation of the 
intellect; they are merely a shoring up of the weakened position of 
humanities departments within our universities. 
Consider the possibility that our universities cannot provide a 
home for culture as they are presently structured. It is a real 
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likelihood and should temper a bit our eagerness for organizing. 
Jacques Barzun argues convincingly that our universities have made 
scholarship an end in itself rather than a servant of culture. 
Scholarship of this sort is diametrically opposed to culture, scholars 
being too encumbered with the "minutiae of analytic methodism" to 
cultivate minds; our concentration upon methods of analysis obstructs 
our view of a work of art, "rather than giving a jewel the setting it 
deserves." The kind of scholarship encouraged by today's 
universities probably does more to destroy than nurture culture. 
If we cannot teach professors of humanities to be humanists and 
the university cannot provide a home for culture, what, then, are we 
would-be humanists to do with our desire to revive the humanist ideal? 
Well, I think we need to think about that quite a bit. In the process 
we might consider Barzun's prediction that the best hope for the 
humanities lies in the forming of small enclaves, "lay monasteries," 
which will protect the tradition of the humanities from a world 
largely indifferent to it and nurture it for growth at some future 
time. At first this may seem a pessimistic prediction, but I suggest 
we think of it as a realistic appraisal of our present situation and 
use this acknowledgment of our present circumstances as the basis of 
inquiry which may lead to change. Such change is unlikely, however, 
if we continue along with our liberal Puritan sense of what we and 
others ought to do to save the humanities. What we ought to do is 
take pleasure in them, and listen to Barzun's reminder that we 
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cultivate our minds not because we should but because It Is 
pleasurable to do so. 
There may be more scholars who desire this pleasure than Barzun 
realizes. I suggest that we look around our own institutions and see 
If we can find people who wish to talk about these matters. My guess 
IS that there are a number of humanists and would-be humanists who 
feel largely isolated and alone in their departments; the first task 
would seem to be to find them, get to know them, and see what 
affinities they share with ourselves and with each other. What seems 
essential here is that we find a basis for conversation which draws 
people together, and I do not think the topic should be the 
improvement of the humanities. Any topic would work which would let 
people discover a "kinship in what pleases and displeases,"^ which 
leads them to want to see more of each other, to become colleagues, 
intellectual friends. Out of these friendships, efforts may or may 
not develop to participate in interdisciplinary efforts, or whatever, 
but the point is that these are the conditions out of which culture 
might begin to grow once again, even amidst the divisive forces of the 
university. We might even come to find sufficient affinity and desire 
for culture among enough academics that through our affinity groups we 
can begin to consider ways in which to make our institutions more 
conducive to the humanist ideal. If, on the other hand, we come to 
find that we cannot change our institutions much, we may look at such 
efforts as the beginnings of an underground network of individuals who 
cherish humane studies, the beginning of Barzun's "lay monasteries." 
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Minimal though it may seem, my suggestion does at least start on 
the right foot, and is markedly different in empnasis an attitude from 
the ways we usually go about the problem. First, it does not assume 
that those most desirous of realizing the humanist ideal are to be 
found in departments of humanities and does not confuse maintaining 
these departments with maintaining the ideal. Secondly, in making the 
enjoyment of the company of others the basis upon which to proceed, it 
sets a different tone for the enterprize than I detect in many of our 
efforts, one of participating in culture rather than trying to 
organize it. Third, it is based on the common insights that 
individuals share rather than some model for integrating various 
disciplines, and it makes conversation about what matters to us 
primarily an end in itself and only secondarily as possible ground out 
of which joint efforts may grow. Unfortunately, most efforts at 
organizing the revival of the humanities or the humanist ideal ignore 
these points and so fail; one cannot revive the humanities while 
ignoring their simplest and most basic tenets. 
This difference in approach may be contrasted with our 
liberalism which values diversity over unity, action over 
contemplation, and individual uniqueness over shared affinities. The 
liberal mind values clashes between diverse points of view, and values 
analysis over intuitive understanding, so it does not readily notice 
that the richness of conversation is based upon shared assumptions out 
of which particular differences are developed. Since our shared 
tradition has broken down and the house of intellect is furnished in a 
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hodge-podge of various methods, vocabularies, and values, our 
conversations founder upon fundamental differences in assumptions and 
the lack of common language. 
Advocates of the humanist ideal must be able to recognize those 
who speak from a liberal humanitarian viewpoint, so that we do not 
mistakenly see affinities that do not exist, and may know when 
fruitful conversation is possible and when it is not. Viewing 
education as the primary instrument of social change and for meeting 
the "needs" of individuals and society, the liberal simplifies 
everything to fit this schema, including the relationship between 
right reason and conduct. The liberal's multi-faceted vision can 
easily confuse us with self-righteous talk of "satisfying needs." 
These assumptions manifest themselves in different ways, as I have 
shown, one minute emphasizing what the citizen needs to know to be a 
good citizen, the next making of education a kind of psychotherapy, a 
few minutes later envisioning a particular kind of education for each 
collective group, another moment one tailored to each individual. 
Whatever value such efforts have, we must remember that they distract 
us from our priorities as humanists. With enough independence of mind 
we can distinguish ourselves from those who would carry us off along 
one of these liberal tangents or coerce us to meet their needs. 
Our own need is to maintain and develop the distinctions between 
humanist categories of thought and liberal ones, and to be wary of 
being induced to use the liberal slogans of the day. If we speak of a 
"connected vision" we need to make clear that it is a personal vision 
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based on a sense of taste which transcends a dichotomy between the 
subjective and objective world that underlies the view of the liberal 
social scientist. The virtues we are cohcerned with are individual 
virtues; the students are individual students. Visions of shaping 
society and solving social problems take us beyond what we are trying 
to do. And in what we are trying to do conversation is essential, for 
while our visions are personal they are worked through with others and 
reflect a relation with and often a debt to them. The issues which 
most concern us are those which we share as human beings; the 
commonality of our temporary and uncertain existence in this world 
outweighs our differences. Whatever our particular differences and 
our need to explore them, we keep in mind that ultimately we need to 
come to terms with each other as human beings, not as members of 
different races or sexes. 
And the one need and only need that humanism seeks to satisfy is 
the need to speculate meaningfully about our lives and our world. 
This thinking-for-its-own-sake may confer "useful" benefits, but we 
mistake the nature of this thought if we see it as essentially a means 
to other ends. If we are to speak of an education that "liberates," 
we need to make clear that it liberates us from the mundane and the 
tawdry through the enjoyment of "things beautiful," and it liberates 
us from being swayed by the unexamined opinions of others by 
developing minds "not easily imposed upon." Some humanists now speak 
of an education that "empowers" and I urge them to reconsider this 
term. I do not see how it illuminates anything in the traditional 
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humanist ideal; if it illuminates anything, it is our liberal Puritan 
desire to unite thought and action, on the firm, but misguided, 
liberal principle that thought is only valuable as the precursor to 
action. 
For the ancient Greeks, the "right word at the right moment" was 
itself a form of action, and they understood how the right word could 
initiate an unpredictable series of actions. Our conversations with 
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